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Abstract
This thesis is the first directly to study the entire limit order book
of a large market. Herein, I conduct a population study on the mi-
crostructure of the Eurodollar future market, to my knowledge this is
a) the first study of its type and b) the largest microstructure study
ever conducted. I will build a data-drive model that incorporates
information from the entire population of quotes updates and trans-
actions on this type of future market. This thesis aims to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the market microstructure on money
market derivatives and the impact of high-speed algorithmic trading
activity on the market characteristics and quality.
I apply a broad battery of market volatility and liquidity measure-
ments, and gauge the proportion of high frequency algorithmic traders
in the market. This thesis provides a standard asymmetric informa-
tion based theoretical model to predict the relation on the term struc-
ture of Eurodollar future contracts. The prediction is a non-linear re-
lation between the saturation of algorithmic traders (ATs) versus the
impacts on the quality of the market. Therefore, I develop a novel
semi-parametric estimator and model the non-linear relation between
the impact of the fraction of algorithmic trading and a large set of
different market quality indicators including volatility, liquidity and
price informativeness. Finally, I consider the efficiency and the speed
of high-frequency prices formation by implementing the return auto-
correlations and vector autoregression, and also make a contribution
to the trade classification algorithm using the order book data.
My findings are fourfold. First, the impact of high frequency trading
(HFT) on market quality is a non-linear by implementing the semi-
parametric model. This may partially explain why prior studies have
found contradictory results regarding the impact of high frequency
traders (HFTs) on market characteristics. Second, prior studies only
including the inside quotes or best bid best ask are limited to reflect
all the information in the market. My findings suggest that the sec-
ond level quoting in the limit order book is by far the most rapidly
quoted element of the order book. Furthermore, I find that wavelet
variance covariance of the bid and the ask side changes substantially
over the term structure; providing further supporting evidence of the
non-linear impact of HFTs. Finally, the adjustment time of the trade
prices formation process is within one second, and the quote prices
are even faster within 200 milliseconds (ms). The mid-quoted return
autocorrelation is positive and gradually increase from the shortest
time interval to the longest time interval. The trade prices are less
sensitive to new information as the contract approaches its maturity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Consider a market populated by both very fast and very large (potentially slow)
agents where each contract traded has a face value of one million dollars and
single trades can be for 100,000 such contracts. The annual transaction volumes
increase from $868 billion in 1996 to $445 trillion in 2013, and the daily trading
speed drops from minutes to milliseconds over these years. In such a setting,
small, but very quick, price adjustments are translated in millions of gains or
losses over milliseconds investment horizons. This is a summary description of the
Eurodollar Future (ED) market, possibly the most active and liquid market that
remains relatively unstudied in the academic literature despite its large volume
and its natural setting for algorithmic trading (AT). With trillions of dollars
traded in this market over a given year, can our economy afford to leave the
impact of the modern developments in trading technology on liquidity and price
formation so significantly under scrutinized.
This thesis provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the microstructure
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of the Eurodollar Future market, traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME), revolving around the effects of algorithmic trading in the quality of the
market. My approach is to apply a broad battery of empirical techniques to mea-
sure the market qualities from both volatility and liquidity aspects, and combine
them in a novel semi-parametric framework that studies the impact of the frac-
tion of informed trading across a large cross section of different market quality
indicators (which include liquidity, adverse selection and price informativeness).
I motivate this analysis using a rational expectations model of futures trading
with the differentiated capacity of traders to take advantage of foresight into the
final valuation of the futures contract. Finally, I examine the speed and the ac-
curacy of Eurodollar future prices formation at high frequency domain, and also
measure the various factors influencing the price efficiency including the distance
to maturity, the trading volumes, and the trading direction.
The costs and benefits of high frequency trading (HFT) activity can be succinctly
summarized under the categories of execution costs/excess volatility versus liq-
uidity provision, latency and price information process. Proponents indicate that
the ability to supply liquidity by quoting and transacting at high speed improves
the information processing capacity of financial markets and permit an increased
volume of transactions at lower latency. Those positing a more cautious tone
suggest that HFT can increase volatility, decouple bid and ask prices and harm
the efficiency of price formation process, generally considered a measure of illiq-
uidity. Recent work by Hasbrouck [2014] analyzing the quoting activity for a
random sample of US equities has indicated that at the highest frequencies the
correlation between the bid and ask quotes is substantially less than unity in
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time frames of around 50 milliseconds (ms) and that the ratio of high frequency
volatility to daily volatility can be nearly five times the level expected from a ran-
dom walk with constant volatility over day. Chakrabarty et al. [2014] find little
evidence of a deleterious effect of banning naked access to US equity exchanges
by the SEC and cites several positives outcomes from this regulatory action. Us-
ing proprietary the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) data,
Kirilenko et al. [2014], analyze the 2010 Flash Crash that appears to have started
in E-mini S&P 500 futures, illustrate that whilst HFT was not the trigger of this
crash, high frequency traders (HFTs) do appear to have exacerbated the degree
of price volatility. A number of recent theoretical contributions have come out
against HFT, indicating that the benefits of high speed transactions are out-
weighed by the negative effect of a subset of traders having substantially greater
opportunities simply through the speed of access, see Kyle and Obizhaeva [2013]
and Foucault et al. [2015].
In contrast, Hendershott et al. [2011] illustrate empirically that the introduction
of the ‘autoquote’ facility for US equities has a significant and positive effect on
a number of liquidity proxies (positive in the sense of an increase in liquidity).
Further support for HFT as a net provider of liquidity maybe found in Hender-
shott and Moulton [2011] and Riordan and Storkenmaier [2012]. In each case,
the statistical experiment is founded on the introduction of a new technology
providing new avenues for HFT. Castura et al. [2010] utilize the variance ratio
method on the Russell 1000 and 2000 markets and illustrate that the high-speed
trading has benefits to the market efficiency. Chaboud et al. [2014] find that the
high-speed algorithmic trading can limit arbitrage opportunities and improve the
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price formation process in the foreign exchange (FX) markets. Gru¨nbichler et al.,
1994, Hendershott and Riordan [2011] and Chaboud et al. [2014] provide evi-
dence to support that HFT can enhance the price formation process. For various
markets and asset classes, Harris [1989], Stoll and Whaley [1990], Chan [1992]
and Huang and Stoll [1994], Engle et al. [2012], Frino and McKenzie [2002] and
Menkveld and Zoican [2014] each either finds evidence to suggest that HFT im-
proves market characteristics or finds no evidence that the level of market quality
is compromised by the presence of HFT or its introduction.
The common microstructure studies focus on the equity market and foreign ex-
change market due to the data availability. Give the lack of coverage in the
literature, this thesis conducts a population study on the microstructure of the
three-month Eurodollar future market. Eurodollar future contracts is a London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) referenced contract with a 10-year life span.
The most popular Eurodollar contracts are quarterly traded, via both open out-
cry and Globex electronic platforms, such as the March, June, September or
December delivery contracts. I have constructed two unique quarterly Eurodol-
lar future datasets. One is the inside quotes and transaction data with every
update from 1996 to 2013; the other is the entire messages within the limit order
book from 2008 to 2014.
The reason I choose this interest rate derivatives market, first of all, it is the
largest future market in the world with the high level of liquidity and fast updating
speed [Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2012]. Each Eurodollar futures
contract has a notional value of $1 million. Especially, after the Dodd-Frank Act
released in 2010, it sets the margin requirements on the interest rate swaps to
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Figure 1.1: Annual Eurodollar Future Trades Volumes versus Global GDP
Notes: This figure represents the ratio of the annual Eurodollar futures trading volumes
and the annual global GDP from 1996 to 2014. The 40 Eurodollar future contracts data
is obtained from CME Exchange tapes via Thomson Reuters Tick History database.
For each calendar year, the ED trades volumes are calculated as the
∑
Vi, where V is
the trades volume and i is a contract type index. The 1996–2014 annual global GDP
data is collected from the World Bank World Development Indicators via Datastream.
lower risks in the trading system. This action impels more traders to move to
Eurodollar futures because it is now commonly cheaper to construct the floating
leg of interest rate swaps using Eurodollar strips. Figure 1.1 depicts the annual
Eurodollar future trading volume and the annual global gross domestic product
(GDP) from 1996 to 2014. We can see, before 2004, the annual volumes of
Eurodollar futures are less than the annual global GDP. Once it passes 2004,
the annual ED trading volume increases from $118.62 trillion in 2004 to $419.41
trillion in 2007. The ratio of ED volumes and the global GDP shows a dip
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between 2008 and 2012, which is in keeping with the period of recent financial
market stress. The 2013 global GDP recovers to $445.39 trillion, and then the
annual ED trading volume in 2014 reaches about eight times as many as the
global GDP1. Another reason I choose this future market is that it has a unique
international money market (IMM, legacy terminology) dates, so I can study the
term structure of Eurodollar futures based on the length to maturity instead of
calendar dates.
1.1 Main Empirical Research Questions
The impact of high frequency trading activity on the characteristics of financial
markets is a topic of considerable contemporary interest. To fill the identified
research gap on the microstructure of Eurodollar future market, the main research
questions under investigation in this thesis are
• In a continuous electronic central limit order book, how does the presence
of high frequency trading impact market quality?
• In the absence of data on the specific types of accounts, or the ability to
track quoting activity from a specific account, is it possible to construct
a meaningful measure of high frequency trading in a continuous electronic
central limit order book?
1The ratio between ED volume and global GDP in 2014 only includes the first seven months,
because my Eurodollar future transaction data is gathered from January 1996 to July 2014.
The annual global GDP is from the World Bank World Development Indicators via Datastream
database.
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• Can we design a model of futures trading that matches the observed pattern
of market liquidity and market quality?
• Can we use these measures to influence the design of markets and better
inform market participants of all types on how best to trade in such a mar-
ket?
To answer these questions I have developed a research programme that uses
theoretical models of futures trading which is then used to motivate a series of
empirical models that provide evidence on the association between market quality
and high frequency trading.
By market quality I refer to two aspects: the level market volatility and the degree
of market liquidity provision. I will carefully identify these two components in
both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Chapter 2 investigates how do the Eurodollar future prices behave and determine
the impact of high speed quoting on very short-term volatility. In this chapter,
I analyze the microstructure of the volatility of inside quotes in the Eurodollar
futures market by implementing the wavelet techniques to extract the local aver-
aging effects to calculate the variance and covariance of the order flow over days
at various timescales. The variance ratio records the changes of quadratic price
variation at different time scales, usually relative to the daily variation. The co-
variance ratios provide some insights into the synchronization and the agreement
between the bid-side and ask-side. If the Eurodollar future market is an efficient
market and both bids and asks prices follows a Brownian motion, the theoretical
prediction of the variance ratio should follow a linear relation and close to one.
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This chapter finds the high variance scaling and low covariance ratio at short
timescales, which suggests the existence of high-frequency microstructure noises
and the disagreement between ask and bid side at highest frequency in this mar-
ket. Besides, as a Eurodollar future contract approaching its maturity, the quote
prices become more volatile.
Chapter 3 theoretically analyzes the relation between informed traders and the
quality of futures markets. I demonstrate theoretically that the anticipated
marginal effect of additional HFT activity is non-linear. Using the entire Eu-
rodollar future limit order book and trades data, this chapter also measures the
proportion of high frequency algorithmic trading as the HFT proxy and calculate
a battery of market liquidity indicators, including bid-ask spreads, quoted depth
and adverse selections. The results illustrate the changes in both the market liq-
uidity and high-speed trading behavior over the term structure of the Eurodollar
contract. I also detect that the quotes at level two from the order book provide
the most high-speed active with a large volume of quotes.
Chapter 4 empirically captures the relationship between HFT and indicators of
market quality using the Eurodollar futures market as a case study. I estimate
a semi-parametric model with HFT intensity, as the proportion of total market
activity, used as a predictor of ‘market quality’ which is a loose description for
a series of indicators of liquidity, execution risk and adverse selection. I demon-
strate, empirically, that a critical saturation point, where the contribution of an
extra percentage point of HFT no longer reduces market quality but actually
increases, is a) supported by empirical observation and b) relatively stable across
a variety of indicators.
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Chapter 5 measures the efficiency of price formation process and the trading
mechanism and answers how fast you need to be in the Eurodollar future market.
In this chapter, I undertake a comprehensive analysis of the price discovery and
price efficiency at a very high-frequency domain. To assess the ability and the
speed of the prices incorporating information, I use the return autocorrelations
at 26 different time intervals, from tick-by-tick level to 30 minutes, to measure
the price efficiency. Then I capture the pricing error, the deviation of transaction
prices from the efficient price, using the vector autoregression model. What I
find is the return autocorrelations are positive and gradually increase from the
shortest time interval to the longest time interval. The findings also suggest the
adjustment time of trade prices is in a very short time frame within one second.
The quote prices adjust even faster than the trade prices, in the milliseconds
frame. Moreover, as the Eurodollar future approaches its maturity, the trade
prices are less sensitive to incorporate any information on the market.
1.2 Contribution of This Thesis
This thesis makes some distinct contribution to the knowledge and understanding
in the market microstructure research area. First of all, this research is the
first one to conduct a population study on Eurodollar future market, and to my
knowledge, it is the largest microstructure studies at this time. Every message in
the Eurodollar future market has been collected. My historical Eurodollar future
data spans 19 years, from 1996 to 2014, including tick-level quotes and trades at
milliseconds timestamp. So I am one of the first researchers to directly model and
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analyze the limit order book for this type of market. The second contribution
of this thesis is that it captures a wide variety of price oscillations utilizing a
recently developed wavelet techniques to scale the prices volatility. Although it
has been adopted by Hasbrouck [2014] in the equity market, this signal processing
technique is the first time used to analysis the interest rate derivatives.
From the point of view of exchange providers, CME Group [2010] makes use of
the requirement for registration of algorithmic traders (ATs) connections to the
Globex trading platform and runs a simple linear analysis of the impact of the
level of HFT activity on bid-ask spreads finding evidence to support the con-
jecture that greater HFT leads to deeper markets. So how to reconcile these
opposing empirical and theoretical findings? A first pass is to look at the theo-
retical structure of the market, when a set of traders has the ability to effectively
predict future outcomes by speed alone. I will show that in a relatively standard,
but realistic setting that as the number of traders with this trading advantage
increases, the size of the price impact for a given level of order-flow imbalance,
whilst initially increasing eventually decreases and then tends monotonically to
zero. The ability of a market to find the efficient price in the presence of a
given degree of order-flow imbalance is the definition of market depth. Hence,
the theoretical prediction will be that for a given number of ATs generating HFT
order flow, the negative effect on liquidity will only be significant when a small
number are in the market exploiting their ability to effectively ‘front run’ the ef-
ficient price through their speed advantage. The idea that as the number of ATs
increases their effect cancels is more-or-less obvious, however, my contribution
is specifically on the shape of the adjustment and I will demonstrate that this
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‘shape’ is supported by observation from empirical evidence.
Another contribution focuses on my novel empirical approach to analyzing the
impact of HFT and the number of ATs within my chosen market. Motivated
by the theoretical findings, I determine the fraction of ATs within a market by
looking directly at the speed of update of the complete limit order-book. I utilize
the Eurodollar futures market for this exercise as it is a large liquid market
with a very high level of activity. The information flows to this market from
the LIBOR reference rate are relatively well understood and I have access the
full and uncensored limit order book. I classify quotes with update speeds of
less than 25 milliseconds as being HFT generated by an AT, which I find on
average to be around 65% of the total number of messages, on average. The
fraction of messaging volume generated at this speed is then used as a proxy for
the intensity of HFT activity as a fraction of total messaging. I will show that
25ms generates a distribution of HFT within the market that is in line with the
exchanges own assessment of the level of activity given their knowledge of the
actual account numbers and hence whether order flow originated from the active
account connection of an AT or from a terminal driven by registered individual.
I then regress this intensity measure HFT from ATs as a fraction of messaging
semi-parametrically onto a variety of measures of liquidity and adverse selection
utilizing a variety of instrumental variables to assist in identification. I show that
the pattern of the effect of the increasing fraction of HFT from ATs on these
liquidity metrics follows the pattern established in the theoretical model very
well (albeit that my theory model predicts a slightly lower saturation point than
empirically indicated by several metrics). I believe that my results go some way
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to answering the question of why many prior studies using linear models have
found substantially differing results.
Furthermore, I develop a new effective algorithm to classify the trades directions.
Because the traditional Lee and Ready [1991] algorithm does not work when the
timescale is smaller than 1 second, I develop a unique volume weighted average
trade classification algorithm to replace the Lee-Ready method, specially designed
for the microstructure studies using the limit order book data at high frequencies.
This new technique has been employed to calculate a range of market liquidity
spreads, spread autocorrelations and short-term pricing errors in Chapter 5. After
comparing the new algorithm with the Lee-Ready algorithm using a toy example,
the traditional method can only classify about 33% of trades as a buy-side trade
or a sell-side trade, but the volume-weighted algorithm can classify about 96%
among all the trades. The other 4% mainly belongs to the iceberg trades, which
are only reported with prices but hidden their volumes.
Two final important take-home observations specific to futures markets are a)
that studies that ignore high levels of the order-book than level one miss a great
deal of activity, level two prices across most maturities are the most actively
updated by a substantial margin. My empirical observations indicate that level
two quoting is a common domain for ATs and the recipient of a considerable
fraction of HFT activity. b) the maturity of the contract is non-linearly correlated
with the numbers and speed of updating. Long maturity contracts have up to
six orders of magnitude less quotes than those with around three to four years
of maturity and there is an asymmetric drop in activity across the order-book as
the tenor of the contract enters its final year. Taken together, any microstructure
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analysis of a futures market will need to sample quite widely across maturities
to gain a full picture of how order-flow and more pertinently speed of order-flow
impacts liquidity.
1.2.1 Summary of Contribution
1. Formulation, solution and simulation of a new multivariate rational expec-
tations model specifically formulated for futures contracts. This is imple-
mented in Mathematica.
2. Formulation of a new semi-parametric empirical model of market quality,
including the introduction of a new bootstrapping approach to confidence
bounds for Gaussian partially linear semi-parametric models with semi-
parametric instruments, implemented in Matlab.
3. The design of a new technique for imputing the trade direction from an
electronic limit order book.
4. Specification, analysis and simulation of a new linear vector autoregression
model of market quality.
5. The design of new algorithms for each of the above empirical models to deal
with multi-terabyte data.
6. The design of new infrastructure to process and match large scale databases
from the raw central limit order book of catalogued exchanged tapes.
7. First research to analyze the complete limit order book.
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8. First thesis to conduct population-level studies on a particular market (all
quotes and trades across the order book from 2008 to 2014).
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes the mi-
crostructure of the volatility of quotes using the Eurodollar futures market as a
case study. Chapter 3 proposes a non-linear theoretical prediction in terms of the
effects of informed traders, and then measures the a set of market liquidity indi-
cators and the fraction of high-speed algorithmic trading in this market. Chapter
4 employs a semi-parametric approach and captures the non-liner marginal ef-
fects of HFT on the quality of Eurodollar future market. Chapter 5 examines the
efficiency of price formation at a very high-frequency domain. I also provide an
extensive online appendix at https://www.dropbox.com/s/uxbilz8879azdkb/
Thesis_OnlineAppendix.pdf?dl=0, which contains a comprehensive series of
complementary information to support this thesis.
1.3 Contents of Online Appendix
This online appendix provides complementary analyses to the main tables and
figures in this thesis. It contains the following content to support the analysis
contained within this thesis:
Appendix A contains additional details and supplemental results for Chapter 2
High speed quoting and excess volatility: evidence from money market derivatives,
including the summary statistics tables, additional quotes volatility tables and
wavelet quotes variance plots.
14
• Appendix A.1 shows the descriptive statistics of quotes (both inside quotes
and entire limit order book) and transactions for all Eurodollar contracts
(see Table A.1 – Table A.4).
• Appendix A.2 provides the median results of bid variance, ask variance,
covariance and correlations at all timescales (see Table A.5 – Table A.20).
• Appendix A.3 includes other types of wavelet variance-covariance results,
including bootstrap mean, mean, max, min and standard deviation (see
Table A.21 – Table A.60).
• Appendix A.4 presents year-long median value of the daily bid-ask wavelets
variance, covariance and correlations (see Table A.61 – Table A.98).
• Appendix A.5 shows the estimation results of high speeding quotes. Table
A.99 –Table A.102 contains the average high speed quoting results from
top 10% days with the highest number of bids. Table A.103 – Table A.106
provide the supplementary tables for variance ratio and timescales of the
most active day.
• Appendix A.6 depicts the wavelet decomposition with bids and asks vari-
ance ratio for all 9 timescale levels. Here I present wavelet variance plots for
the March, June, September and December delivery contracts groups (see
Figure A.1 – Figure A.4) and wavelet variance plots for each Eurodollar
contract (see Figure A.5 – Figure A.44).
Appendix B is complementary to the Chapter 4 High frequency trading and ex-
ecution risk dynamics: evidence from eurodollar limited order book data. This
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section presents a significant number of ancillary treatments for the robustness
check, including marginal effects plots with algorithmic trading proxies at various
thresholds and different instrumental variables.
• Appendix B.1 shows some examples of the impacts of AT proxy thresholded
at 200 ms on the execution risks by the implementation of the conventional
Robinson estimator using the semipar command in Stata 13. These plots
from Stata provide complementary information for the robustness of the
marginal effects plots from Matlab in the thesis (see Figure B.45 – Figure
B.61).
• Appendix B.2 presents the marginal effects of algorithmic trading proxies
on the execution risk dynamics utilizing the partially-linear semi-parametric
model. Figure B.62 to Figure B.71 show the marginal effects of AT proxy
thresholded at 25 ms. Figure B.72 to Figure B.80 show the marginal effects
of AT proxy thresholded at 200 ms.
• Appendix B.3 illustrates the robustness check for the marginal effects of
algorithmic trading on market quality indicators. For the robust check, I
employ two different instruments instead of the total messages. Firstly, I
use the number of traders as the instrument for the proxy of algorithmic
traders thresholded at 25ms (see Table B.107 and Figure B.81 to Figure
B.97). I also use the number of traders as the instrument for the proxy of
algorithmic traders thresholded at 200ms (see Table B.107 and Figure B.98
to Figure B.114). Alternatively, I also use the volume to message ratio as
the instrument for the proxy of algorithmic traders thresholded at 25ms
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(see Table B.109 and Figure B.115 to Figure B.131); and the results and
plots of the marginal effects of AT proxy thresholded at 200ms using the
volume to message ratio as instrument are in Table B.110 and Figure B.132
to Figure B.148.
Appendix C provides additional supplemental results for Chapter 5 High-frequency
price discovery and price efficiency on interest rate futures. This section contains
the return autocorrelation, liquidity spreads, spreads autocorrelation and regres-
sion results tables to support the analysis of Chapter 5.
• Appendix C.1 illustrates the mid-quote return autocorrelations from 30
days before maturity subsample to 1800 days before maturity subsample
(see Table C.111 – Table C.120 ).
• Appendix C.2 depicts the daily first-order, fifth-order and tenth-order auto-
correlations of the mid-quote returns at various time intervals sorted by the
days to maturity across 40 Eurodollar contracts (see Figure C.149 – Figure
C.152).
• Appendix C.3 describes the average and median of a range of market liquid-
ity spreads of the Eurodollar future market, including bid-ask spreads (S˜ Q),
quoted half-spread (S˜ Q
1/2
), quoted depth (S˜ D), effective half-spread (S˜ E),
realized spreads (S˜ R), and adverse selection (S˜ AS). This section includes
all the spreads from 30 days before maturity subsample to 1800 days before
maturity subsample (see Table C.121 – Table C.130 ).
• Appendix C.4 contains the first-order, fifth-order and tenth-order autocor-
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relations of liquidity spreads with the 30 days before maturity subsample to
the 1800 days before maturity subsample (see Table C.131 – Table C.160).
• Appendix C.5 represents the daily first-order, fifth-order and tenth-order
autocorrelations of a set of liquidity spreads sorted by the days to matu-
rity across 40 Eurodollar contracts, including quoted half spreads, realized
spreads and adverse selection (see Figure C.153 – Figure C.161).
• Appendix C.6 shows the impulse response plots of five variables, including
the trade direction, trade volume, square root of trade volume, and asks
and bids market concentration for the 10-year full sample period, one-year
tenor group, three-year tenor group, and five-year tenor group (see Figure
C.162 – Figure C.171).
• Appendix C.7 summarizes the multivariate linear regression results of a set
of market activities indicators, price discovery factors, mid-quote return
autocorrelations, market liquidity spreads and spreads autocorrelations,
within the 10-year full sample period, one-year tenor group, three-year tenor
group, and five-year tenor group (see Table C.161 – Table C.184).
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Chapter 2
High Speed Quoting and Excess
Volatility: Evidence from Money
Market Derivatives
The futures contract on the 3-month Eurodollar Deposit is one of the
most actively traded in global financial markets. Most reliable esti-
mates suggest that the notional outstanding on these contracts makes
this the worlds largest futures market.1 Several regulatory interven-
tions into the probity of submissions of the Eurodollar futures reference
rate, the 3-month LIBOR, have focused attention on this market, and
in particular its transactional microstructure and information content.
In this study, I analyze the microstructure of the volatility of quotes in
the Eurodollar futures market by implementing the recently developed
approach of Hasbrouck [2014]. Using a comprehensive database of ev-
ery update to the inside-quotes – some two billion observations, from
1996 to 2014 – my results paint a fascinating picture of the changing
behavior of traders in these very actively traded contracts. For long
maturities the variance ratios of the updates of the inside-quotes are
well behaved and approach unity – this is in contrast to the equity
market. However, as the contracts approach maturity the number of
updates to the inside-quotes increases dramatically (by six orders of
magnitude for the one year prior to maturity) and the variance ra-
tios now begin to approach those found in the equity market literature;
finally, as the contract approaches maturity, this effect then declines
dramatically. My results lend credence to the theory that maturity ef-
fects are driven by speculative HFT traders entering the futures mar-
kets for only certain epochs of the futures lifecycle.
1Source: CFTC [Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2012, Barclays Settlement].
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Empirical research on the microstructure of interest rate derivatives is a rela-
tively overlooked area of financial economics. However, recent civil and regula-
tory actions against several large financial institutions with substantial activities
in interest rate related swaps and futures has shone a light on these very actively
traded, but little studied products. In this chapter, I conduct an extensive anal-
ysis of the 3-month Eurodollar futures market and in particular the short-term,
intraday, volatility of quotes over the lifecycle of the futures contract. I will uti-
lize techniques to extract the ‘variance and covariance ratios’ of noise components
at various timescales over a single day and illustrate the marked change in the
behavior of the market near the maturities of these contracts. Variance ratio
analysis documents the change in the expected level of quadratic variation at dif-
ferent time scales and maybe used to determine the optimal sampling frequency
for variance-covariance analysis and determine the impact of high speed quoting
on very short-term volatility. Additionally, the analysis of the covariance ratio be-
tween the inside-bid and inside-ask, provides insight into the time-scale at which
there is a breakdown in the agreement between the buy and sell side of the order
book, an important measurement of market liquidity and the informativeness of
quotes.
My evidence points to a marked maturity effect decoupling the inside-bid and
insides-ask prices, resulting in sudden changes in liquidity even when the contracts
are actively traded. An implication of the results is that these frictions may allow
sophisticated traders with quick reactions to exploit informational advantages
near maturity. The results indicate that whilst abnormal variance ratios appear
near maturity, the clustering effect usually occurs prior to the last day of trading
and is coincidental with high levels of market activity. The market for the 3-month
Eurodollar futures contract (henceforth Eurodollar Future), when measured by
the notional value of open interest is the “most liquid and largest” [Commodity
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Futures Trading Commission, 2012, p. 5]. The CFTC reports that the notional
open interest was in excess of $564 trillion in 2011. My dataset is comprehensive
in that I am able to analyze every quote at the inside-spread from 1996 to 2014.
The volume of this market is quite extraordinary, with actual traded volumes
across 40 contracts averaging in the trillions of dollars over my sample period –
indeed the dollar volumes of quotes are in the quintillions of dollars. At any given
time the Eurodollar market has notional amounts outstanding that are around an
order of magnitude more than global GDP. With each contract having a notional
value of one million dollars, small relative price fluctuations can represent very
large absolute dollar amounts.
My approach is to assess the relative quadratic variation for every millisecond
timestamped updates of the best bid and offers (the inside-spread), in this mar-
ket and compute variance ratios at different timescales for the bid and ask. The
time variation in the variance ratios provides a guide to the mechanisms driving
the update of prices over a given day. In an important contribution, Hasbrouck
[2014] has outlined an empirical approach to identify quote-induced volatility in
equity markets. The importance of this topic cannot be understated as “[bid-offer]
volatility degrades the informational content of the quotes, exacerbates execution
price risk for marketable orders, and impairs the reliability of the quotes as refer-
ence marks for the pricing of dark trades” [Hasbrouck, 2014, p. 1:2]. Hasbrouck
[2014] utilizes equity best bid and best ask data from 2001 to 2011 and associates
this with the transition to electronic trading. In keeping with the equity market,
futures are traded through a limit order book, however, futures contracts are cen-
trally cleared by the futures clearing house, so there are subtle differences that
may play a role in differentiating the results found herein and for equivalent data
from the equity market.
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Given that the pattern of high frequency trading is closely correlated to the
maturity of the futures contract, I impute the term structure of quoting activity
by type in the market and demonstrate that activity varies in relation to the IMM
dates. Given that the Eurodollar future has a very important relationship to the
interest rate swaps (IRS) market the dynamics of execution costs have significant
implications for the overall structure of the dollar fixed income market. Indeed,
it is instructive at this stage to provide a short example of the type of problem
I address. Let us consider a two-year interest rate swap with the present value
of floating payments and fixed payments equalized to be $49.967 billion. For
convenience, I will assume that the floating payments are referenced to the same
IMM reset dates which are the quarterly maturities for the Eurodollars, hence the
basis risk is zero.1 Consider a futures strip that hedges the floating rate payments,
the holder will periodically need to buy (to hedge fixed rate payers exposed to
the risk of falling rates) and sell (to hedge fixed rate receivers exposed to the risk
of rising rates). Let us consider a standard quarterly rebalancing, several tools
exist that can be used to compute the convexity adjustments.2 I will focus just
on the economic implications of transactions on the floating side, when rates are
1I should note that this is a relatively small position compared to some implied by the
trades in my data-set, I use this toy example as the number of contracts needed to compute
the hedge is relatively trivial to calculate, see ‘CME Group – Interest Rates and Eurodollars’
for other extended examples. Why is Eurodollar notional position so large and getting larger?
Following the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Part 39, Subpart B, Section 39.13(2) (ii) which covers
margin requirements indicates that futures contracts must be covered by performance bonds
with one-day liquidation and interest rate swaps require a five-day liquidation timetable. The
Dodd-Frank Act has, as such, substantially increased margin costs for the previously relatively
unregulated bilateral swaps market. The result is that a ten-year Eurodollar futures contract
constituting a portfolio of futures will have a significantly lower margin requirement than an
equivalent interest rate swap, as the futures are centrally cleared and marked to market daily.
As of September 2014, a proposal for bilateral un-cleared swaps to be cleared by a ‘qualified-
central-clearing-party’, the CME ‘ClearPort’ system is an example of this. Therefore, the swaps
will in effect mimic many of the properties of futures.
2Bloomberg has the EDS functionality, CME provides the ‘Swap Equivalents’ tool and in
Matlab the LiborMarketModel function can be used to accomplish the same goal to nest in
more automated platforms.
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falling, such as in the post-2008 period although similar counter examples can be
constructed on the buy side.
The floating rate counterparts will sequentially sell Eurodollars at each of seven
rests over the life of the swap. The largest trading volume in my sample period
from 1996 to 2014 from the viewpoint of completed trades in a specific contract
is EDH1 on February 18, 2011 (contracts maturing March, 2011), with $49.967
billion of ED futures contracts were traded. It should be noted that the lack of
convexity between price and yield exhibited by the Eurodollar curve means that
the hedging ratio will change slightly per time, so the textbook approach does
not quite hold, a fact that has caught many trainee swap traders. Consider a
single quarterly sale of 49,967 Eurodollars, the notional size of $1 million, this
will be one quarter prior to maturity. If the inside-buy is currently trading at
99.66 and the inside-sell is 99.6775, with more than 50,000 contracts available at
both the sides of the spread (these are real spreads and trades from February 18,
2011 prices for March maturing contracts) and the trader decides to cross the
spread, he expects to complete the sale at or above 99.6775. This is under the
presumption that in the 35 to 70 milliseconds required to execute the best buy
does not move substantially. However, my variance ratios indicate that shortly
before maturity dates the volatility of inside-bid substantially higher than that
expected under a daily level of variance. At execution for a large trade such as
this one, the trader takes a risk that either the best bid will suddenly withdraw
and the trade is not completed. Note that CME has four main types of order,
none of which is a market order in the traditional sense.1 Or alternatively the
1These are: the standard limit order that posts itself to a level in the order book concomitant
with the price within the quote and if it is a bid or an ask (or creates a new level if there are no
matching existing prices) relative to the best-bid or best-ask; a market order with protection,
effectively an order that buys(sells) any contracts the best ask(bid) price plus a specific spread
and if there is any remainder posts the price and remaining volume as a new limit-order at the
limit of the range; a market to limit, which is effectively the same as the market order with
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best bid jumps and a high frequency trader buys the contracts at 99.66 and
instantly sells at 99.6775 (the previous best ask) realizing 1.75 basis points per
contract, or instantly gaining $2,186,056.25, this is a relatively benign case, as I
have measured the intraday kurtosis of the inside-spread quote by quote to be
high as 830,000.
This might simply be considered unlucky in that the trader happened to choose
a trade as the market moved, however the covariance/correlations scaling ratios
tells us a different story. Correlations between the inside-bid and inside-ask decay
dramatically at the quote level, indicating that the price ceiling on the ask side is
highly uninformative of the overall order book. I find that the effects are related
to heightened trading activity and this is high correlated to specific maturity
dates in the contract cycles. This appears not to be a coincidence as the IMM
dates coincide with a great number of swaps seeking to reduce basis risk, given
that prevailing interest rate conditions are well understood net buying and selling
pressure can be anticipated relatively easily. Whilst in the equity market, variance
ratios and bid-ask decoupling can amount to potential HFT arbitrage profits of
a few hundreds of dollars a trade, the Eurodollar market permits a far quicker
root (in terms of transactions) to large HFT profits.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold: first, to extend the approach to
capture a wide variety of price oscillations; and second, I am the first to conduct
this analysis on interest rate futures priced relative to the LIBOR, something
protection except the upper range is the best-bid best-ask; a resting stop limit is an order that
sits until a trigger price is traded and then a limit order is submitted to the market, again if
the order cannot be filled immediately then the price within the stop limit is posted; finally, a
stop limit with protection is the same as a stop limit, but the triggered order has a protected
range. For each order type there are a variety of duration and display qualifiers, such as the
standard fill-and-kill (if part filled the remainder is killed), good ’till cancelled (order needs to
be cancelled by the trader) and more intriguingly the MaxShow or IceBerg, which masks part of
the volume of the quote, as each chunk of the quote is filled a new identical quote is displayed.
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that is unique in the literature. My main objective is to disentangle systematic
maturity effects from ‘other’ sources of microstructure noise, such as possible
informed trading. I therefore construct an analysis that follows Hasbrouck [2014],
however I decompose the average variance-covariance ratios relative to maturity
date and activity to illustrate the systematic effects of high speed quoting on short
time-scale volatility. My results can be roughly summarized by the timeline in
Figure 2.1, with three main ‘epochs’ for the contract – these of course also relate
to the contracts position on the implied corresponding forward rate curve.
The first epoch, begins at inception the equivalent of a long fixed forward rate
position, is very thinly traded with variance ratios approaching unity, and daily
microstructure effects from high-speed quoting (proxies by the wavelet correla-
tions across the bid and ask) are indicated to be low. Second is an equity-like
epoch, in which high-speed quoting is prevalent and whilst variance ratios rise
they are never as high as those reported in Hasbrouck [2014]. Finally, the third
epoch is very near delivery, with the future mimicking the implied short rate –
volumes are high but quoting is less frequent; at this point the variance ratios
at the shorter timescales sharply rise to levels much above those in the equity
literature. I provide a comprehensive summary of these results and in particular
I show that they are extremely stable across time and delivery quarter.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 provides a more
detailed overview of the analysis of the microstructure of fixed income derivatives
and summarizes related literature. Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 illustrate the em-
pirical methodology and the unique Eurodollar dataset. Section 2.4 provides some
analysis from the Bid-Offered volatility decomposition and Section 2.5 provides
some summary comments.
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Contract Inception
with 9 year 364 day ma-
turity at T
‘Thin trading’ epoch,
Infrequent transactions
and quoting
‘Equity-like’ epoch’,
very high frequency
quoting, low variance
ratios, low wavelet
correlations at HFT
frequency.
‘Short rate’ epoch,
decreasing quoting
frequency, with high
volumes, high variance
ratios.
t0 t0 < t < T − 2 yr T − 2 yr < t < T − 1 wk T − 1 wk < t ≤ T
Figure 2.1: Trading ‘Epochs’ in the Life-cycle of a Eurodollar Futures Contract
(yr denotes years and wk denoted weeks).
2.1 Background and Literature
The Eurodollar market, and specifically its microstructure, is not commonly stud-
ied directly in academic research papers, although the futures price is sometimes
used as an ingredient in the construction of forward rate curves and as a forward
looking asset pricing factor.1 Given this lack of coverage in the literature I shall
spend a short time reviewing the background of this market, the way the CME
tapes are recorded and its general size characteristics; it is also useful to under-
stand the function of the Eurodollar market in the international markets given
the basic theoretical predictions on the characteristics of futures markets with
differentiated agents. So historically who trades Eurodollar futures?
Eurodollar markets are defined as banking markets which involve Eurodollar
short-term borrowing and lending conducted outside of the legal jurisdiction of
1In fact, Google Scholar and JSTOR record that no papers containing Eurodollar in the
title or abstract have been published since 2010. An unbounded search shows that 488 mention
Eurodollar in text with 12 directly related to pricing and none that address the transactional
behavior of the market.
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the United States authorities. Historically, the deposits have been mainly con-
trolled by European banks and financial institutions, hence the name “European
dollars”. These banks were either foreign banks or foreign branches of the US
banks. Because Eurodollars are not under the Fed regulation they offer higher
margins than similar deposits within the United States.
The market developed after World War II following the Marshall Plan that re-
sulted in large quantities of US dollars flowing into Europe and being deposited
in European banks. Subsequent to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the
Soviet government was concerned that the US government could freeze its dollar
deposit accounts in North American banks in retaliation. This led to the first Eu-
rodollar account when the Soviet government transferred $800,000 into a British
bank, which then deposited, anonymously, an equivalent amount into a US bank.
This operation is considered to be the first time the words “European dollars”
were used [Levi, 2007; Pilbeam, 2005]. The interest rate applied to the account
is therefore the offered rate charged by the US bank to the British bank. Over
time, this evolved into a standardized account and the most common duration
is 3 months or 90 days pegged to the 3-month LIBOR rate. A natural evolution
of this arrangement is to have a hedging instrument attached to forward deliv-
ery of a standardized account size. Hence, each Eurodollar future delivers one
minus the prevailing dollar three-month LIBOR rate times one million dollars.
The predominant literature on Eurodollar futures is on complete market pric-
ing, see Brigo and Mercurio [2006] and Musiela and Rutkowski [2005]. Indeed,
dollar interest rate hedging with Eurodollars had been a core feature of invest-
ment management courses in the UK and French institutions training eastern
European central bankers since the late 1960s. However, this declined with the
ICE-IR swaps boom of the early 2000s, even though for practical purposes much
of the quoted swaps were either back-to-back or entirely synthetic with Eurodollar
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strips.
The daily LIBOR has been the subject of extended discussion over the 2008 to
2014 period. On June 27, 2012, Barclays Bank settled with the US Commodities
Futures Trading Commission, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the UK
Financial Services Authority (FSA) fines totaling $200 million, $160 million and
£59 million respectively. Up to this point, these were some of the largest penalties
ever applied to a financial institution for manipulation of key rates. Subsequently,
UBS, the Royal Bank of Scotland and J. P. Morgan have all seen fines in excess
of this amount levied by these three regulatory authorities and the European
Commission. In September 2013 ICAP, an electronic dealer broker also settled
a lawsuit regarding rate manipulation of the LIBOR index paying $65 million to
the CFTC and £14 million to the UK Financial Conduct Authority.
The objective of this study, however, is to analyze the market quote structure
for interest rate derivatives; part of my focus will be on the structure of intraday
variation around LIBOR announcements. Given the lack of knowledge of the ex-
act form of the manipulation (in Section 2.2 I will outline some of the anecdotal
evidence from the regulatory reports) it is almost impossible to pre-judge how
the variation in bid and offered prices will change, and this study restricts itself
to a “model-free” analysis of the market ex-post and concentrates on the transac-
tional structure and in particular the impact of very high frequency transactions.
However, from prior modeling approaches, such as the classic informed trading
models of Kyle [1985], Glosten and Milgrom [1985] and Admati [1985], I can infer
that the presence of informed traders should substantively increase prior to the
updated news from the LIBOR fixing as a minority of traders exploit their private
information.1
1The process of setting the LIBOR rate is called “fixing”. This is not to be confused with
cartel-like behavior to manipulate the market, so the expression “fixing the LIBOR” simply
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The first LIBOR interest rate was published in 1986 [British Bankers’ Association,
2008] and I shall now very briefly recap the reference rate-setting process. At
11.00 am each weekday morning the banks in the LIBOR pool submit their rates
to an administrator. Up until September 2013, this was administered by the
British Bankers’ Association; this process is now administered by the NYSE: ICE
LIBOR unit. Prior to September 2013, at 11.30 am Thomson Reuters would then
publish the LIBOR fixings and make available the individual banks submissions.
Since September 2013, the NYSE: ICE LIBOR unit makes the fixings available to
various data vendors (including Thomson Reuters) for distribution to the market
and directly to the futures exchanges for settlement on maturing interest rate
derivatives set relative to this rate.
A key initial feature of the rate-fixing process was that banks “stated” their rates
– no evidence of an actual transacted offered rate was needed. The original ra-
tionale for this was that banks may not have borrowed in all the maturities and
currencies surveyed (e.g., there may not have been a 3-month deposit transaction
for a particular bank). Therefore, if the rates needed to be backed by transactions
then every so often more than 25% of the banks might provide a null rate and so
no “mid-rate” might be computable. Given the importance of LIBOR in settling
large volumes of derivatives and in the setting of borrowing rates on mortgages
and corporate loans, the need for a complete set of offered rates appeared to out-
weigh the disadvantages of evidence of transactions behind the individual banks
rate setting.
As such, unlike the Treasury bond future, the underlying instrument of the Eu-
means to set the rate. To actually force the rate to a particular level in order to try and make
excess returns on interest rate derivatives, the most appropriate term is“manipulate the LIBOR
fix” as used by the CFTC. The various settlement reports indicate two epochs for LIBOR rate
manipulation: the first, pre-2007, was specifically to try and game money market derivatives
trades and the second, a beauty contest, to present a picture of lower borrowing costs.
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rodollar Future is not a bond, but a notional Eurodollar time deposits with in-
terest rate pegged to the 3-month dollar LIBOR rate. The actuarial interest
payment on a Eurodollar time deposit equals LIBOR times the numbers of days
for the investment divided by 360 days [Brigo and Mercurio, 2006]. Let me set up
some notational conventions to progress from the expressions for the theoretical
model to the empirical model for the rest of the thesis.
I utilize two notational conventions for time denoted t. Subscript t ∈ {t, . . . , T}
is a daily time index where t ∈ N+ is an integer. Alternatively, I set (t) (not
subscripted) to be a continuous time index such that t ∈ R+ and more specifically
I normally constrain t ∈ [0, T ] where T = 1 for one day. Later in the thesis, I will
deal with an intraday transaction and quoting time, I will denote this by subscript
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Therefore, for every integer k ∈ N+ there is an equivalent
calendar tick time entry K˜k ∈ R+, such that K˜k+1−K˜k ≥ 0,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. In
certain circumstances I can deal with identical time stamps; however, my general
approach is to evenly distribute identical tick times over a single millisecond (the
stated accuracy of the time stamp).1
A price quoted at time Pt is the end of day price, for all other measurements
the stated value at time t is an average or a sum and this is declared locally.
Alternatively, I use P (t) to represent the price in continuous time, in general I
think of a single indexed day as being in the domain t ∈ [0, 1]. I denote two
arbitrary, but ordered dates as t1 and t2, such that t2 < t1 (normally t2− t1 = 90
days for the three month LIBOR) and I utilize a time shift operator τ , such that
for any date t I can define a time shift in days of t + τ . Whilst unnecessary for
my analysis I will follow the market convention and treat a year as having 360
and not 365 days.
1The data vendor informs me that the ordering is informative in terms of the receipt or
execution of trades and quotes and I adjust the time stamps accordingly.
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The intra-day index is more complicated as I deal with three clocks: the trade
clock, the times when trades are executed; the inside quote clock, the times at
which the best-bid and best-ask are updated (as a price-volume tuple); and the
market depth clock, when any updates are made to the order-book at any level
(reported as a price-volume-number of traders indexed by order book level tuple).
Unfortunately, I have two uses of the word ‘level’. First, I use it for the wavelet
decomposition of the inside quotes; and second, it is used to describe the ranking,
by price, of the quotes in the limit order book, both are entrenched terminologies
and I shall be clear as to which context the work is used in throughout the thesis.
Finally, the Eurodollars are quoted by contract maturity date and there are 40
concurrently traded quarterly dates, I therefore index by i ∈ {1, . . . , 40} and
this is strictly in alphabetical order therefore i = 1 refers to EDH0 (the contract
maturating on the third Wednesday of March 2000, 2010, 2020) and i = 40 is
EDZ9 (the contract maturating on the third Wednesday of December 2009, 2019,
2029). Equilibrium pricing of a Eurodollar future is relatively well understood,
the prices for a contract delivered at time t the price is 100 − L(t, t + τ), where
L(t, t+ τ) is the quoted LIBOR rate from t to t+ τ .
Following from my notation set-up let the LIBOR at day t on a Eurodollar deposit
with a maturity of τ days be expressed as
L(t, t+ τ) =
360
τ
( 1
PB(t, t+ τ)
− 1
)
, (2.1)
where L is the LIBOR rate, PB stands for a synthetic bond price from the implied
delivery rate and t ≤ t+τ . I now consider a day T as a date for which all forward
contracts are martingales. Assuming that t1 and t2 are future points in time and
PN is a notional amount, the basic payoff of a Eurodollar contract should be
PN(1 − L(t1, t2)). As such, the fair price of Eurodollar future contract PEt can
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be expressed as follows:
PEt = Et
[
PN
(
1− L(t1, t2)
)] ≡ PN(1− Et[L(t1, t2)])
= PN
(
1− Et
[ 360
t2 − t1
( 1
PB(t1, t2)
− 1)]) ≡ PN(1− Et[1
4
( 1
PB(t1, t2)
− 1)])
= PN
(
1 +
1
4
− 1
4
Et
[ 1
PB(t1, t2)
])
, (2.2)
where PN is a notional amount and Et is the expectation operator. For the 90-day
Eurodollar contract referenced to the 3-month LIBOR, its future price P F (t, T )
on the settlement day T is
P F (t, T ) = 100
(
1− L(t, t+ 90)). (2.3)
Therefore, the value of this Eurodollar Future is
PET = 100
(
1− L(t, t+ 90)) ≡ 100(1− 4( 1
PB(t, t+ 90)
− 1
))
= 100
(
1− 1
4
P F (t, t+ 90)
)
. (2.4)
It is fairly evident that the future variation in L(·) must be a semi-martingale
(SM) for there to be a “fair” valuation of the futures contract from the viewpoint
of the long and short positions – see Brigo and Mercurio [2006] or Karatzas
and Kardaras [2007] for an extended discussion of this requirement. Critically,
as pointed out in Karatzas and Kardaras [2007], there need not be a complete
absence of arbitrage, but the weaker form of ‘No Unbounded Profit with Bounded
Risk’ for the construction of an appropriate nume´raire for the price process. My
analysis does not require any specific functional form; however, for the purposes
of asset pricing my framework could be easily transposed from being a measure
of market quality to a high frequency asset pricing factor.
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That the fixing L(t, t+ 90) is a SM is a point of considerable recent discussion in
the regulatory literature. As previously mentioned, up to 1 May 2014 Barclays
Bank, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland, Rabobank and Deutsche Bank have settled,
or been fined for, allegations with regulatory bodies led by the US CFTC for
manipulation of key rates. In the settlement reports the 3-month dollar LIBOR
was noted several times as being a key target for manipulation of the fixing. 1
2.1.1 Trading Eurodollar Futures
When designing statistical experiments on ultra-high-frequency data, understand-
ing of the institutional arrangements within the transactional market matters.
Eurodollar futures are traded in two ways, first via open-outcry and second via an
electronic centrally cleared market. The most actively traded Eurodollar futures
have quarterly deliveries and extend out to ten years from contract rollover to
maturity. These contracts mature during the months of March, June, September,
or December, extending outward 10 years into the future. Since the Eurodollar
time deposits cannot be transferred or used as collateral for loans, the Eurodollar
future cannot be made by physical delivery at maturity – settlement is always to
cash. CME is the electronic and open-outcry clearing house for these contracts.
The exchange operates continuous electronic trading from 5 pm (Chicago time)
Sunday to 4 pm (Chicago time) Fridays. Open-outcry runs from 7:20 am (Chicago
time) to 2 pm (Chicago time) Monday to Friday. The electronic trading market
is the CME GLOBEX (centrally cleared limit order book) located centrally in
Chicago. Unlike energy futures with physical delivery, no Eurodollars are cleared
1See http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/
legalpleading/enfbarclaysorder062712.pdf pp. 6–11 for the Barclays’ Bank report. Page 6
specifically refers to “Three-Month Eurodollar Futures” and this forms the basis of the CFTC’s
remit for this section of the charge.
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by over-the-counter (ClearPort) transactions, so my dataset is the complete his-
tory of the inside-quotes. One interesting issue is that of “iceberg” orders – these
are permitted for this contract and are labelled by CME as a maxShow option.
Cleared iceberg trades appear on the trades tapes as a cleared trade (often within
the inside-spread) with volume attached (200 contracts is a very common iceberg
trade size) much larger than the surrounding quotes. Whilst some anecdotal evi-
dence on the price impact implication of iceberg trades exists within out dataset,
I leave a comprehensive analysis of these trades for future work.
Most Eurodollar Futures are settled quarterly; the top code is ED and this covers
both open-outcry and electronic settlement1. The codes for Eurodollars are de-
noted H (March), M (June), U (September) and Z (December). The last trading
day is the second business day prior to the third Wednesday of the settlement
month. Positions in excess of 10,000 contracts (recall that each contract is one
million dollars) have limited trading (i.e. have position accountability) to the
exchange and positions in excess of 850 contracts are reportable to the weekly
CFTC commitment of traders report. As shown by the descriptives of my dataset,
individual trades of in excess of 10,000 contracts are actually fairly common so
the analysis of the Commitments of Traders (COT) report is relatively useful for
this contract.
For each settlement quarter (H, M, U and Z), there are 10 maturities ranging from
years ending in 0 to 9. Therefore 40 types of contract are simultaneously traded
from EDH0 to EDZ9. The nearest maturity contract is the one delivering to
coded quarter closest to the current date with a year ending in the same number
as the present year. For instance, if today is March 11, 2014, then the nearest
1Note that Bloomberg tickers restrict the code ED to only electronically traded futures;
my access to the historical CME tapes is by Thomson Reuters where GE reflects the electronic
trades only.
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delivery is EDH4 delivering on Wednesday, March 19, 2014. On Thursday, March
20, 2014, the EDH4 contract will then become the longest maturity contract, with
settlement on Wednesday, March 20, 2024. The actual settlement is termed as
being T + 2, i.e. the rate is the rate on the last business day two days prior to the
third Wednesday (this must be a business day in both New York and London,
so very occasionally this moves). Rates are rounded to the nearest 1/100 of a
basis point and are settled in cash. CME timestamps the Eurodollar futures
prices using millisecond stamps and the tapes retain these tick-times. Table 2.1
illustrates the EDH0 quotes data over 4 min around noon GMT (6 am EST)
on January 3, 2006 with the GLOBEX millisecond timestamps included. More
recently a monthly contract for the “near years” has been issued and traded
at a substantially lower volume than the nearest maturity quarterly contracts.
My analysis indicates that the pattern for these contracts is consistent with the
quarterly contracts in spite of the lower volume of trades – results can be found
in my online appendix.1
In Figure 2.2 (a) and Figure 2.2 (b), I provide two daily snapshots of the best-bid
best-offer, the mid-price and the executed trade prices for the March 2010 matu-
rity Eurodollar future. Figure 2.2 (a) illustrates the trading in a 2.5-year maturity
futures contract for September 10, 2007. We can see that the spread during the
early part of the day is at nearly two basis points – very few transactions occur at
this stage. As the day progresses, quote updates increase and so do the number
of trades, some of which are outside the best-bid best-offer (the magenta trade
markers). Quote updating at the inside-spread during this day is measured in
seconds and even minutes. By contrast, Figure 2.2 (b) shows that when the same
coded contract is observed within one year to maturity, the update speed declines
1The online appendix contains supplemental information about this thesis. As it is too
large to upload to the submission system, you can find it at https://www.dropbox.com/s/
uxbilz8879azdkb/Thesis_OnlineAppendix.pdf?dl=0
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Table 2.1: Inside Quotes Data Structure
Notes: This table displays the raw inside quotes data structure of EDH0 quotes on
January 3, 2006. I gather Eurodollar futures contract Quotes and Trades bid price and
volume, ask price and volume, and trades price and volume in milliseconds. The data
are sourced from the Thomson Reuters Tick History database (February 2014).
to sub-seconds and the number of transactions becomes higher. To my eyes, the
spread does not vary much over the day, however we can see that quoting activity
and density of transactions appear concomitant through the density of the trade
markers. However, the actual variance and kurtosis of the spread over this day is
far higher than is visible in the simple plot. There are a number of trades outside
the best-bid best-offer, in Figure 2.2 (b) but the proportion is much lower than
in the first trading epoch.
The extent of algorithmic trading is relatively unknown in this market. However,
two facts support the conjecture that algorithmic trading of these contracts is
both possible and present. The first rationale is the Globex market platform
itself. The fastest access is via the GLink system which provides co-location
options for traders and as such there is no technical reason to prevent high-
frequency algorithmic trading. The second observation comes from the data. For
contracts near maturity there is evidence of level of quoting and re-quoting at
speeds beyond the reaction capacity of a human being (less than 200 milliseconds).
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(a) Trades and inside quotes in EDH0 (March, 2010 maturity) on September 10, 2007
00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00
98.2
98.3
98.4
98.5
98.6
98.7
98.8
98.9
99
 
 
Trade Inside BB−BO
Trade Outside BB−BO
Asks
Bids
Mid Price
(b) Trades and inside quotes in EDH0 (March, 2010 Maturity) on June 5, 2009
Figure 2.2: Trades and Inside Quotes in EDH0 (March, 2010 maturity)
Notes: Figure (a) is trades and inside quotes in EDH0 on September 10, 2007: the best bid,
best ask, the middle price and the executed price. The total volume on this day is $8.113 billion
with 63,520 observations of asks and 63,534 observations of bids. Total trades observations are
1,016 with 14 trades outside the best bid and best ask. NOTE that the images are enlarged for
review purposes only and are for illustrative purposes only. Figure (b) is trades and quotes in
EDH0 on June 5, 2009, which has the largest daily trade observations for EDH0 with $449,988
billion volume of trades. Total trades observations are 30,030 with 34 trades outside the best
bid and best ask. 435,611 asks and 435,544 bids are observed on this day. For data purposes
I treat a day as being 00:00:00.001 CST to 11:59.59.999 CST, however, my plots follow the
scientific literature and I plot the day from 00:00:00.001 UCT to 11:59.59.999 UCT.
37
I find a large number of reacting bids/asks that occur at “identical” millisecond
stamps, indicating that the trade initiation is in fact faster than one millisecond.
I will now review some of the current literature relating to algorithmic trading at
high frequencies.
As a subset of algorithmic trading, high-frequency trading is usually defined as
computer-based transactions that are designed and initiated at speeds faster than
any human being could manage (sub-200 ms is a standard benchmark). The rise
of HFT follows two developments: first, the relatively steep drop in the cost
of high performance computing environments; and second, competition between
exchanges resulting in increased speed of execution and far lower latency times.
2.1.2 A Brief Review of High Speed Quoting and Volatil-
ity
The ability to execute orders at millisecond and sub-millisecond speed has been
the subject of considerable recent analysis, see Hendershott et al. [2011], Hen-
dershott and Moulton [2011] and Riordan and Storkenmaier [2012] for a series
of recent empirical work in this area. There is evidence that for some stocks, in
particular large-cap stocks, automated trading has increased liquidity [Hender-
shott et al., 2011]. The increase in automated trading results in a reduction in
bid-ask spreads, thereby reducing transactions costs for investors and indicating
increased market depth. Similarly, Riordan and Storkenmaier [2012] report that
after technological innovation resulting in latency reductions for HFT systems,
liquidity increased across market capitalization. Hendershott and Moulton [2011]
study the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) system in 2006 and indicate that
prices become more efficient due to faster price discovery – subsequently this
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reduces the noise surrounding the efficient price of the asset.
HFT traders have been found to provide a high liquidity by keeping up prices
and trading volumes at some level and smoothing the price volatility. Since
HFT has been widely applied to exchanged trading, the most popular questions
regarding HFT should be about the beneficial effects of HFT on the economy.
Prior researches on this topic mainly examine the relationship between HFT
and a variety of aspects of market quality, such as liquidity, volatility, depth,
profitability and price discovery.
HFT as a mechanism for causing excess volatility in bid and ask quotes, resulting
in excessive execution price risks for investors, is a well-studied conjecture. Since
the flash crash in 2010, there has been general concern that volatility could in-
crease and resiliency could degrade as technology improvements enhance trading
speed. To discover how abnormal HFT activity varies with abnormal volatility,
Brogaard [2012] adopts the NASDAQ-HFT and BATS-HFT datasets to estimate
the short-term volatility. The findings show a positive relation between abnormal
HFT marketable order participation and abnormal volatility.
Using the same NASDAQ-HFT dataset, Brogaard et al. [2014] investigate the
related issue of the behavior of HFTs during times of market stress. The volumes
of high-frequency traders increase on the daily highest volatility, which suggests
that HFT is more active during market stress times. Brogaard et al. [2014]
add a corollary to this analysis by suggesting that HFT actually improves price
discovery on days with high intrinsic volatility. This ‘critical-saturation’ point for
HFTs or ATs in the market is a finding I will demonstrate substantive evidence
for in the latter part of my study. Using an alternative experimental setting,
Hagstro¨mer and Norde´n [2013] assess the effect of passive HFT activities on short-
term volatility based on tick size changes. The findings indicate that increased
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passive, market-making, activities have the ability to cause a decrease in short-
term volatility, although the density of HFTs is not studies in this instance.
At a structural level, away from the technological evolution, the relation between
the price volatility and futures contracts with respect to time to expiration has
been comprehensively studied. The classic theoretical treatment being Samuelson
[1965] who proposes that futures price volatility should increase when contracts
are close to expiration. This behavior is denoted as the ‘maturity effect’ in the
extant literature. A great number of empirical studies, using a variety of exper-
imental approaches, have been based around detecting evidence for or against
the Samuelson conjecture; albeit with very mixed results see [Anderson and Dan-
thine, 1983; Bessembinder et al., 1996; Bollen and Inder, 2002; Chen et al., 1999;
Daal et al., 2006; Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Grammatikos and Saunders, 1986;
Gurrola and Herrer´ıas, 2011; Han et al., 1999; Kalev and Duong, 2008; Khoury
and Yourougou, 1993; Milonas, 1986] for about a 50:50 split on confirming the
volatility adjustment versus rejecting it.
In my study I will combine the HFT literature with the analysis of maturity effects
in futures contracts to build a picture of the microstructure lifecycle of a given
contract. Maturity effects have usually been studied in relation to agricultural
futures contracts rather than financial futures [Bessembinder et al., 1996; Kalev
and Duong, 2008], and historically the focus has been on trying to explain why
the maturity effect is not working for all markets from an economic perspective.
Studies such as by Bessembinder et al. [1996] point out that if a market has
negative covariance between spot price changes and change of net carry costs,
this market usually appears to have the maturity effects. Bessembinder et al.
[1996] also indicate that negative correlation and covariation usually occur in
physical assets instead of financial assets. In contrast, Hong [2000] argues that the
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variation of informed trading in the market have different effects on the maturity
effects of return volatility as contracts roll to the expiration. When the degree of
information asymmetry is relative low, the Samuelson effect exists in the future
market. While the Samuelson effect does not hold in the future market when
the degree of information asymmetry is relative high. Comparative studies such
as Kalev and Duong [2008] confirm that the maturity effect usually follows with
the negative covariance condition, and they find little support for visible maturity
effects in the Eurodollar futures market. This is in contrast to my findings, which
indicates that the maturity effect in Eurodollar futures is primarily in the variance
ratios as the contract approaches maturity and that the causation for this change
in the variance scaling varies as I see high frequency trading activities peak and
then dip just prior to maturity, with one year to two months from maturity giving
the highest proportion of high frequency, possibly speculative, trading.
The most closely related prior study to this chapter is by Hasbrouck [2014]. To
evaluate the short-term quote volatility in the US equity market, Hasbrouck ex-
amines the variance ratios at different timescales from 50 ms to 27 min for the
US equity National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). An important contribution of
Hasbrouck’s study is in analyzing volatility in prices, rather than in returns.
Inside-quote volatility at high frequency is determined over 16 wavelet levels
using both short-term data in 2011 and long-term historical data from 2001
to 2011. At short-term quote volatility in the US equity market, Hasbrouck
[2014] demonstrates that short-term quote variance is larger than variance in
long timestamps. Moreover, bid-ask correlations are positive but low at sub-
second timescales, which suggests that the bid and offer are not moving together.
Hasbrouck utilizes a simulation approach to estimate millisecond-level volatility
analysis with second-stamped quotes data. He finds high correlations between the
original timestamp estimation and the simulated estimation. For the long-term
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historical analysis, the highest quote volatilities occurred during the 2004–2006
period, this coincides with the transition to electronic trading in the US markets
and a share rise in HFT.
2.2 The Hasbrouck Wavelet Approach
Hasbrouck [2014] employs a Haar wavelet method to evaluate the information
contained in high-frequency data. Wavelet analysis has been widely used for
processing fundamental signal tasks, such as compression, abatement of noise,
or optimizing a recorded sound or image. Wavelets are widely utilized in eco-
nomics and finance as well, for a non-exhaustive list of applications see: [Conlon
and Cotter, 2012; Conlon et al., 2008; Galagedera and Maharaj, 2008; Gencay
et al., 2002; Lien and Shrestha, 2007; Percival and Mofjeld, 1997; Percival and
Walden, 2000; Rua and Nunes, 2009]. As with all wavelets, the Haar basis is a
multi-resolution analysis; that is the decomposition of a signal into sub-signals
of different size resolution levels, the number of partitions is given by 2levels as
the sample is progressively partitioned. Whilst my approach is effectively in line
with Hasbrouck [2014], some differences are present given the varying nature of
my data, hence I review the implementation in some detail.
The wavelet transform is often compared with the Fourier transform in so far
as: the raw format of most signals is in the time-domain; the Fourier transform
determines the frequency content of signals; the transform is invertible and both
continuous and discrete time approximations exist. However, there are limita-
tions to the Fourier transform often not present in a wavelet. Time information
is lost after transforming the signal to the frequency domain, so that it becomes
impossible to tell what happened in some periods. Many signals contain inter-
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esting transient response characteristics, such as drifts, trends, sudden changes,
even the beginning and end of signals. These features have all been shown to be
characteristics of financial data, especially high and ultra-high frequency data.
To overcome the shortcomings of the Fourier approach, Gabor [1946] proposes a
short-time Fourier transform (also known as the Gabor transform). The short-
time Fourier transform is a technique to transform a time-domain signal to two-
dimensional functions with both the time and frequency domains. It provides the
information contained in signals in a certain time and a certain frequency range.
The accuracy of the information depends on the time window size. However, time
window sizes of the short-time Fourier transform are the same for all frequency
components. Many signals need diverse time windows to obtain more accurate
time and frequency information.
The wavelet transform is an advanced approach to overcome the limitations of
both the Fourier transform and Gabor transform to obtain further information.
Generally speaking, the main difference between the wavelet transform and the
Fourier transform is that wavelets can be localized in both time and frequency,
while the Fourier transform is only localized in frequency. Since the wavelet
transform combines information from the time domain and the frequency domain,
it has more flexibility than the Fourier transform. Compared with the short-
time Fourier transform, the wavelet transform proposes time windows of flexible
width. When low-frequency information is needed, the wavelet transform uses a
long time window. A short time window can be employed to accurately analyze
high-frequency information.
The Haar wavelet is an example of an orthogonal system of functions defined
on the unit interval [0,1] [Haar, 1910]. There are two functions that play key
roles in wavelet analysis: the scaling function (father wavelet) and the wavelet
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(mother wavelet). The scaling function S (k) corresponding to the Haar wavelet
can be defined by S (k) = 1|0 ≤ 1 or S (k) = 0|∀k > 1. The Haar wavelet’s
mother function H (k) is defined over the domain H (k) = 1|0 ≤ k < 1/2
or H (k) = −1|1/2 ≤ k < 1 and 0 otherwise. The scaling equation of the
Haar wavelet is therefore: S (k) = S (2k) + S (2k + 1) and hence S (k) =
1√
2
√
2S (2k)+ 1√
2
√
2S (2k−1), so the Haar wavelet filter coefficients are γ0 = γ1 =
1√
2
. The Haar mother wavelet contains a short positive pulse followed by a short
negative pulse, as such the Haar wavelet belongs to an orthogonal system in the
field of real numbers. In a useful result for asset pricing Paul Levy demonstrated
that the Haar wavelet is more accurate in its local approximation if subdivided
into different intervals, while the Fourier functions only have one interval Meyer
[1993] provides a comprehensive summary of the statistical properties of the Haar
wavelet amongst others.
My objective is to compute the ratios of the bid (subscript B) and ask variance
(subscript A) and covariance (subscript AB) at differing timescales, usually rela-
tive to the daily variation. Let the bid, ask and trade prices of Eurodollar Futures
be considered as a discrete sequence of prices P = {Pi,1, Pi,2, . . . , Pi,t}. The vari-
ance and covariance ratios are denoted respectively R˜B, R˜A and R˜A,B. In each
case, I have a variance–covariance ratio operator of the form:
R˜i[v, v
′] =
 1Mvσ2i,Tv .( 1Mv′ σ2i,Tv′ )−1, i ∈ {A,B}1
Mv
σi,Tv .(
1
Mv′
σi,Tv′ )
−1, i ∈ {AB}
(2.5)
setting d ∈ {v, v′} to represent to time scale indices v and v′,
σ2i,Td = E[(Pi − E[Pi])2]|Td, i ∈ {A,B} (2.6)
σi,Td = E[(PA − E[PA])(PB − E[PB])]|Td, i ∈ {AB} (2.7)
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where Td represents an exact time scaling (milliseconds, seconds, minutes, hours,
days), σ2i,Td for i ∈ {A,B} is the variance at that time scale with σ2i,Td for i ∈ {AB}
is the covariance, and 1
Md
j ∈ {v, w} is a factor that coverts σ2i,Td and σ2i,Td into
a common time scale. If prices follow a random walk with constant volatility
then the ratio operator R˜i,d → 1. Although it should be noted that this is not a
sufficient condition to identify the time series as a random walk. The conditional
suffix |Td denotes the time scaling that the expectation E[.] operates over. It is
useful to have a general labelling of the time scale due to the properties of the
filter that I will apply to estimate the scaled average price E[Pi].
The focus of my analysis is on the bids and asks components and computing σ2i,Tv
and σi,Tv . Notice that the variances are in terms of price levels and not returns,
Hasbrouck [2014] offers a quite convincing argument that when estimating mi-
crostructure effects the deviations from the efficient price will, in all likelihood,
be transient, rather than persistent.
I use a wavelet filter to a) identify the time scale and b) provide a local average
price. I can think of the time scaling as being a series of local averages and the
wavelet provides a convenient systematic approach to determining the local time
scales. The basic wavelet constructs are the basis functions and these are formed
according to the ruleHw(k) = 2w/2H (2wk−d), where w ∈ Z denotes as a unique
time scale level, d ∈ Z, which sets out the scheme for determining the series of
local averages at scale d.
One of the fundamental advantages of wavelet analysis is the capability to de-
compose time series into different components. Based on the concept of multi-
resolution analysis, a time series can be decomposed into different elements as-
sociated with a unique timescale level w. Figure 2.3 represents the multi-level
wavelet decomposition process. The original signal is split into high-frequency
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Figure 2.3: Wavelet Decomposition Tree
Notes: This figure represents the multi-level wavelet decomposition process. The orig-
inal prices (Pk) is split into high-frequency components (Hw) and low-frequency com-
ponents (Lw), where k is the intraday time index and w is the timescale levels. For a
length 2w vector of observations, the vector Sw is a smooth component, which equals
to the sample mean and defined the wth-level wavelet smooth. The residual Rw stands
for a rough component at timescale level w.
components (Hw) and low-frequency components (Lw). For a length l = 2
w
vector of observations, the vector Sw is equal to the sample mean and defined
the wth-level wavelet smooth, while Rw stands for the residuals. I can think of
these as being 2w local averages. Hasbrouck [2014] argument is that the mi-
crostructure noise components are stationary in levels (as opposed to returns for
GARCH type models) and that a local averaging approach provides a better ap-
proximation of the central tendency of the variance than differencing. Indeed, as
is demonstrated in Meyer [1993], locally flat domains are easily filtered by the
wavelet and subtracted from cross wavelet covariance estimation, a feature that
causes standard quadratic regression methods considerable difficulty. Notation-
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ally, therefore, wavelet multi-resolution analysis can be defined as:
Pw = Sw +Rw (2.8)
I assume that the wavelet smooth S is the local mean of length l ending at a
time k, which can be calculated as S(l, k) = l−1(pk + pk−1 +· · · + pk−l−1) where
the deviation equals R(l, k, s˜) = ps˜ − S(l, k) and s˜ is a tick-time, such that
k − l < s˜ ≤ k.
Eurodollar Futures prices Pk = Pk−1 + εk, where εk is a white-noise process with
unit variance. Hence, the mean square deviation, M, can be expressed as
M(l, k) = l−1
k∑
s˜=k−l+1
[R(l, k, s˜)]2 (2.9)
The expectation can be simplified to E[M(l, k)] = V ar[R(l, k, s˜)] = σ2l . The
mean S(l, k) is a smooth component, the residual series R(l, k, s˜) is a rough
component. So the rough variance is σ2l ≡ σ2lw at the timescale lw = l02w−1,
where σ2l reflects variation at timescale lw and shorter. The incremental change
in moving from timescale level w − 1 to w is ν2w = σ2w − σ2w−1, where ν2w reflects
the incremental variance (or wavelet variance) at timescale level w and σ2w is a
rough variance. Hence I can approximate the exact time scaled R˜i,d, from the
nearest R˜i,w computed from the scaled ratio of σ2w to another scale σ
2
w′ .
Interpretation of the covariance ratio is relatively clear, if the covariance decreases
(that is the covariation at high frequency is less than the covariation at the lower
frequency) then the bid and ask prices have decoupled. Some degree of decoupling
is to be expected as the update of order flow is discrete at the highest frequency,
hence one price (the bid or the ask) will be expected to lead the other at different
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points. Over a day this will even itself out, so as the frequency decreases, the
degree of coupling will naturally increase.
If high frequency trading increases liquidity and decreases latency, then the degree
of decoupling should be less when there are more HFTs in the market. However,
if a HFT from ATs is designed to deliberately obfuscate the order-flow to enable a
manipulative market trading strategy, then I might anticipate that the degree of
decoupling will be higher and hence R˜AB[w,w′] will decrease. In terms of variance
the ratios R˜A[w,w′] and R˜B[w,w′] denote the excess volatility at wavelet time
scale w relative to w′. Hence, higher levels of R˜A[w,w′] and R˜B[w,w′] represent
a higher degree of risk for buyers and sellers at the point of execution.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section I introduce the data processing procedures and provide a summary
of the descriptive statistics of the sample. I have constructed a unique dataset for
the 40 quarterly Eurodollar Futures contracts from January 1, 1996 to December
31, 2013. My futures data was obtained from CME exchange tapes via Thomson
Reuters and is available for researchers to purchase, given the volume of data
within the order book and the long sample of time this is likely to be the largest
study of its type ever conducted. Each is labelled by a Reuters Instrument Code
(RIC), such as EDH0, EDH1, . . . , EDZ9 (see Table 2.2). The 40 Eurodollar
Futures contain all Eurodollar quotes and transactions on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange’s Globex platform. The last trading day for Eurodollar contracts is two
business days prior to the third Wednesday of the delivery month. Table 2.2 shows
the settlement date, duration, the average of bid price, the average of bid volume,
the average of ask price, the average of ask volume, the average of trade price
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and the average of trade volume for ED contracts having their delivery months
in the same year.
Table 2.2: Size Data Sample for Time and Sale Data
RIC Duration
Trades Asks Bids
Average Average Average Average Average Average
Volume no. of obs. Volume no. of obs. Volume no. of obs.
($ trillion) (million) ($ quadrillion) (million) ($ quadrillion) (million)
ED?0 2000-2010 28.22 1.64 47.38 23.04 46.09 22.92
ED?1 2001-2011 15.00 1.50 74.23 23.34 74.73 23.39
ED?2 2002-2012 12.54 1.45 69.64 24.05 68.23 24.20
ED?3 2003-2013 12.69 1.38 181.74 24.05 183.37 24.17
ED?4 2004-2014 22.11 1.62 171.92 24.53 166.41 24.60
ED?5 1995-2005 38.99 1.92 83.23 25.65 80.73 25.79
ED?6 1996-2006 43.77 1.68 56.75 25.17 57.18 25.23
ED?7 1997-2007 58.98 1.36 65.88 21.88 66.62 21.98
ED?8 1998-2008 69.24 1.62 35.92 21.78 36.49 21.92
ED?9 1999-2009 49.23 1.90 19.85 23.31 19.74 23.32
Notes: This table depicts data sample for time and sale data. The roll-over dates of the
40 Eurodollar quarterly trade futures and the average number of observations plus the
average volume of bids, asks and trades. The time and sale data are from the Thomson
Reuters Tick History database for January 1, 1996 to January 1, 2014, labelled by the
Reuters Instrument Code (RIC; EDH0, EDH1, . . . , EDZ9). I calculate the average
value for ED contracts having their maturity date in the same year, denoted ED?0,
ED?1, . . . , ED?9. Hence, ED?0 includes four 10-year future contracts from 2000 to
2010 – namely, EDH0, EDM0, EDU0 and EDZ0. Note, that the minimum tick size on
the exchange is 1/4 of a basis point for the nearest expiring contract and 1/2 otherwise.
Specifically, ED?0 includes four 10-year future contracts from 2000 to 2010,
namely, EDH0, EDM0, EDU0 and EDZ0 (see Table 2.2). Their delivery months
are March 2010, June 2010, September 2010 and December 2012, respectively.
The average number of ED?0 bids and asks are both 23 million approximately
and the number of trades is 1.64 million. The average volume of ED?0 trades,
asks and bids are $28.22 trillion, $47.38 quadrillion and $46.09 quadrillion, re-
spectively. Across the 40 ED contracts by year of delivery, ED?3 has the largest
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average bids volume ($183.37 quadrillion) and the largest average asks volume
($181.74 quadrillion). The largest trades volume is the ED?8 contract with $69.24
trillion. Furthermore, ED?5 has the largest average number of bids, asks and
trades, with approximately 25.79 million observations of asks, 25.65 million ob-
servations of bids and 1.92 million observations of trades.
To avoid unnecessary replication, I report the EDH? (? ∈ {0, . . . , 9}) futures
only in this chapter. However, my results are consistent across the contracts,
and these results are available in the online appendix which provides a variety of
subsampling and robustness checks.
Figure 2.4 plots the best bid, best ask and trades for the EDH0 from 1996 to
2013. EDH0 is a 10-year future contract (settlement at March 2000, 2010 and
2020) with the most recent settlement date being March 17, 2010. The number
of updated bids and asks are both 23 million approximately, and the updated
ask and bid volumes are $35 quadrillion and $38 quadrillion respectively. Bids
prices, asks prices and trades prices of EDH0 are marked by the red line, green
line and blue line, respectively, although the trades are masked almost entirely
by the roughly 20:1 quote to trade ratio.
The long-term evolution of EDH0 illustrated in Figure 2.4, it plots the evolution
of this contract from long forward rate to near-spot forward rate over these three
epochs. The most dramatic shift is the near collapse in the short rate during
2008. Over this period, some 24 million quotes were submitted, with the notional
value of outstanding interest in the quadrillions of dollars. After gathering all 40
Eurodollar Futures data I split them into two parts. The first sub-sample is from
January 1, 1996 to July 31, 2007; the second is from August 1, 2007 to December
31, 2013. Then I eliminate all the data with prices smaller than $80. For the
remainder of the chapter, I will use days to maturity as the time index, instead
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of the actual calendar date.
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Figure 2.4: EDH0 Contract Inside Spreads
Notes: This plot depicts EDH0 inside quotes from 1996 to 2013, for 2000, 2010 and
2020 deliveries. The two rollovers of this contract code are denoted by the dotted lines.
Table 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics for each EDH future contract in these
two periods. Descriptive statistics of the other 30 ED contracts can be found
in the online appendix. Mean, median and mode of bid-ask spread are in basis
points (bps) and mean returns are in one-millionth. For the first sub-sample (see
Table 2.3 period A), the highest mean bid-ask spread belongs to EDH2 contract
with 2.22 bps, but its median spread is only 0.5353 bps. The mean and median
are far apart for EDH2, with 805.8972 in the kurtosis of the spread. The highest
median spread occurs in EDH1 contract with 2.1042 bps, which also has the
highest mean trades return. The smallest mean bid-ask spread belongs to EDH6
– only 0.6091 bps. Although EDH7 has the highest bids volume with $63.842
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quadrillion, its mean trades return is the lowest among all the ten EDH futures.
In the second sub-sample (see Table 2.3 period B), EDH7 has both the highest
mean spread and mean returns. Due to the extreme value existence, its median
spread is only 0.5149 bps with 2,337 kurtosis spread. EDH7 also shows the
highest mean returns. On the other hand, EDH0 expresses the lowest mean
spread and mean return. Furthermore, EDH4 has the highest asks volume with
$220.811 quadrillion. The largest trade volume is the EDH9 contract with $52.2
trillion. Meanwhile, EDH3 has the largest asks observations with approximately
24 million. The differences are relatively minor compared to the overall quantity
of trading, for contracts maturing in 2009 to 2011 trading volume is high and
this indicates that the safety of Eurodollar deposits were in demand at this time
of financial market stress. It is noticeable that the spreads widened during this
period and the price of these contracts fell, this can be seen in Figure 2.4.
More specifically, the mean bid-ask spread of EDH0 in the second period is smaller
than that before 2007. The same pattern appears in the median and mode of its
bid-ask spread. For EDH0 trades prices, we can see its mean returns, maximum
returns and minimum returns. However, the maximum bid-ask spread, skewness
spread and kurtosis spread after 2007 are larger than in the first period. This
indicates that the closer to the maturity date, the narrower the bid-ask spreads
and the higher the frequency of trading for ED contracts. What is particularly
interesting is that the contracts maturing throughout the 2007–2012 period have
the highest kurtosis indicating that even for a market with the renowned depth
of the Eurodollar, substantial liquidity shocks were felt.
52
T
ab
le
2.
3:
F
ir
st
Q
u
ar
te
r
D
el
iv
er
y
C
on
tr
ac
ts
S
ta
ti
st
ic
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
R
IC
M
e
a
n
M
e
d
ia
n
M
o
d
e
M
a
x
S
t.
d
e
v
S
k
e
w
n
e
ss
K
u
r
to
si
s
M
e
a
n
M
a
x
M
in
S
t.
d
e
v
S
k
e
w
n
e
ss
K
u
r
to
si
s
sp
r
e
a
d
sp
r
e
a
d
sp
r
e
a
d
sp
r
e
a
d
sp
r
e
a
d
sp
r
e
a
d
sp
r
e
a
d
r
e
tu
r
n
s
r
e
tu
r
n
s
r
e
tu
r
n
s
r
e
tu
r
n
s
r
e
tu
r
n
s
r
e
tu
r
n
s
(b
p
s)
(b
p
s)
(b
p
s)
(b
p
s)
(o
n
e
m
il
li
o
n
th
)
(b
p
s)
P
e
ri
o
d
A
:
J
a
n
u
ra
y
1
9
9
6
-
J
u
ly
2
0
0
7
E
D
H
0
1
.4
5
7
5
1
.0
5
6
7
1
.0
5
1
0
0
.0
5
4
7
3
.2
7
2
5
4
2
.3
1
1
3
2
,7
1
7
.6
9
2
8
0
.0
9
4
3
0
.0
1
3
8
-0
.0
1
9
8
2
.0
3
6
1
-9
.6
6
4
7
2
,6
8
1
.4
8
2
8
E
D
H
1
2
.1
9
7
9
2
.1
0
4
2
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
5
2
5
4
.3
6
4
2
2
7
.4
0
6
8
1
,2
4
2
.8
0
4
5
0
.0
9
9
4
0
.0
1
0
8
-0
.0
2
0
1
1
.7
5
6
3
-1
7
.4
1
7
1
3
,3
1
8
.1
7
5
5
E
D
H
2
2
.2
1
8
5
0
.5
3
5
3
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
7
2
6
8
.4
8
6
1
2
3
.6
4
3
5
8
0
5
.8
9
7
2
0
.0
8
1
1
0
.0
1
0
9
-0
.0
5
6
3
2
.2
0
6
5
-1
6
5
.9
4
8
9
4
2
,3
2
8
.8
5
6
5
E
D
H
3
2
.1
4
4
8
0
.5
2
4
2
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
4
2
5
7
.4
0
7
3
1
4
.8
2
6
6
3
3
3
.8
1
3
3
0
.0
5
9
5
0
.0
0
9
2
-0
.0
5
5
6
1
.8
3
2
0
-1
9
9
.0
7
3
3
6
0
,5
3
4
.4
9
7
6
E
D
H
4
1
.6
9
7
3
1
.0
1
0
6
0
.5
0
5
9
0
.1
1
1
5
4
.7
5
2
9
3
7
.7
8
5
1
6
,3
8
5
.3
0
4
5
0
.0
6
1
6
0
.0
0
8
1
-0
.0
6
2
3
1
.9
8
6
3
-2
2
4
.2
6
2
9
7
0
,6
0
0
.9
5
9
1
E
D
H
5
0
.9
0
5
2
0
.5
1
4
2
0
.5
1
5
3
2
.2
5
1
6
2
7
.9
4
7
0
7
9
8
.4
5
7
8
6
4
3
,1
6
2
.1
3
5
8
0
.0
1
6
2
0
.0
2
7
9
-0
.0
3
0
2
0
.9
0
4
1
-7
4
.3
4
1
9
6
0
,3
5
4
.1
0
9
7
E
D
H
6
0
.6
0
9
1
0
.5
2
1
6
0
.5
2
5
0
0
.0
5
7
9
1
.0
2
7
5
8
3
.0
0
7
1
1
8
,8
3
2
.3
8
8
9
-0
.0
1
2
3
0
.0
4
0
0
-0
.0
4
0
5
0
.8
5
5
5
-3
6
.9
4
6
2
1
3
3
,7
6
3
.0
8
3
1
E
D
H
7
0
.6
6
8
5
0
.5
2
7
1
0
.5
2
8
4
0
.0
6
2
0
2
.7
8
6
9
6
7
.0
6
5
7
6
,0
7
7
.5
8
1
7
-0
.0
1
6
6
0
.0
0
4
3
-0
.0
2
6
0
0
.6
2
6
8
-1
0
1
.5
7
7
7
3
9
,9
9
8
.7
2
3
6
E
D
H
8
0
.6
7
1
5
0
.5
2
6
7
0
.5
2
5
8
0
.0
6
2
0
1
.1
5
1
9
1
3
4
.6
6
6
2
4
1
,9
8
4
.5
6
7
4
0
.0
0
9
4
0
.0
0
5
9
-0
.0
0
9
7
0
.5
7
8
0
-8
.6
8
8
2
2
,4
7
0
.0
0
6
6
E
D
H
9
0
.8
6
5
0
0
.5
2
7
7
0
.5
2
4
6
0
.1
1
5
6
1
.8
8
1
0
1
5
2
.5
4
5
5
6
8
,2
8
6
.2
4
8
8
0
.0
3
8
9
0
.0
4
4
2
-0
.0
4
4
2
1
.5
6
9
1
-7
.0
5
5
8
5
1
,2
2
3
.3
2
8
9
P
e
ri
o
d
B
:
A
u
g
u
st
2
0
0
7
-
D
ec
e
m
be
r2
0
1
3
E
D
H
0
0
.9
6
0
9
0
.5
1
7
0
0
.5
0
1
4
0
.1
5
5
3
1
.9
4
3
4
1
3
1
.6
1
4
4
7
0
,6
9
8
.0
7
3
3
0
.0
0
3
3
0
.0
0
7
9
-0
.0
5
6
7
0
.5
7
0
4
-6
0
9
.5
4
2
9
6
0
7
,8
3
1
.4
6
7
3
E
D
H
1
1
.3
1
7
9
0
.5
1
1
8
0
.5
0
2
1
0
.1
8
4
8
3
.9
2
7
4
8
7
.3
8
2
8
2
7
,6
1
4
.9
0
4
5
0
.0
0
4
4
0
.0
0
7
6
-0
.0
5
3
3
0
.5
8
1
4
-5
3
5
.1
0
3
3
4
9
3
,0
2
9
.1
2
6
5
E
D
H
2
1
.3
0
7
9
0
.5
1
3
8
0
.5
0
2
6
0
.1
8
3
0
3
.7
8
8
0
9
3
.1
8
6
2
2
9
,5
2
0
.3
4
1
3
0
.0
0
4
7
0
.0
0
3
3
-0
.0
3
6
3
0
.4
5
1
2
-3
7
6
.3
3
9
8
3
0
2
,6
2
6
.1
2
5
6
E
D
H
3
1
.6
9
7
0
0
.5
1
1
2
0
.5
0
1
5
0
.0
5
5
9
3
.7
8
6
9
9
.5
7
1
0
2
9
5
.9
4
3
2
0
.0
0
5
5
0
.0
3
6
8
-0
.0
3
6
8
0
.6
8
6
0
-1
2
1
.5
2
8
4
2
0
5
,0
7
8
.3
8
7
8
E
D
H
4
1
.4
0
3
5
0
.5
0
9
8
0
.5
0
2
1
0
.1
7
6
9
6
.5
5
8
7
3
8
.2
5
4
3
4
,7
2
2
.5
5
3
5
0
.0
4
2
2
0
.0
2
3
2
-0
.0
2
3
1
0
.9
7
3
2
0
.3
9
9
1
4
,9
6
5
.5
2
1
3
E
D
H
5
1
.5
8
1
6
0
.5
0
8
0
0
.5
0
3
1
0
.4
7
6
7
1
6
.1
7
1
2
1
3
6
.3
6
8
0
3
0
,3
3
8
.9
6
9
0
0
.0
4
5
1
0
.0
0
5
5
-0
.0
0
4
6
0
.6
4
8
6
0
.4
2
7
9
2
9
6
.7
2
7
1
E
D
H
6
1
.3
7
7
7
0
.5
1
0
1
0
.5
0
5
3
0
.0
4
2
0
9
.1
7
3
9
1
9
.5
0
8
1
4
0
9
.5
0
9
5
0
.0
4
8
1
0
.0
0
5
0
-0
.0
0
6
6
0
.8
6
7
2
0
.2
0
4
7
2
0
5
.7
4
5
2
E
D
H
7
1
.9
2
5
3
0
.5
1
4
9
0
.5
0
8
8
0
.1
8
3
9
1
2
.8
4
6
9
3
0
.6
9
9
6
2
,3
3
6
.8
5
8
6
0
.0
6
2
5
0
.0
0
8
1
-0
.0
0
7
2
1
.0
5
3
5
0
.1
0
5
2
2
5
6
.5
0
6
1
E
D
H
8
1
.8
7
0
2
0
.5
2
4
6
0
.5
2
3
0
0
.1
8
7
6
1
0
.6
4
6
4
2
9
.6
4
3
8
2
,1
6
7
.1
5
8
0
0
.0
1
6
3
0
.0
0
5
3
-0
.0
3
0
8
0
.9
2
7
4
-4
4
.8
1
8
7
1
5
,0
3
0
.5
6
3
3
E
D
H
9
1
.1
3
0
4
0
.5
1
8
8
0
.5
1
5
9
0
.1
5
5
3
9
.7
6
5
7
6
4
.4
5
4
6
4
,3
8
4
.0
0
7
2
0
.0
0
3
7
0
.0
0
6
7
-0
.0
3
1
3
0
.4
4
3
9
-2
0
5
.5
7
5
8
1
4
7
,4
6
1
.4
0
1
3
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
il
lu
st
ra
te
s
th
e
fi
rs
t
q
u
ar
te
r
d
el
iv
er
y
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
d
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
b
et
w
ee
n
1
9
9
6
a
n
d
2
0
1
3
w
it
h
m
a
tu
ri
ty
in
M
a
rc
h
.
T
h
e
m
ea
n
,
m
ed
ia
n
an
d
m
o
d
e
of
th
e
b
id
-a
sk
sp
re
ad
a
re
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
b
a
si
s
p
o
in
ts
a
n
d
m
ea
n
re
tu
rn
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
o
n
e
m
il
li
o
n
th
in
co
n
tr
a
st
to
th
e
ye
ar
ly
d
el
iv
er
ie
s
I
n
ow
cu
t
on
e
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
d
el
iv
er
y
d
a
te
(H
fo
r
M
a
rc
h
)
b
y
ye
a
r
o
f
d
el
iv
er
y.
53
2.4 Term Structure Properties of the Estimated
Quotes Volatility
The CME tapes are in the form of large comma separate variable (csv) files
containing monthly blocks of milliseconds timestamped inside-bid and inside-ask
quotes and volumes by contract type (ED{quarter}{delivery year last digit}).
I convert the data in the original files into hdf5 format and then deploy the
wavelet approach of Hasbrouck [2014] described previously for the 40 ED con-
tracts.1 Many studies of high-frequency data remove outliers and other possibly
erroneous records. The most complex aspect of my data is the variation between
open-outcry and electronic quote updates. However, I have access to the GE-
coded data tapes containing only the electronic records and I find no discernible
difference in the results. It should also be noted that the CME open-outcry quotes
are three orders of magnitude less in numbers of updates on average across con-
tracts. Analysis of the CME open-outcry pit trades themselves offers some vari-
ation. However, the small number of completions makes this less economically
meaningful as an object of study.
The wavelet approach requires some choices on behalf of the econometrician –
most of these involve the number of levels to filter, plus the choice of basis.
Hasbrouck [2014] utilizes 16 levels for equity data for his highest frequency tranche
of TAQ data and a Haar wavelet basis (local average filter). However, for this
study I have adopted nine levels, plus the zero level (J = 10) and maintained
the wavelet basis. This is because Eurodollars futures quotes tend to update at
1The Matlab codes used to calculate the bid and ask wavelet variances are adapted from
those provided on the webpage of Joel Hasbrouck and the authors gratefully acknowledge their
use. I use a hierarchical data format, hdf5, to the streaming of daily data from the tapes to the
wavelet algorithm and reduces the memory problems associated with such large datasets over
relatively long time periods.
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slightly lower frequencies than equities for the majority of my sample (although
at $1 million per contract the dollar volume per quote update is far larger). My
timescales reveal a decline in average tick update time for my selected treatment
groups from 30 days before maturity to 1 year before maturity. For example,
level 1 timescales of EDH0 bid wavelets in the pre-30-day group, pre-60-day
group, pre-3-month group and pre-1-year group are 8.9, 4.3, 2.5 and 1.3 seconds,
respectively. The longest timescales, level 9, in these four pre-maturity groups are
38.2, 18.5, 10.9 and 5.7 minutes. Recall that Eurodollar Futures trade 24 hours
continuously during CME opening times so there is less compression of trades
into fixed exchange hours as occurs in the case of the equity and equity options
market. In the online appendix, I present the median for all timescales of bids
wavelet variance, asks wavelet variance, bid–ask wavelet covariance and wavelet
bid–ask correlations for EDH0 to EDZ9. A series of other volatility results for
these 40 Eurodollar contracts are reported in the online appendix, such as the
bootstrap mean, mean, minimum and maximum and standard deviation.
After the settlement of the shortest maturity contract the exchange rolls over
the contract code and hence the maturity of the contract extends out to 9 years
and 362 days. At this point, the level of quoting and trading activity drops
towards zero. For days with more than 5,000 quotes, daily bids and asks wavelet
variances and bid/ask wavelet covariance have been computed. I have then cut
the results of this daily analysis and computed average bid and ask variance and
bid–ask covariance for 30 days, 60 days, 3 months, and 1 year before ED contract
maturity date. For these four sub-samples, I calculate all the timescales for nine
levels for EDH contracts. Within the sub-groups, the wavelet results are classified
based on prices. So I have different timescales for 0–25% prices, 26–50% prices,
51–75% prices and 76–100% prices in the 30-day group, 60-day group, 3-month
group and 1-year group before maturity. I have also cut the sample by daily
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quoting activity looking at the average of the top 10% of days and reporting the
variances and covariances for the highest activity days for each contract in my
sample.
I offer a more detailed look at the maturity effect, computing average bids and
asks wavelet variances over 30 days, 60 days, 3 months, and 1 year before the
contracts’ maturity date considering only the days when the number of quotes is
at least 5,000. To analyze the performance of high-price contract groups (such as
the 76%–100% group), Table 2.4 reports the median variance of bids and asks, the
median bid-ask wavelet covariance and the median wavelet correlations for the
first quarter delivery contracts (EDH group) corresponding to time-scale levels 1
and level 9.1 The Table illustrates that there is an increasing trend for the median
variance of asks and bids and for the median wavelet covariance as the time to
maturity decreases from 1 year to 30 days. For instance, for the March 2010
delivery (EDH0) Eurodollar future at timescale level 1, the median ask variance
one year before maturity is 1.7864. A month before maturity it increases to
3.4744. For the median bid variance, it also increases as maturity approaches in
the case of the March 2010 delivery contract; at timescale level 1 its evolution is
given by 1.7574 (1 year to maturity), 2.03 (3 months to maturity), 2.32 (2 months
to maturity), and 3.3829 (1 month to maturity). In economic terms, the excess
variance from the bid side translates to around 6bp per quote (multiplying the
median spread by the variance ratio). This trend is also observed in the case
of the bid–ask covariance of this contact, which increases from 1.7495 to 3.4333
as time to maturity decreases from 1 year to 30 days. Moreover, the trend is
observed in all the cases reported in the Table. Therefore, overall my empirical
evidence supports Samuelson’s maturity effect theory in that the bid and ask
variances and covariance of the first quarter delivery contracts gradually increase
1The results for all nine level timescales are available in the online appendix.
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as maturity approaches.
Bessembinder et al. [1996] point out that the maturity effect is not observed in all
markets, especially for financial assets settling to cash as opposed commodities
with a physical delivery, such as crude oil or agricultural commodities. Kalev
and Duong [2008] do not find support for the Samuelson hypothesis in CME Eu-
rodollar future markets. However, my empirical evidence supports Samuelson’s
maturity effect theory. From the 1-year window to 30 days before maturity, the
EDH bid and ask variances and covariance gradually increase. This indicates that
the Eurodollar Futures price volatilities increase when the Eurodollar contracts
are close to expiration. At this moment it is important to highlight that Spoof
quoting is common in the equity markets and is used to disguise positions within
the order book [Hasbrouck, 2014]. Moreover, the recent regulatory interventions
in the reference rate indicate that there is quite likely to be substantial infor-
mation asymmetry across market participants in the Eurodollar futures market.
The complete short-term structure of interest rates is updated during a daily
LIBOR fixing, this will in turn update the implied impact on the forward curve
approximated by the variously maturing Eurodollar futures. As such, to manip-
ulate the price of a contract one needs to manipulate the appropriate point in
the yield curve rather than just the 3-month LIBOR rate. Full identification and
comparison of trading activity during periods of heightened LIBOR manipulation
is therefore very difficult. The Eurodollar rate is intimately linked to the fixed to
floating swap market and reference rate manipulation can benefit a counter-party
in many different legs of a given swap-Eurodollar deal. So there are many steps
that may provide systematic arbitrage opportunities that cannot be identified by
this type of analysis alone. This is outside the scope of this study.
Variance ratios for EDH4 and EDH9 median value at level 1 and level 9 are quite
60
high, in fact, they rise to levels similar to that found in the equity markets. For the
high price level group (76–100%), the EDH4 median value in Table 2.4 indicates
a small jump from the 30-day window to the 60-day window. The median of
asks variance in the 30-day window is 2.5236 at level 1, while that for 60 days is
2.7287. EDH4 bid variance and wavelet covariance also increase by 0.0971 and
0.1436, respectively. In comparison, small jumps of EDH9 occurred between the
60-day window and the 3-month window at level 1. Moreover, the median of
EDH9 wavelet covariance at level 1 only increases from 1.6656 to 1.6706 between
the 60-day window and the 3-month window.
The median of bid-ask wavelet correlations, however, shows a generally increas-
ing trend as the contracts approach maturity. Hasbrouck [2014] argues that the
better functioning markets should have nearly perfectly correlated bids and asks
and this is supported by several recent theoretical contributions, see Hansen and
Lunde [2006] as an example. However, my results are in strong accordance with-
out found Hasbrouck [2014]; which indicates that at a timescale of 800 ms or
lower, the bid/ask variance correlation is below 0.6 for 80% of the US equities
in 2011; only those equities in the highest trading volume quintiles have 0.72.
The wavelet correlations of ED contracts in Table 2.4 are relatively higher than
Hasbrouck’s results of the US equities. Table 2.4 shows the median value of cor-
relation increases from 0.6038 (30 days window) to 0.6711 (one year window) at
timescale level 1. Actually, the correlations of all EDH contracts at level 1 are
larger than 0.6 and at level 9 are larger than 0.9 and close to 1. If the bid and
ask variation were perfectly correlated, public information revelation would shift
both bids and asks prices by the same amount.
In Figures 2.5 and 2.6, I present the term structure of the wavelet bid and ask
variance for the 40 Eurodollar future contracts. To construct the Figures, I first
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perform a nine time-scale level wavelet multi-resolution analysis considering only
the days when the number of quotes is at least 5,000.1 Then, I compute the sum
of bids and asks wavelet variances for all the contracts.
To provide a complementary understanding on the maturity effects in Figures 2.5
- 2.6, I choose to plot the sum of wavelet variances based on the time to maturity
and not on the actual transaction dates used by Hendershott et al. [2011] and
Hasbrouck [2014]. Given that each Eurodollar futures contract has a tenor of
10-year, my procedure implies plotting the term structure from 10 to 0 years to
maturity. Figure 2.5 exhibits the results using all the years in my sample (1996
– 2013), while Figure 2.6 is focused on the period of the recent financial crisis
(2007 – 2010). Wavelet variance plots for March, June, September and December
delivery contracts and bid-ask variance plots of each single contract can be found
in the online appendix.
Both Figures show that during the first two years the quoting variance rate is
relatively stable at all the timescale levels, indicating that the price variability
for every contract is less vigorous at the beginning of its lifecycle. From eight
years before maturity, the variance ratios start to increase reaching their maxi-
mum value around two years before maturity. This change is consistent with the
maturity effect behavior, characterized by monotone increases in price variability
as the contract approaches maturity. Interestingly, around one week before ma-
turity the quoting variance suddenly drops. Figure 2.5 also shows the asymmetry
between the bids and asks price variability on both the degree of changes and the
movement directions in all the nine levels timescales.
1This is a relatively arbitrary choice. The main reason for it is that 5,000 is the minimum
number of updates for the variation in quotes needed to perform a nine levels wavelet decom-
position. Eurodollar Futures quotes tend to be less frequent than an actively traded stock,
albeit with a far larger volume attached to each individual quote. 5,000 updates result in no
singularities within my dataset.
62
The maturity effect can be clearly seen in Figure 2.6, which is focused on the pe-
riod of the recent financial crisis from 2007 to 2010. This plot illustrates ED price
volatility during the financial crisis. Consistent with the maturity effect conjec-
ture, quoting volatility maintains a low level at the beginning of time to maturity,
and then monotonically increases since six years before maturity. Compared with
the variance of full sample (see Figure 2.5), there is less vigorous during the first
four years. Around the last two years, it shows the similar pattern with Fig-
ure 2.5. Both bids and asks variances reach the highest level, but substantially
decrease at 1 week approaching maturity.
To record the time series variation, I calculate year-long averages of the daily bid-
ask wavelets variance, covariance and correlations for all ED contracts. Tables
2.5 and 2.6 report the yearly median value of EDH0 and EDH8. Yearly results
for other March, June, September and December delivery contracts are available
in the online appendix and provide materially similar results. Table 2.5 presents
the median bids and asks variance, the covariance and the wavelet correlations
of the EDH0 contract at all timescales by year from 2006 to 2013.1 There are
no results in 2011 given that EDH0 was delivered in March 2010 and then rolled
over to a new 10-year period contract, so that there are virtually no trades or
quotes. As observed in Table 2.5, the ask and the bid variances of EDH0 show
obvious increases from 2009 to 2010, therefore also providing evidence in favor of
the maturity effect theory that the variability of contract prices should increase
monotonically toward the maturity date [Samuelson, 1965]. However, the median
results of both the bid and the ask variance decrease between 2007 and 2008 which
may be a consequence of the recent subprime mortgage market collapse, which
led investors to be more careful about what they invested in. This interpretation
is further supported by the dramatic rise experienced by the ask and the bid
1Years before 2005 have been eliminated due to the lack of observations.
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variances during the 2009-2010 period, which seems to be the result of a large
market correction.
Table 2.6 displays the bid and ask variance, the covariance and the wavelet cor-
relations at timescales level 1 to level 9 from 2005 to 2013. It reports the same
information for the EDH8 contract, a potentially informative contract, due to its
maturity date on March 2008, lies precisely over the dates of the March 2008 Bear
Stearns bankruptcy. Interestingly, although EDH8 was delivered in March 2008
and then began a new 10-year period of contract there are no year gaps even after
its maturity date in 2009. The results reported in Table 2.6 show that in the case
of EDH8 the variances increased slightly moving to 2008 although without the
sudden large jumps expected in the maturity effect theory of Samuelson [1965].
I believe this might be an effect of the financial crisis and of investors lack of
confidence in the Eurodollar Futures market as, coinciding with the beginning of
the second EDH8 contract period, the variances increased from 2009 to 2010.
Yet another interesting feature my sample allow me to do is to construct a set
of annual Eurodollar Future forward rates mapping to the forward curve. To
construct the set, I group ED futures by delivery date and, considering only the
days when the number of quotes is at least 5,000, I compute bids and asks wavelet
variances for each ED futures group over 30 days, 60 days, 3 months, and 1 year
before the contracts’ maturity date. Then, I separate contracts according to their
prices and average the variances across price quartiles using each of the four time
horizons listed above. The results, reported in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, allow me to
compare the Eurodollar futures market with the US equity market in terms of
fundamental and transient volatility and therefore in terms of decoupling of bid
and ask sides of the book over time.
A number of elements in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are worth mentioning. First, the
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Tables show that the bid variances for all pricing groups and at all time-scales are
relatively similar to the ask variances meaning that, unlike Hasbrouck’s findings
for the US equity markets, the effects of both best bid and best ask appear to be
about the same for Eurodollar Futures. My results also suggest that the higher
price groups tend to have the higher variance and wavelet bid-ask correlations.
For example, at time-scale level 1 the average of second quarter delivery contracts
(EDM) asks variance in the 30 days before maturity rises from 1.5223 in the lowest
price group to 2.6613 in the highest price group at the 14.3 seconds timescale. In
the same time-scale level, the average of second quarter delivery contracts bids
variance in the 30-day period also increases from 1.5157 to 2.638 when moving
to higher price groups. Note also that both bid and ask variances rise with
shorter timescales. These results highlight the differences between the Eurodollar
Futures market and the US equity market where Hasbrouck [2014] finds that the
volatility of the lowest dollar volume quintile is much higher than that of the
highest quintile. Table 2.7 also shows that the volatilities of both the best-bid
and the best-ask increase before approaching maturity. For the 76-100% price
group at timescale level 1, the ask variance of fourth quarter delivery contracts
(EDZ) 1 year before maturity is 1.7641, while its ask variance 30 days before
maturity increases to 2.6613 at timescale level 1 for the highest price level group.
The average results of bid–ask covariance and correlations for EDM, EDU and
EDZ are recorded in Table 2.8. The volatilities of bids and asks of every maturity-
type contract maintain positive covariances and correlations at all timescales. For
instance, the average wavelet correlations are larger than 0.8 for all four price
levels at timescale level 9. This suggests that the bid volatility and ask volatility
are in significant correlation just prior to the ED Future maturity date.
To explore the transient nature of Eurodollar future contracts quoting frequency,
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I examine the short-term variance of high-frequency quotes. To do so, for each
ED contract I rank trading days by the number of quotes and keep the top 10%
most active days. Former analysis on the quoting variance revealed that the
quoting variance suddenly drops approaching maturity (compared with Figures
2.5 and 2.6). Because the high trading volume period usually occurs within both
an “equity-like” epoch and a “short-rate” epoch, therefore I only consider days
up to two years prior to maturity and calculate the average variance ratios and
the wavelet correlations for the high-speed quotes of each contract.
The results are exhibited in Table 2.9 which presents the top 10 ED contracts
average high-speed quote variance and covariance based on the lowest timescales
at level 1. The other 30 contract results are available in the online appendix.
Consistent with my previous results, both the bid and ask variance ratios increase
in moving to shorter timescales. The speed of quoting is definitely consistent with
the existence of algorithmic traders; at time-scale level 1 and I observe quoting
as fast as 280.5 ms and it is faster than 1 sec for all contracts.
Here again, a comparison with Hasbrouck [2014]’s results for the equity market
is relevant to better understand the market of the Eurodollar Future. My results
show that the high-speed quotes in the Eurodollar Future market have lower
variance ratios and higher bid-ask correlations. The wavelet variance at timescale
level 1 is one-half of the one reported by Hasbrouck for the US equity market.
Hasbrouck reports that the variance ratio at the lowest timescale is about four
times larger than that at the longest timescale in the equity markets, while my
results suggest that the variance ratio at timescale level 1 is only about 1.5 times
as large as the one observed at timescale level 9.
However, if I compare my high-frequency quoting results with Hasbrouck’s highest
quintile the differences are less pronounced. The results suggest that for all the
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contracts the bid and ask variances are around 1.5 at timescale level one, and
reduce to near 1 at the longest time-scale. Hasbrouck’s equity results range
from 1.37 in the shortest timescales to 1 when moving to the longest timescales.
The bid-ask co-movements can be assessed by wavelet bid–ask covariances and
correlations at different timescales. My wavelet bid–ask correlations of high-speed
quotes are also similar to the correlations in the US equity market reported by
Hasbrouck. With these results in hand, I consider the period between two years
before maturity and one week to maturity to be an “equity-like” epoch in that the
Eurodollar Future market exhibits similar characteristics than the ones observed
in the American equity market.
For robustness, this chapter also considers only the most active days for each
contract, instead of the top 10% active days. Table 2.10 presents the variance
ratio of the highest daily number of bids for 10 ED contracts with the lowest
level 1 quote timescale. The other 30 ED contract-code results are available
in the online appendix. Timescales of the most active days are much smaller
compared with Table 2.9. The shortest timescale is 109.8 milliseconds at level
one of EDZ9. Wavelet variance ratios and correlations are unity with the top 10%
days’ results. Both bid variance ratio and asks variance ratio decline from around
1.5 at level one to about 1 at the longest timescale. Wavelet bid-ask correlations
of the most active days are higher than 0.6 at the shortest timescale and close to
1 at the longest timescale. Overall, the results of the most active days in Table
2.10 are materially similar although in general, the timescales are much smaller
than the timescales of the top 10% active days.
The results I have discussed so far allow us to characterize the trading life-cycle of
the Eurodollar Future that I present in Figure 2.1. My initial descriptive statistics
suggest that there is not much action in terms of quotes neither in terms of trades
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during the first two years of life of the Eurodollar Future. Indeed, during this
initial period both transactions and quoting are infrequent. I label this period
as a “thin trading” epoch. This period is then followed by an “equity-like”epoch
when high frequency quoting is very intense. This period is characterized by
low variance ratios in both sides of the book and low correlations between asks
and bids. Finally, as the contract get closer to maturity this frenetic activity de-
clines. I label this period “short rate” epoch, characterized by decreasing quoting
frequency, high volumes and high variance ratios.
2.5 Chapter Summary
I have provided an extensive empirical analysis of the microstructure of bid and
ask volatility on the Eurodollar Futures market during the period 1996–2014
utilizing a Haar wavelet multi-resolution analysis on every inside-quote update
across the whole market. Whilst I find equity-like variance ratios at certain
points in the maturity life-cycle of the money market futures, this effect varies
considerably with maturity. I have identified several specific epochs, the initial
seven years or so of the contract (the furthest tenors in the term structure) is
characterized by little no activity; however, between two and one years from
maturity, for which the trading activity rises substantially.
However, even when the speed of update approaches 100 milliseconds, my variance
ratios although greater than one are not at levels found in the equity literature.
In contrast, though wavelet correlations between the bid and the ask prices do
drop considerably and this is in keeping with the equity literature, indicating that
the order books in these markets have a great deal of noise, very likely from active
HFT automated trading. Unlike in an equity market where multiple overlapping
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exchanges create bottlenecks, the CME is centrally cleared with microsecond
(although in practice 0.1 millisecond) time stamping and latency. So the playing
field is relatively even, from the market design point of view, the fact that I do not
see exploding variance ratios during the high trading epoch could be useful in any
potential redesign of the national market system. It is worth remembering that
at any given time, eight of these contracts will be within the equity like-epoch
and one quarterly and two monthly contracts will be within the short rate epoch.
So it appears that HFT shifts trading once the contracts pass a critical time-
to-maturity. Identification of this critical time, maybe of help to those seeking
to avoid direct trading against HFTs, however as I discussed previously, those
hedging swaps with IMM dates are substantively time constrained as the purpose
of the transaction is hedging specifically date floating rate risk. Whilst my data
contains pit-trades, which are by construction, not HFT, the low number of trades
renders analysis by wavelet-based variance ratio analysis impractical.
I do, however, find that very near to maturity, as the future mimics the short
rate, the variance ratios drop dramatically. This epoch is usually as the contract
approaches one or two weeks from maturity. However, the speed of updating in
this period is not high and at high frequencies whilst the wavelet correlations
decrease it is not to the extent found in the preceding equity-like period. Taken
together this results paint an interesting picture that should provide a helpful
guide to practitioners and academics seeking to identify the time scale at which
microstructure effects begin to inundate themselves on the price process, for a
limit order book in a centrally cleared market. Realized volatility analysis at
the sub-second level is increasingly common for estimating the ex-post quadratic
variation in prices and the bid-ask spread plays a central role in providing a proxy
for market illiquidity. The results indicate that realized volatility estimation for
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the long maturity futures will simply not be possible as trading activity is so low.
In contrast, for one to two years from maturity sub-second measurements are
possible and, from my results, less noisy that those found in the equity markets.
Given the scope of this study, a large variety of options exists for summarizing
the variance and covariance ratios. An online appendix provides a number of
different slices across the data, by contract, maturity trading frequency, calendar
time and conducts a comprehensive series of robustness checks for the interested
reader.
76
Chapter 3
High Speed Trading Behavior
and Market Liquidity: Evidence
From Eurodollar Limited Order
Book Data
Using the Eurodollar futures market as a case study, I have con-
structed a unique dataset consisting of both the inside quotes (best-bid,
best-ask) – every update from 1996 to 2014 – and the entire activity
within the limit order book – from 2008 to 2014. This allows me to
classify, ex-post, the realized fraction of high frequency trading activity
within the market. I find that the most active level of the order book
for the overall volume of quotes and in particular high speed quoting
is level two. Indicating that studies on this type of contracts that ig-
nore quoting outside the best-bid best-ask are possibly missing some
interesting features of the market. I demonstrate theoretically that a
non-linear relationship between the proportion of informed trading and
the market quality and critical HFT saturation levels would be antici-
pated. My results paint a fascinating picture of the changing behavior
of traders in these very actively traded contracts and the market liq-
uidity over the texrm structure of the Eurodollar contract.
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3.1 Introduction
Empirical research on the microstructure of interest rate derivatives is a relatively
overlooked area of financial economics. The futures contract on the 3-month
Eurodollar deposit is one of the most actively traded in global financial markets.
This appears to be an anomaly as reliable estimates indicate that the notional
dollar amount outstanding on these contracts potentially makes this one of the
world’s largest financial markets.
In this chapter, I conduct an extensive analysis of the three-month Eurodollar
futures market and in particular the short-term, intraday, volatility and liquidity
of over the tenor of the futures contract. I will demonstrate that high frequency
trading activity has a relatively stable term structure over my sample period.
Specifically, I will make use of both the inside quotes and all of the other quotes
from the limit order book, and classify trading activity by speed of update of
quotes within the market. My dataset includes the number of active accounts
connected to the market and this allows me to instrument for the likelihood of
simultaneous execution resulting in the accidental false-positive identification of
high frequency quoting in a busy market. Indeed, the fractions extracted from
the order-book are qualitative close to those computed by the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange in a similar study, where participants were required to declare the
connection type to the exchange, information not made publicly available to
researchers.
My dataset is available to any researchers to buy, however, to structure it in a
way that is useful for econometric analysis requires substantial pre-processing.
Each microsecond time stamped update to the order book contains a snapshot of
the current market across all the actively traded levels sorted by price. Typically
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a single contract during its actively traded epoch (see Figure 2.1 for a graphical
summary) will have several million rows of data each day by five to ten quoting
levels (moving out from the inside quotes at level one). For each level at each time
stamp, there are three pieces of information, the price of the quote, the volume
of contracts bid or asked and the number of active accounts with open quotes.
CME group has access to the list of individual accounts and this is not made
available publicly to researchers. This means I cannot place a specific quantity
on the number of actual trading accounts in the market, only provide a notional
maximum assuming that at any give time stamp that the same accounts are not
quoting across a variety of levels on both sides of the order book. However, even
on a very busy day the maximum number of active accounts does not appear to
exceed 100, and it seems more likely to be less than 30. Given that the median
update time of the order book is between 3 and 4 milliseconds, it appears unlikely
that the realized daily fraction of high frequency updates is inflated by simultane-
ous execution being miss-classified as high frequency trading. Furthermore, the
CME’s own analysis, see CME Group [2010], of the fraction of algorithmic trading
accounts active during a day is very much in keeping with unconditional averages
I compute herein, but the classification of high frequency updates as those occur-
ring at a speed substantially beyond normal human reaction times (200 ms). I
further conduct a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate that the realized fraction of
detected high frequency traders within the market does not change substantially
as I move from a threshold of 200 ms to 25 ms.
Indeed, Keynes predicted that in futures markets with hedgers and speculators
with different market participation requirements indicates that a premium should
be paid by seekers of protection from future variation in the spot price to those
providing that protection. However, the equilibria in such markets will of course
depend on the proportion of hedgers and speculators and the degree of technolog-
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ical differentiation between them. After extraction of the realized high frequency
trading activity proxy, I therefore eschew linear regression for a semi-parametric
estimator when attempting to determine the relative execution risk as a function
of potential algorithmic trading in the next chapters, which I presume to be a
technology of the speculator.
Imposing the restriction that algorithm based high frequency trading is a specu-
lator technology permits a simpler interpretation of my results; however, relaxing
this assumption does not diminish the ability of the AT regressions to identify
the mechanisms that determine the impact of algorithmic high speed trading on
execution risk and the quality of the market. However, if hedgers are also engaged
in AT trading, the interpretation of non-linear interactions between the fraction
of algorithmic-based traders in the market is inherently more complex. For in-
stance, I postulate that there will be a term structure to AT trading based around
the fact that IMM dates play an important role in the institutional provision of
interest rate swaps (IRSs). From the perspective of AT as a pure speculation
instrument, I would anticipate that the algorithms would deteriorate the quality
of the market up to a point then effectively cancel themselves out as the specu-
lators formed the majority of market participants. However, if both hedgers and
speculators used use AT, then the interaction would be less clear as the key driver
would be the technology gradient between the market participants and this would
not provide for specific predictions.
This chapter introduces an asymmetric information based theoretical model for
futures trading to predict the effects of informed traders on the term structure
of Eurodollar future contracts. Following the approach of Hendershott et al.
[2011] utilized in the equity market, I measure a battery of market liquidity
spreads on every level of the Eurodollar future limit order book data from 2008
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to 2014, including bid-ask spreads, quoted half spreads, quoted depth, effective
spreads, realized spreads and adverse selection indicators. I also measure the
proportion of high frequency algorithmic trading as the AT proxy, based on the
quotes messaging updates under a certain time thresholds (from 200 milliseconds
to 25 milliseconds). To my knowledge, this is the only study of its type to
effectively cover the entire population of quote updates and the only one to cover
the microstructure of this market. I will demonstrate that: a) theoretically, the
fraction of informed trading in the market has a non-linear marginal effect on
the market quality. b) not including quoting activity over and above the inside
quotes loses a great deal of information. Indeed, I show that for the majority
of the term structure of the contracts the level two quotes are by far the most
active.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the
theoretical development with an asymmetric information based model of futures
trading, and Section 3.3 summarizes related literature. Section 3.4 presents the
empirical methodologies to calculate a set of market liquidity indicators and high
frequency algorithmic trading proxies. Section 3.5 and Section 3.6 describe my
Eurodollar future dataset and provide some analysis from the market liquidity
and the high-speed algorithmic trading proxies from the Eurodollar limited order
book. Section 3.7 provides some summary comments.
81
3.2 Theoretical Model for Futures Trading
3.2.1 A Theoretical Model of Advantaged Trader Satura-
tion
My major empirical observation is that the fraction of informed trading has a non-
linear relationship with the execution risk and other market quality indicators,
whereby the impact of low numbers of traders with significant trading advantages
can have a deleterious effect on market quality, but that this patter reverses as
more traders enter the market. We can see that this type of effect is predicted
in a simple linear noisy rational expectations model in the spirit of Admati and
Pfleiderer [1988] and Admati and Pfleiderer [1989].
Let f˜(t) = [f˜S(t), f˜L(t)]
′ for f(t) ∈ R2 be the log prices of pair of futures contracts.
I presume that neither contract is maturing that day, but that the reference rate
is revealed such that the final prices for the day at mark to market δ˜(t)− f(T ) is
the variance between the fair valuation and the marked to market futures prices.
Indeed, in the Eurodollar futures market the reference yield curve from the dollar
LIBOR rates is revealed several hours (recall this is a 24hr market) prior to the
daily settlements (11 am CET, with settlement at 20:00 CET).
I will restrict my theoretical development to two contracts simultaneously traded
in the market although my results are generalizable and analytically tractable for
nf futures. I will presume that the maturity date of f˜S(t) is T¯S and f˜L(t) is T¯L
where T¯L > T¯S and Ti∈{L,S} > T , therefore neither future is maturing within the
days trading and hence there is no final settlement. I can think of f˜S(t) being the
short maturity future and f˜L(t) being the long maturity future. I presume that
there are N˜ traders in the market and this is split between NAand NB, such that
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N˜ = NA +NB. I model a days trading in a future such that the mark to market
valuation is denoted δ˜(T ). I will presume that trading takes place continuously
over a days trading, such that:
dδ˜(t) = Σ˜1/2dW˜ (t) (3.1)
where W˜ (t) is a two-dimensional brownian motion and subsequently δ(t+ ∆t)−
δ(t) ∼ N(0,∆tΣ˜) over the interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T . I presume that a maturity effect
exists therefore setting Σ = [σij]ij∈{S,L}, I impose that σSS > σLL. Under the
fair valuation assumption, the final true value of the futures V (T ) is known and
agreed on with certainty by all participants.
I denote with the subscript B uninformed traders, who submit a random aggre-
gate order flow of vector d˜ for each of the futures over the interval 0, T , this order
flow is presumed to be zero centered E0[d˜] = 0 covariance matrix E0[d˜d˜′] = NBΨ˜.
In the Kyle [1985], Glosten and Milgrom [1985] and Admati [1985] approach this
is the noise or liquidity traders providing aggregate liquidity to the market. I can
think of this as institutional traders are forced to create specific positions in the
market. This order flow is presumed to be evenly distributed over the interval
0, T .
The group of traders denoted by the subscript A is algorithmic high speed traders
who trade off the order-flow information. It is at this point I depart from the
standard Kyle [1985], Glosten and Milgrom [1985] and Admati [1985] approach.
In a futures market, the mark to market prices are assumed to be set at the end of
a days trading denoted T . Traders denoted A are presumed to have a technical
advantage over the institutional traders as they can track the direction of the
order flow and as such the have an unbiased but noisy valuation of the terminal
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valuation δ(T ), whereby the n ∈ NA receives a signal δA(T ) such that
δ˜A(T ) = δ˜(T ) + ζ˜ + ξ˜ (3.2)
where ζ˜ ∈ N(0, Γ˜) and ξ˜ ∈ N(0, Φ˜) are the global and trader specific noise vectors
respectively. For tractability, I do not model their instantaneous profit function,
but I can write down their objective in the form of their integrated profit function,
let a˜n be the aggregate order flow of the n ∈ NA trader
a˜∗n = arg maxa˜n E[(δ˜(T )− f(T ))′a˜n] (3.3)
I presume that there is a market clearing mechanism within the futures market
that matches order flow. Let e˜ =
∑NA
n=1 a˜
∗
n + d˜ be the aggregate order flow
across both futures contracts. In a centrally cleared trading platform such as
CME, the clearing house matches and clears all available trades and then places
the remainder in the limit order book. The mechanism can be thought of as a
price matching model whereby the objective is to promote the efficient clearing
of information such that δ˜(t)− f(T )→ 0. Therefore, the market clearing pricing
rule is founded on the principal that E0[f(T )] = δ˜(t).
It is useful at this juncture to specify a quick notational convention I specify a
positive semi-definite matrix Θ˜ ∈ C2×2 and subsequently let Θ˜ ∈ {Σ˜, Γ˜, Φ˜, NBΨ˜}
represent the structural parameter matrices. I denote the individual elements as
Θ˜ = [θ˜ij]ij∈{S,L}. I decompose the positive definite matrix Θ˜ = ΘΘ′, where Θ is
lower triangular with elements Θ = [θij] and θi>j = 0, the elements of this matrix
are labelled vechΘ = [θk]
′
k∈{1,...,3}. Recalling that vechΘ˜ = [θSS, θSL, θLL]
′. Let
θ˜1/2 be the Cholesky factorization operator and eig be the eigenvalue operator
such that eig : A → a reports the vector of eigenvalues for a square matrix A.
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The model can be expressed as a simple one period Kalman filter assuming that
the matrices Θ˜ ∈ {Σ˜, Γ˜, Φ˜, NBΨ˜} and the scalar NA are known a-priori by all
participants.1 This leads me to my first result, the market equilibrium under
rational expectations.
Theorem 1. A Noisy Linear Rational Expectation Market Equilibrium. Let the
observed price of the futures contracts be f(t) = δ˜(t) + Λ˜e˜, where Λ˜ is the multi-
variate equivalent of “Kyle’s lambda” and e˜ is net order flow, with the algorithmic
traders linear noisy rational expectations equilibrium is given by a˜∗n = B˜δ˜(t). The
market clearing equilibrium under Noisy Linear Rational Expectations (NLRE)
is defined by the following equations of state:
Λ˜ =
√
NA(NBΨ˜)
−1/2M˜−1/2(NBΨ˜)−1/2, B˜ = Λ˜−1J˜−1Σ˜−1 (3.4)
M˜ =
√
NBΨ˜
1/2J˜−1Σ˜ξJ˜
′−1√NBΨ˜1/2, Σ˜ξ = Σ˜(Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜)−1Σ˜′ (3.5)
J˜ = 2I + (NA − 1)Σ˜(Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜)−1(Σ˜ + Γ˜)Σ˜−1 (3.6)
The proof proceeds in effectively the same manner as the proof in Watanabe
[2008], pages 33-39, however I generalize it to the case where the N˜ = [Ni] is a
diagonal matrix of informed traders for each asset. I augment the details of the
1A useful result to note is that if vechΘ ∈ R3+ and θ2 < θ1θ3 then the Cholesky factors
recover the elements of Θ and the eigenvalues of the matrix Θ˜ are analytic and greater than
zero.
Θ˜1/2 =
( √
θ21 θ1θ2|θ1|−1
0
√
−θ22 + θ22 + θ23
)
≡ Θ and Θ˜−1/2 ≡ (Θ˜−1)1/2 =

√
θ22+θ
2
3
θ1θ3
− θ2
θ3
√
θ22+θ
2
3
0 1√
θ22+θ
2
3

and
eig Θ˜ =
1
2
 θ21 + θ22 + θ23 −√(θ21 + θ22 + θ23)2 − 4θ21θ23
θ21 + θ
2
2 + θ
2
3 +
√
(θ21 + θ
2
2 + θ
2
3)
2 − 4θ21θ23

it is useful to note that the presumption that θ2 > 0 is not needed to recover an analytically
tractable result; however, I commonly do not observe negatively correlated futures prices and
the reduction in algebraic complexity of the result is relatively significant.
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proof from Watanabe [2008] with the linear multivariate rational expectations
form presented in Admati [1985] and Admati and Pfleiderer [1988, 1989].
The interested reader is directed to Watanabe [2008] for a fuller description of
the simpler equilibrium conditions as I concentrate on the adjustments needed
with the inclusion of segmented trading restrictions. The initial part of this proof
illustrates how my model is essentially the same as that contained in Watanabe
[2008], page 34-39, which is in turn an adaptation of Admati and Pfleiderer [1989].
I specifically concentrate on the fact that my addition does not lead to the loss of
tractability to the analytic solution. Fortunately, the original linear equilibrium
for the situation when N˜ is a scalar holds under this restrictive assumption, while
it would not hold for the case when N˜ is a positive definite (PD) integer matrix.
For this application the restriction is useful and defensible, however future work
will focus on this treatment. First, I set up the general form of the asset price
progression
f(t) = Λ˜0 + Λ˜1e˜ (3.7)
following the notation scheme from §(3.2.1) the indexed demand side scheme is
a˜n = B˜0 + B˜1ξ˜n (3.8)
where the matrices Λ˜1e˜ and B˜1 and the vectors Λ˜0e˜ and B˜0 are computed from
the model structure. Using the first filtration
ξ˜n ≡ E˜
[
δˆ |Fn
]
(3.9)
= cov
(
δ˜, b˜′n
)
var−1t
(
b˜n
)
b˜n (3.10)
= Σ˜
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)−1
b˜n (3.11)
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the profit maximisation condition for each trader is
max
a˜n
E˜
[(
δ˜T − Λ˜0 − Λ˜1
(
a˜n +
∑
i 6=n
a˜i + d˜
))′
a˜n |Fn
]
d˜ (3.12)
with system consistent net order flow
b˜ = a˜n +
∑
i 6=n
a˜i + d˜ (3.13)
the asymmetric information in trading process yields a first order condition
0 = δ˜ + ξ˜n − Λ˜0 − Λ˜1
(
2a˜n +
∑
i 6=n
[a˜i |Fn ]
)
(3.14)
consider that this assumption only works if the market is truly partitioned, i.e.
an informed trader is restricted to the A market; and this will not hold if the
traders have free access to alternate assets within the market. This impacts the
second order constraint too, which is now
E˜ [a˜i |Fn ] = B˜0 + B˜1E˜
[
ξ˜i |Fn
]
(3.15)
where E˜
[
ξ˜j |Fn
]
is the expectation of another trader j ∈ Ni estimate of δ. The
conditional variance and covariance of the system in 3.11, for any j /∈ n is therefore
Σ˜ξ˜ ≡ var
(
ξ˜n
)
= Σ˜
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)−1
Σ˜ (3.16)
Σ˜c ≡ cov
(
ξ˜i, ξ˜
′
n
)
(3.17)
= Σ˜
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)−1 (
Σ˜ + Γ˜
)(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)−1
Σ˜ (3.18)
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Then, setting the prior mean E˜(ξ˜i) = 0, the conditional update simplifies to
E˜
[
ξ˜i |Fn
]
= Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
ξ˜n (3.19)
so far this is a repeat of Watanabe [2008], which builds on Admati and Pfleiderer
[1988]. However, I now diverge somewhat, as the system consistent first order
condition with informed traders will be
0 = δ˜ + ξ˜n − Λ˜0 − 2Λ˜1
(
B˜0 + B˜1ξ˜n
)
−
(
N˜ − 1
)
Λ˜1
[
B˜0 + B˜1Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
ξ˜n
]
(3.20)
note that the inclusion of
(
N˜ − 1
)
Λ˜1
[
B˜0 + B˜1Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
ξ˜n
]
, holds only if trN˜ = N˜
under the Watanabe [2008] approach. This now solves for the system of equations
in 3.4 to 3.6, first set
0 = I˜ − 2Λ˜1B˜1 −
(
N˜ − 1
)
Λ˜1B˜1Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
, or (3.21)
Λ˜1B˜1 = J˜
−1, with J˜ ≡ 2I˜ +
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
(3.22)
back substitution from 3.16 and 3.17, reproduces the expression suggested for J
in 3.6. Again I see the Hadamard product enter the system,
Λ˜0 = δ˜ −
(
N˜ − 1
)
Λ˜1B˜0 (3.23)
following from this, the market maker efficiency condition will be
f(t) = δ˜ + E˜
[
δ˜ |Fθm
]
= δ˜ + cov
(
δ˜, e˜′
)
var−1 (e˜)
(
e˜− N˜B˜0
)
(3.24)
proceeding in the standard fashion reveals the market maker variance covariance
88
expression
cov
(
δ˜, e˜′
)
=
N˜i∑
i=1
cov
(
δ˜, δ˜′i
)
B˜′1 = N˜Σ˜ξ˜B˜
′
1 (3.25)
by extension
var (e˜) = B˜1var
 N˜i∑
i=1
ξ˜n
 B˜′1 + Ψ˜
= N˜B˜1
{
Σ˜ξ˜ +
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜c˜
}
B˜′1 + Ψ˜ ≡ Σ˜e˜,c˜ (3.26)
once again from standard matrix commutation rules this holds, only under the
condition that trN˜ = N˜ , this yields the liquidity adjusted pricing formula to be
f(t) = δ˜ + N˜Σ˜ξ˜B˜
′
1
[
N˜B˜1
{
Σ˜ξ˜ +
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜c
}
B˜′1 + Ψ˜
]−1
×
(
e˜− N˜B˜0
)
(3.27)
= δ˜ +
[
B˜1
{
I˜ +
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
}
+ N˜−1Ψ˜B˜′1
−1
Σ˜−1
ξ˜
]−1
×
(
e˜− N˜B˜0
)
(3.28)
again I proceed along the lines of Watanabe [2008], generalising from Admati and
Pfleiderer [1988] with the addition of my separated trader condition,
Λ˜1 =
[
B˜1
{
I˜ +
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
}
+ N˜−1Ψ˜B˜′1
−1
Σ˜−1
ξ˜
]−1
, or (3.29)
Λ˜1B˜1 =
[
J˜ − I˜ + N˜−1B˜−11 Ψ˜B˜′1
−1
Σ˜−1
ξ˜
]−1
, and (3.30)
Λ˜0 = δ˜ − N˜ Λ˜1B˜0 (3.31)
eliminating
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜cΣ˜
−1
ξ˜
leaves a system of four equations for the four un-
knowns Λ˜1e˜ and B˜1 and the vectors Λ˜0e˜. Cancelling for J˜ yields
B˜−11 Ψ˜B˜
′
1
−1
= N˜Σ˜ξ˜ (3.32)
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substituting for my standard functional form of B˜, whereby B˜1 = Λ˜
−1
1 J˜
−1, I find
Λ˜1Ψ˜Λ˜1 = N˜ J˜
−1Σ˜ξ˜J˜ ′
−1
(3.33)
as such (
Ψ˜
1
2 Λ˜1Ψ˜
1
2
)2
= N˜Ψ˜
1
2 J˜−1Σ˜ξ˜J˜ ′
−1
Ψ˜
1
2 ≡ N˜M˜ (3.34)
element by element dividing by N˜ yields an expression for M˜ , which is of the form
V UV ′ and therefore PD. Therefore a Cholesky factor M˜
1
2 exists. The resultant
order flow is therefore
a˜n = B˜1ξ˜n = Λ˜
−1
1 J˜
−1Σ˜
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)−1
b˜n = Λ˜
−1
1 J˜
−1Σ˜ξ˜Σ˜
−1b˜n (3.35)
The matrix Λ˜−11 J˜
−1Σ˜
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)−1
is the solution to the autoregressive terms
of B1, given the structure of the solution to Λ˜1 = Λ˜, which is PD then we can
see that the multivariate equivalence of Kyles lambda is a PD matrix autoregres-
sive coefficient. Hence the mapping of time-varying vector autoregressive model
(TV-VAR), whereby the Grammian matrix (X ′X)−1 should be partitioned as
a function of Λ˜. This is very useful as it allows me to show that the liquidity
augmented price is linear in liquidity shocks.
I now report two market equilibrium artefacts as propositions that rearrange the
equilibrium equations of state, the expected quadratic variation and the expected
volume of trade across the two assets. It is useful to use these to guide the
calibration of the model.
Proposition 1. Expected Price Variance Let ∆tH˜ = E[(f(t+ ∆t)− f(t))(f(t+
∆t)− f(t))′] be the observed pricing variance-covariance matrix. From Theorem
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1, this is determined from Θ˜ ∈ {Σ˜, Γ˜, Φ˜, NBΨ˜} by the following expression
∆tH˜ = Σ˜ + Σ˜Λ, where Σ˜Λ = NAΣ˜((NA + 1)(Σ˜ + Γ˜) + 2Φ˜)
−1Σ˜ (3.36)
From Theorem 1, the variance of the price process is mechanistically specified
from the multivariate autoregression as
∆tH˜ ≡ var (f(t+ ∆t)− f(t))) = var
(
Λ˜e˜
)
+ var
(
δ˜ − Λ˜e˜
)
(3.37)
by induction the variance follows from the noise of the submission process and
the multivariate extension of Kyle’s lambda, therefore the variance iteration will
be
var
(
Λ˜e˜
)
= E˜
[
Λ˜e˜e˜′Λ˜
]
= E˜
[
Λ˜E˜ (e˜e˜′) Λ˜
]
= E˜
[
Λ˜var (e˜) Λ˜
]
(3.38)
Simple rearrangement and substitution from the definitions in Theorem 1 yields
var (e˜) = Λ˜−1cov
(
δ˜, e˜′
)
= N˜ Λ˜−1Σ˜ξ˜B˜
′
1 = N˜ Λ˜
−1Σ˜ξ˜J˜ ′
−1
Λ˜−1 (3.39)
and therefore the expectation collapses to
var
(
Λ˜e˜
)
= E˜
[
N˜Σ˜ξ˜J˜
′−1
]
(3.40)
I show that the imposition of N˜ = [Ni] runs through the derivation without loss
of generality, therefore
N˜Σ˜ξ˜J˜
′−1 = N˜
(
J˜ ′Σ˜−1
ξ˜
)−1
= N˜
[
2Σ˜−1
ξ˜
+
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜−1
ξ˜
Σ˜c˜Σ˜
−1
ξ˜
]−1
(3.41)
The diagonality condition imposed on N˜ reduces the noise to the following diag-
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onal matrix
N˜Σ˜ξ˜J˜
′−1 = N˜
[
2Σ˜−1
ξ˜
+
(
N˜ − 1
)
Σ˜−1
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜
)
Σ˜−1
]−1
(3.42)
Substitution from Theorem 1 definitions yields
N˜Σ˜ξ˜J˜
′−1 = N˜Σ˜
[(
N˜ + 1
)(
Σ˜ + Γ˜
)
+ 2Φ˜
]−1
Σ˜ ≡ Σ˜Λ˜e˜ (3.43)
Add up all of the variances and impose diagonal restrictions on the covariances
to derive the variance condition,
var
(
δ˜ − Λ˜e˜
)
= Σ˜− cov
(
δ˜, e˜′
)
Λ˜−
[
cov
(
δ˜, e˜′
)
Λ˜
]′
(3.44)
+var
(
Λ˜e˜
)
= Σ˜− Σ˜Λ˜e˜ (3.45)
therefore yielding the volatility expectation. 
Proposition 2. Expected Market Volume Following Admati [1985], Admati and
Pfleiderer [1988] and Admati and Pfleiderer [1989] let aggregate volume be defined
by
V˜ = 1
2
|
∑NA
n=1
a˜n|+ |d˜|+ |e˜| (3.46)
in terms of the equilibrium in Theorem 1 this is given by:
E0[V˜ ] = 1√2piE0[(diag(NAB˜(NA(Σ˜ + Γ˜) + Φ˜)B˜)
1/2 + (3.47)
diag(Ψ))1/2 + (diag(NAB˜(NA(Σ˜ + Γ˜) + Φ˜)B˜
′ +NBΨ˜))1/2]
I utilize Lemma 2 from Watanabe [2008] to begin with augmenting it by replacing
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(
B˜
N˜i∑
n=1
b˜n
)
with
(
B˜
trN˜ i∑
n=1
b˜n
)
. From this the net order flow in my notation will
be,
Σ˜e˜ = var (e˜) = var
B˜ trN˜ i∑
n=1
b˜n
+ var(d˜)
= N˜B˜
[
N˜
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜
)
+ Φ˜
]
B˜′ + Ψ˜ (3.48)
therefore in expectations the volume will be
E˜0
[
V˜
]
=
1
2
E˜0
E˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣
trN˜ i∑
n=1
a˜n
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ E˜
∣∣∣d˜∣∣∣+ E˜ |e˜|
 (3.49)
The last part is identical to Lemma 2 of Watanabe [2008], except with the inclu-
sion of the Hadamard product expression, under my diagonal specification, it is
easy to see that this is in effect two separate Watanabe [2008] models. This is
sequentially simplified to
var (a˜n) = B˜
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)
B˜′ (3.50)
= Λ˜−1J˜−1Σ˜ξ˜Σ˜
−1
(
Σ˜ + Γ˜ + Φ˜
)
Σ˜−1Σ˜−1
ξ˜
Σ˜ξ˜J˜
′−1Λ˜−1 (3.51)
= Λ˜−1J˜−1Σ˜ξ˜J˜ ′
−1
Λ˜−1 = N˜−1Ψ˜ (3.52)
recalling the definitions from Proposition 1 and 2 and hence the cross market
volume. 
93
3.2.2 Existence of a Non-linear Response in the Price Im-
pact Matrix Λ˜
On average I observe between 100 and 200 traders in the market at any given
moment. The term structure of trading activity tends to be at a plateau for
contracts between 0 and 3 years from maturity and drops towards single digits
past 5 years. Following data from the CME group, I set NB to be 20 and adjust
the number of NA traders from zeros to the majority, keeping NB fixed. For the
parameters, I use the following as a baseline specification for my simulation. I do
not have specific point estimates for Γ˜, Ψ˜ and Φ˜, however, if I set the first element
of Σ˜ to be the square of the approximate long run daily volatility of the reference
LIBOR rate and H˜ and V˜ to be the observed price volatility and volume of the
future I can use these reference to points to generate reasonable domains for Γ˜,
Ψ˜ and Φ˜.
Σ˜, the variance covariance matrix of the true valuation price process σ1 =
1/4, σ3 = σ1/5 and σ2 = 7/10σ1σ3.
Γ˜, the covariance matrix of the global noise across all A traders signals
γ1 = 1/10, γ3 = 1/10 and γ2 = 5/10γ1γ3.
Ψ˜ the covariance matrix for each A traders signal ψ1 = {1/4, 1/2, 1, 3/2},
ψ3 = ψ1/2 and ψ2 = 0.2ψ1ψ3.
Φ˜ the variance of an individual B traders order flow φ1 = 1, φ3 = φ1/2
and φ2 = 0.
In Figure 3.1, I plot the level (diagΛ˜) and the partial derivative ∂ diagΛ˜/∂nA of
the elements price impact matrix Λ˜ that determines the degree of misalignment
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Figure 3.1: The Effect in Level and Derivative of a Change in the Fraction of
Type A Traders versus Type B Traders
Notes: I do not model explicitly the advantage that speed gives the traders other than
I presume that the ability to rapidly anticipate the direction of the underlying value
process from the order flow provides a systematic advantage. Hence, Type A has a
noisy but unbiased expectation of the terminal valuation δ˜(T ). The model postulates
four sources of quadratic variation in the market. Σ˜ is the quadratic variation in the
underlying asset. Γ˜ is the global noise disturbing all type Type A traders forward look-
ing signals. Φ˜ represents the quadratic variation of the idiosyncratic noise disturbing
each of the NA Type A traders signal over and above the global noise. Finally, Φ˜ is
the variance-covariance matrix describing the quadratic variation of each of the NB
traders random submissions. In the four quadrants, I plot the diagonal elements of the
resulting Λ˜ matrix from the market clearing equilibrium in Theorem 1 and its derivative
with respect to NA/N˜ where N˜ = NA +NB. Recalling that f(T ) = δ(T ) + Λ˜e˜, where
e˜ is the aggregate net order flow.
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between the observed futures price f(T ) and δ(T ) as a function of aggregate order
flow e˜ with respect to the fraction NA/N˜ ∈ [0.1, 0.8] of Type A traders in the
market. We can think of the elements of the Λ˜ as the representative of the depth
of the market and the impact of order-flow on price.
We can see that across a variety of values of ψ1 and ψ2 that the model predicts
that a small number of Type A traders will increase the magnitude of the first
S and second L elements of diagΛ˜, however, as the number of Type A traders
increases the detrimental effect on the market decreases and rapidly reverses. I
will now introduce some previous studies and then move on to demonstrating that
the pattern of market depth as a function of the fraction of traders advantaged
by speed increases has a similar pattern to that predicted herein.
3.3 A Brief Review of High Frequency Trading
and Market Liquidity
The prior literature investigated that algorithmic trading can increase liquidity
and market efficiency; hence, it can accelerate to the price discovery function.
Others suggested that AT has effects on increasing price volatility and reducing
liquidity, especially when financial markets are in times of stress.
Frino and McKenzie [2002] put forward that the screen trading can enhance the
price discovery in both spot and future markets. Besides, they also discuss that
the futures lead the spot market in price discovery, this has been supported by
Harris [1989], Stoll and Whaley [1990], Chan [1992] and Huang and Stoll [1994].
Engle et al. [2012] directly adopt the detailed order-execution data from Morgan
Stanley, which includes the arrival price, parent trades size, and volume-weighted
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average price. They employ these data to measure the impacts on execution
risk and cost of algorithm aggressiveness. Domowitz and Yegerman [2006] use
ITG’s transaction cost for over 40 buy-side institutions to examine performance
from different algorithmic trading services. They believe that algorithmic trading
is a cost-effective technique, however, their empirical evidence “suggests that
algorithms are not yet sophisticated enough for large order sizes” [Domowitz and
Yegerman, 2006, p. 11].
Despite the equity markets, AT platform has been widely spread to futures, for-
eign exchange and commodities markets. CME Group [2010] investigates the
effects of algorithmic trading methodologies on market liquidity in a series of
CME products, such as Eurodollar, EuroFX, E-mini S&P 500 and Crude Oil fu-
tures. CME Group [2010] asks their clients to register their Operator ID (Tag 50)
through Automated Trading Systems (ATS) in 2006, therefore, they can monitor
the volume of AT orders relative to the total trades volume, even the volume
of electronic message traffic. They report that the volume and message traffic
originating from the increased AT activities is associated with increased liquidity
and reduced volatility. While, the results according to different markets are not
balanced. The results are relatively positive for Eurodollar, Crude Oil future and
10-Year Treasury note markets. E-mini S&P 500 market shows mixed results.
As for the foreign exchange markets, Chaboud et al. [2014] analyze the rela-
tion between AT and price discovery process with a more comprehensive dataset.
They employ Euro-Dollar, Dollar-Yen and Euro-Yen trading data from Electronic
Broking Services (EBS). Their data set has been clearly classified whether the
transactions belongs to human or computer trades. They put forward that al-
gorithmic traders are more following highly correlated strategies. Furthermore,
there’s little evidence about the relation between AT and volatility, which is con-
sistent with Hendershott et al. [2011]. However, Chaboud et al. [2014] illustrate
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that most volatility in FX returns should attribute to non-algorithmic orders.
There is a wide range of studies on the effects of market liquidity on the price
information process [Harris, 1990; Kyle, 1985; Madhavan, 2000; O’Hara, 1995].
Kyle [1985] points out that three key characteristics of liquidity can embody
the market microstructure: Tightness, Depth, and Resilience. Tightness can be
measured by the gaps of bids and asks; Depth can be measured by the trades
large quantities without changing current price; Resilience refers the ability to
trade assets with little influence on the price. My study considers to use bid-ask
spreads, quoted half-spread, effective half-spread, realized spread, price impact
and quoted depth as liquidity indicators.
As an important component of transaction costs, the bid-ask spread is a com-
monly used indicator of market liquidity. A smaller bid-ask spread indicates
a more liquid market; otherwise, a larger bid-ask spread implies poor liquid-
ity. There are many ways to measure bid-ask spreads, including quoted spreads,
effective spreads and realized spreads. Quoted spread is simply the difference
between the bid prices and ask prices. Effective spread can be calculated by the
trade prices comparing the midpoint of bid and ask at the time of the execution.
Considering the impacts of transaction on the prices, effective spread can indicate
the deviation between the actual price and the mid price before the execution.
Price impact is calculated as the mid-quote of the bid and offer at trade time
comparing with the mid-quote at a some time period after trade time. Compared
with effective spread, realized spread is the difference between trades prices and
the midpoint of bids and asks at a specified time period after the time of the
execution. The existence of informed traders will lead to market prices to shift
up after buying or down after selling. The realized spread considers and captures
these adverse price movements. The relation among these spreads is that effective
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spread can be equal to the sum of price impact and realized spread.
Since HFT has increased sharply over the past decade, some studies have demon-
strated direct evidence that the automated trading results in a narrower bid-ask
spread [Angel et al., 2011; Bershova and Rakhlin, 2013; Carrion, 2013; Castura
et al., 2010; Hendershott et al., 2011; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2010; Malinova
et al., 2013; Menkveld and Zoican, 2014; Zhang and Riordan, 2011]. Hendershott
et al. [2011] investigate the influence of the increasing algorithmic trading from
2001 to 2005 on different measures of spreads. They find a significant reduction
in effective spreads across all market-cap quintiles, with most quintiles decreas-
ing to 1/3 of their start levels. Angel et al. [2011] examine the measurements
of market quality and how they change over time and in response to regulatory
changes and structural changes in the US equity markets. They state that both
execution speeds and trading costs have fallen, bid-ask spreads have narrowed,
and available liquidity has increased.
A similar conclusion has also been put forward by Castura et al. [2010] who,
examining the US equities market find that the bid-ask spread has narrowed,
available liquidity has increased and price efficiency has improved. Menkveld
[2013] provides direct evidence of a link between a single, large, high-frequency
market maker and the narrowing of spreads on the Chi-X and Euronext from
January 2007 to June 2008. Over this period, bid-ask spreads in Dutch stocks
declined by 50% relative to Belgian stocks, which implies that high-frequency
market making reduces bid-ask spreads. The relation between HFT and different
spreads has been discovered to depend on whether HFT is categorized as an
aggressive activity or a passive activity. HFT tends to trade passively when
spreads are wide and trade aggressively when spreads are narrow [Carrion, 2013;
Zhang and Riordan, 2011]. Castura et al. [2010] also put forward that realized
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spreads are significantly more negative when HFTs trade aggressively.
In addition to the bid-ask spreads, market depth is an important indicator of liq-
uidity. Recent studies have reported evidence to suggest strong, positive impacts
of HFT on the market liquidity [see Angel et al., 2011; Brogaard, 2010; Castura
et al., 2010; Jarnecic and Snape, 2014]. Market liquidity indicates the ability for
investors to obtain ideal inventory positions with low execution costs and low
transactional price impacts. Angel et al. [2011] estimate that the median depth
at the NBBO increased across all the US stocks. Furthermore, when allocating
their portfolios to diverse stocks, investors need to convert liquidity into dollar
amounts; therefore, the average dollar amount of stock quoted is a better measure
of liquidity. Whilst this type of analysis is very common for stock, I can find very
little evidence for the prior analysis of inside-spreads for money market/interest
rate derivatives. An alternative equity market study, Castura et al. [2010] uses
the dollar amount available at the inside-spread to measure the available liquid-
ity at any instant in time and compute quarterly time averages. The results
show a reduction in available liquidity during the financial crisis of 2007/2008
and available liquidity that reverted to a high level in 2010. A similar study by
Jarnecic and Snape [2014] employ data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE)
and find that high-frequency traders tend to provide liquidity at large spreads
and to demand liquidity at narrow spreads. Additionally, high-frequency traders
are likely to smooth out liquidity over time; however, their impact on volatility
is uncertain.
The most closely related to this study are the papers by Hendershott et al. [2011]
and Hendershott and Riordan [2013]. Hendershott et al. [2011] investigate the
relation between AT and liquidity using NYSE stocks over the five years between
February 2001 and December 2005. Using Biais and Weill [2009] for references,
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Hendershott et al. [2011] employ the NYSE electronic message traffic as a proxy
for AT. The message traffic includes order submissions, cancellations and trade
reports. Because of the introduction of ‘Autoquote’ at NYSE in 2003, they also
use this market structure change as an instrument variable to assess the impacts
of AT on liquidity. Hendershott et al. [2011] indicate that AT can narrow quoted
spread, and reduce price impacts and trade-related price discovery, especially for
stocks with large market capitalization. The finding illustrates that AT enhances
liquidity and makes quotes more informative.
However, using message traffic as AT proxy is difficult to directly check “when
and how AT behave and their role in liquidity supply and demand” [Hendershott
and Riordan, 2013, p. 1004]. On the other hand, Hendershott et al. [2011] use
Autoquote as an instrumental variable to evaluate that AT has the effects to
enhance liquidity and makes quotes more informative. While, Hendershott and
Riordan [2013] focus on the detecting the channels by which AT could increase
market liquidity.
3.4 Empirical Measurements
My analysis is divided into two parts. First, I generate a series of market quality
indicators from high frequency data. In the main, I use the bids and asks in
the entire limit order book and transaction data for this information, and I then
aggregate this to daily data. Second, I generate daily approximations of the frac-
tions of high frequency algorithmic trading (as the speed gain will be specifically
via a computerized algorithm submitting quotes via an electronic communication
network).
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3.4.1 Liquidity Spreads Measurements
My liquidity measures follow the approach of Hendershott et al. [2011] which
provides a comprehensive overview of the various liquidity measures from the
literature. They only have the inside quotes and transactions data. Inside quotes
only include the highest bid prices and lowest ask prices, it can not provide
the complete picture of order flow. My data contains the whole limited order
book and trades, so it is possible to calculate liquidity spreads for each level.
Moreover, Hendershott et al. [2011] use the Lee and Ready [1991] algorithm to
calculate trade direction, however, this method is not that accurate for HFT
data. I found out about 85% belongs to “no trades” classification. Therefore, I
alter the Lee-Ready Algorithm using the volume weighted average price of five-
level order book. In total, I measure 8 different liquidity spreads and use them
as dependent variables in regression, bid-ask spreads (S˜ Q), quoted half-spread
(S˜ Q
1/2
), quoted depth (S˜ D), effective half-spread (S˜ E), realized spreads (S˜ R,5
for 5 minutes and S˜ R,30 for 30 minutes) and price impacts (S˜ AS,5 for 5 minutes
and S˜ AS,30 for 30 minutes).
This section I follow the timing convention from §(2.1) that t represents the
length of trading time on an individual day, k denotes an intraday time index
and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5} is the order book level. Bid-ask spreads and quoted half-
spread are simply the difference between the bid prices and ask prices. Quoted
half spreads, S˜ Q
1/2
jk , can be defined as
S˜ Q
1/2
jk = 100(pajk − pbjk)/2(pmjk) (3.53)
where j is the jth level of the order book, pajk and pbjk are the ask price and
bid price for level j = {1, 2, ..., 5} at intraday time k, and pmjk is the quoted
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mid-price prevailing at the time of the kth trade. Quoted depth indicates the
competition and capacity of the market. Larger quoted depth means there are
more competitors and the market can absorb more orders before changing the
current price. I calculate the five levels of the order book quoted depth, S˜ Djk , to
have greater accuracy
S˜ Djk = pajkvajk + pbjkvbjk (3.54)
where vajk and vbjk are the ask volume and bid volume for level j at intraday
time k.
The effective half-spread shows the difference between the actual trades prices
and the mid-quote prices. The smaller the effective spreads, the more liquid is
the contract and the more actual transaction prices are near the mid prices. For
the kth trade relative to the quote level j, the proportional effective half-spread,
S˜ Ejk , can be expressed as
S˜ Ejk = qjk(pjk − pmjk)/pmjk, (3.55)
where qjk is trade direction indicator that +1 for buyer-initiated trades, 0 for no
trades, and -1 for seller-initiated trades; pjk is the actual transaction price at time
k; and mjk is the quoted mid-price at the time of the kth trade. Unlike effective
spreads, realized spreads describe the difference between quoted mid-price and
the actual transaction at a specified time period after the trade execution time.
Hence, the realized spread can capture the adverse price shifts caused by the
existence of informed traders. Here I calculate realized spread at 5 minutes and
30 minutes after the trades. The realized spread (5 mins) for the kth transaction
at the j quote level is defined as
S˜ R,5jk = qjk(pjk − pm,j,k+5min)/pmjk, (3.56)
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where pjk is the actual transaction price at the time of the kth trade, qjk is the
buy-sell trade direction indicator, mjk is the midpoint prevailing at the time of
the kth trade, and mj,k+5min is the quoted mid-price at 5 minutes after the kth
trade. Similarly, the 30-minute realized spread can be measured analogously with
the quoted mid-price at 30 minutes after the transaction (mj,k+30min).
S˜ R,30jk = qjk(pjk − pm,j,k+30min)/pmjk, (3.57)
To evaluate the impact of informed traders shifting market prices, I calculate the
5 minutes and 30 minutes price impact of a trade. The adverse selection, S˜ AS,5jk ,
is calculated as the difference between the quoted mid-price of the bid and offer
at trade time and the quoted mid-price at 5 minutes after execution,
S˜ AS,5jk = qjk(pm,j,k+5min − pmjk)/pmjk, (3.58)
Similarly, the 30-minute adverse selection is defined as
S˜ AS,30jk = qjk(pm,j,k+30min − pmjk)/pmjk, (3.59)
The arithmetic identity among these spreads is that effective spread can be equal
to the sum of price impact (adverse selection) and realized spread.
S˜ Ejk = S˜
R
jk + S˜
AS
jk (3.60)
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3.4.2 A Proxy For the Fraction of High Frequency Algo-
rithmic Trading in the Market
The objective of this chapter is to understand the impact of speed on the preceding
market quality indicators. My dataset consists of the entire limit order book from
inside quotes to the highest quote level (usually level 5 for the CME), sorted by
price. I believe that this is the first large scale study of a complete limit order
book ever attempted. One of the useful aspects of analyzing Eurodollar futures is
that the limit order book and trades from the Globex trading platform provides
the entire picture of activity in the market. Eurodollars are not cleared through
CMEs over-the-counter (OTC) trading platform (like light crude or currency
futures) and since the closure of open outcry trading pits the Globex platform
process all trades and quotes.
Whilst I have all of the available message updates for the Eurodollar market the
data does not show directly whether orders come from computer algorithm or
human being, that is I do not have the trading account numbers (each has a
prefix that determines if the account is an AT and hence generates HFT order
flow). However, I have a couple of guides as to the approximate average fraction
of ATs in the market. First, the CME groups own study, CME Group [2010],
with access to the account numbers for a snapshot of trading in 2010 reports that
around 64% of Eurodollar messaging activity on the limit order book is generated
by ATs. Second, I have access to the number of accounts actually active on the
exchange. For instance, if ten accounts are active and a human being can generate
new orders at speeds of approximately 500ms then the likelihood of two non AT
generated orders arriving within 25ms of each other is relatively low. Therefore
HFT as a pattern of trades that arrives on the order book within a very short
time period of each other (conditional on the number of traders in the market)
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should provide a proxy to the quantity of order flow ascribed to HFT and hence
the number of ATs in the market.
The physiology literature estimates the average human reaction time as being,
in general, greater than 250ms [Kosinski, 2008]. However, it is unlikely that a
human being over the whole trading day will generate a new quote on a 250ms
grid. For my main AT proxy, I threshold at 25ms as this yields a modal fraction
of order flow messages close to the average quantity of order flow computed by
CME with access to the AT account prefixes, see Figure 3.4. For robustness, I
have also constructed proxies at between 50ms and 200ms and the time evolution
of these proxies closely correlates to the 25ms proxy (on the most active days
90% of messages are below 200ms, however, 75% are also below 25ms indicating
that the clustering is no accident of numbers of traders). Furthermore, I have the
number of traders actively quoting in the market at any given time (the number
of active connections to the exchange) on the very busiest days no more than 200
participants are quoting in any given contract and for the majority of the time
this is substantially less than 50. I precondition, non-parametrically, the total
active number of traders in the market as an instrumental variable to extract the
endogeneity that might be inherent in construction of the proxy.
Hence, let the algorithmic trading messages, M˜A˜jt∆k, with timestamp updates ∆k
of less than 25ms for order book level j for the day t. The total number of
messages for order book level j for the day t is M˜jt. Therefore, the estimated
fraction of algorithmic trading messages A˜ is defined as
A˜jt∆k = M˜
A˜
jt∆k/M˜jt (3.61)
The total messages per minute, M˜∆jt, can be calculated as M˜
∆
jt = M˜jt/T
∗
t , where
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trading time, T ∗t , is the length of the first order to the last order on an individual
day t, which is measured in minutes.
3.5 Data and Summary Statistics
Besides the insides quotes dataset I have constructed in the Chapter 2, this chap-
ter utilizes the limited order book data of Eurodollar futures. I consider the order
book data from level 1 to level 5 for the 40 quarterly Eurodollar Futures contracts
between January 1, 2008 and July 31, 2014. The futures data are labelled with
RIC codes, such as GEH0, GEH1,...GEZ9. I provide real-time order book data
snapshots in Table 3.1, which displays the first 2 levels of the GEH0 market depth
data over 2 sec around 6 pm GMT on August 5, 2008 with milliseconds stamps.
The data structure includes the bid prices, bid volumes, the number of buyers,
ask prices, ask volumes and the number of buyers in each level.
Table 3.2 indicates the maturity, the average volume and the observations of
market depth asks and bids. GE?4 has the largest bid and ask volume with
$631.86 quadrillion and $618.16 quadrillion, respectively. The largest average
number of observations is the GE?5, which has 57.13 million observations for
the bids side and asks side. The market depth data is utilized to compute the
liquidity measures and AT proxy for all the five levels. Then I match the daily
wavelet variance ratio with the daily liquidity measures and the daily fraction of
algorithmic trading. In total, there are 2,339 days with all 40 contracts for my
final daily frequency regression analysis.
For the market depth data (i.e. the complete set of quotes within the order-book)
we can see a very clear picture of the activity within the market graphically.
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Table 3.2: Size Data Sample for Order Book Data
RIC Maturity
Asks Bids
Average Average Average Average
Volume Number of Obs Volume Number of Obs
($ quadrillion) (million) ($ quadrillion) (million)
GE?0 2010 58.75 20.46 58.58 20.46
GE?1 2011 139.01 32.07 137.53 32.07
GE?2 2012 156.87 42.73 155.26 42.73
GE?3 2013 326.52 39.07 316.77 39.07
GE?4 2014 631.86 47.52 618.16 47.52
GE?5 2015 408.38 57.13 409.42 57.13
GE?6 2016 149.00 45.21 149.93 45.21
GE?7 2017 32.85 22.64 32.88 22.64
GE?8 2008 5.51 9.97 5.50 9.97
GE?9 2009 7.34 12.56 7.18 12.56
Notes: This table depicts data sample size for limited order book data. The roll-over years
of the 40 Eurodollar quarterly trade futures and the average number of observations plus the
average volume of bids and asks. The limited order book data are from the Thomson Reuters
Tick History database from July 1, 2008 to January 1, 2014, labelled by the Reuters Instrument
Code (RIC; GEH0, GEH1, . . . , GEZ9). The exchange ticker is GE, which is the RIC for the
globex only trades and quotes. I calculate the average value for GE contracts having their
maturity date in the same year, denoted GE?0, GE?1, . . . , GE?9. Hence, GE?0 includes
four 10-year future contracts from 2000 to 2010 – namely, GEH0, GEM0, GEU0 and GEZ0.
Note, that the minimum tick size on the exchange is 1/4 of a basis point for the nearest
expiring contract and 1/2 otherwise. This yields 2,339 days times 40 contracts for my final
daily frequency regression analysis. Note that I report the total quoted depth of the market∑
t
∑
i Pi,kVi,k for each delivery year across the four quarterly deliveries, where t is the daily
index, k is the intraday time index and i is contract type index.
Figure 3.2 plots the price, volume and number of active accounts quoting for
a single contract again I use the March 2010 maturing contract, EDH0, as my
exemplar. As the limit order book is only from electronic trades the ticker symbol
is now ‘GEH0’ which stands for Globex. For the two randomly chosen days I see
that on July 11, 2008, when the contract still has about 20 months to run there
were 268,258 updates to the order flow, that is the changes in quoted price (top
plot), volume (middle) or active account connections (lower). For the volume
and number of traders I have reflected the bids (-ve) about the abscissa axis
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to provide a comparison for the volume of bids versus the volume of asks. The
different coloured plots represent the levels of the order book (recall this is ordered
by price), where blue is level one, green is level two, red is level three, cyan is
level four and magenta is level five.
As EDH0 approaches maturity the volume of messages in the order book increases
substantially, as does the volume. In Figure 3.3, by August 6, 2009 the number
of message updates over the day measured (UTC time) increases by a factor of
ten to 2,018,494. Interestingly, whilst more than five levels are available to quote
at (indeed for contracts such as the S&P 500 E-mini, I see up to ten layers of
quotes in practice) the tapes indicate that no more than five levels are quotes.
It is also striking that the price differentials of the quotes are now no more than
the minimum tick-size, so at any given point the range from the level five bid
to the ask covers 5 cents. One point to note is that whilst the number of active
accounts on August 6, 2009 is higher at the peak, it is still under 300.
CME group has conducted its own survey of its traded futures contracts, the
advantage that CME has in this respect is that each account connected to the
Globex platform needs to declare the type of connection, that is whether the ac-
cess is for an individual trading account with named traders or to an automated
trading platform. Their 2010 report indicates that about 64% of message up-
dates within the limit order book comes from automated trading accounts for the
Eurodollar (the fifth most active by messaging after EuroFX, S&P 500 E-mini,
Crude Oil and ten-year treasury note futures and the fourth most active by vol-
ume). I find that thresholding the update speed at 25ms returns a modal value
at around 65%. Time-series variation for my AT proxy by thresholding at 200 to
50ms provides very similar patterns and I explore this choice in more detail later
in this chapter.
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Figure 3.2: Order Book Market Depth in March 2010 Maturing Contract (EDH0
on July 11, 2008)
Notes: This figure displays the five levels limit order book of EDH0 on July 11, 2008:
the bid and ask price, volume and the number of buyers and sellers at the five levels. The
total volume on this day is 268,258 observations for each level. Notice that whilst the
contracts are continuously traded from Sunday to -Friday 5:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m central
standard time (10 pm to 9 pm universal standard time, my plots are all in UCT), there
is a 45 minute daily break in trading at 4.15 pm CST (9.15 pm UCT) on weekdays.
However, this is not the time at which the daily settlements are computed, this occurs
between 1.59 pm and 2.00 pm CST and either reports the mid price of the volume
weighted best-bid best-ask or the volume weighted average price of any trades during
this survey. For data purposes I treat a day as being 00:00:00.001 CST to 11:59.59.999
CST, although I have run my study by UCT and found no significant difference in the
results as the majority of trading is within the day denoted by 00:00:00.001 CST to
11:59.59.999 UCT.
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Figure 3.3: Order Book Market Depth in March 2010 Maturing Contract (EDH0
on August 06, 2009)
Notes: This Figure displays the five levels limit order book of EDH0 on August 06,
2009: the bid and ask price, volume and the number of buyers and sellers at the five
levels. This is the largest quoting day with 2,018,494 observations for each level. Notice
that whilst the contracts are continuously traded from Sunday to -Friday 5:00 p.m. -
4:00 p.m central standard time (10 pm to 9 pm universal standard time, my plots are
all in UCT), there is a 45 minute daily break in trading at 4.15 pm CST (9.15 pm
UCT) on weekdays. However, this is not the time at which the daily settlements are
computed, this occurs between 1.59 pm and 2.00 pm CST and either reports the mid
price of the volume weighted best-bid best-ask or the volume weighted average price of
any trades during this survey. For data purposes I treat a day as being 00:00:00.001
CST to 11:59.59.999 CST, although I have run my study by UCT and found no signif-
icant difference in the results as the majority of trading is within the day denoted by
00:00:00.001 CST to 11:59.59.999 UCT.
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Using the normal kernel function to estimate densities, Figure 3.4 (a) and (b)
illustrate the distribution of bid and ask algorithmic trading proxies (threshold
at 25 ms) of both the contract-day panel dataset and the volume weighted average
dataset. The volume weighted average dataset includes 2,339 observations. When
both bid and ask AT proxies are below 5%, the density keeps at a very low level
(see Figure 3.4 (a)). Once the fraction of the bid and ask AT reach 14% and 15%,
the density of AT proxies suddenly increases to around 0.013 - 0.015, respectively.
There are fluctuations for both ask and bid AT proxies between 16% and 40%,
where bid AT proxy shows more volatile than ask one. When the fraction of AT
traders is larger than 40% of total traders, bid and ask proxies seem to converge
and rise steeply, and both arrive the high peak with 0.033 density (bid AT proxy)
and 0.035 density (ask AT proxy) around 65%. CME Group [2010] reports that
the proportion of algorithmic activities on Eurodollar futures markets is 64.46%,
which is consistent with my findings (see the black dotted line in Figure 3.4 (a)
and (b)). Finally, AT proxies return to zero at 100%.
Figure 3.4 (b) presents the kernel density of contract-day panel dataset AT proxies
with 35,491 daily observations. Consistent with volume weighted average dataset,
the faction of AT traders below 5% is very low. Both bid and ask AT proxies
follow the similar path and rise smoothly. There are some shifts but the volatile
degree is much less than the volume weighted average dataset between 10% and
40%. After the proportion of algorithmic traders larger than 45%, the density
of AT proxy suddenly rises and reaches the highest point around 70% and drop
back to zero at 100%.
In short, bid and ask AT proxies of two datasets show the similar pattern, with
low density level below 5%, the highest density between 65% - 70% and are highly
volatile between 15% and 40%.
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Figure 3.4: Kernel Density Estimation of AT Proxies and Total Volumes
Notes: Graph (a) shows the kernel density of the bids and asks daily fraction of algo-
rithmic traders with 2,339 observations in the volume weighted average dataset; and
graph (b) is the density of daily AT proxies with 35,491 observations in the panel
dataset. The black dotted line represents the proportion of AT proxy from the CME
Group [2010], which they report that the proportion of algorithmic activities is 64.46%
on Eurodollar futures markets. Graph (c) and graph (d) present the kernel density of
the trades and quotes daily total volumes in both volume weighted average dataset and
panel dataset. The daily total volume is computed as
∑
PkVk, where Pk is trades, asks
or bids prices, Vk is trades, asks or bids volume and k is tick-times.
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The distribution of the contract volume provides some insight into the activity of
the market at a daily frequency; for each day, I compute
∑
Vk where Pk are the
traded or quoted prices. Figure 3.4 (c) and (d) present the Gaussian kernel density
plots (with logarithmic abscissa values) across the contract-day panel. We can
see that there are a small number of days in both the panel for trades and quotes
that have intense spikes in volume for both the panel and the market aggregate.
Unlike the asymmetries in the quoting frequency, however, the distribution of
bids and asks is roughly consistent (recall that the volume quoted need not be
identical across the bids and asks). The most active days have around $6.65
trillion of contracts traded and roughly three times this quoted.
3.6 Liquidity and Depth Measures with Algo-
rithmic Trading Proxies
At this stage of the chapter, I move from the inside quotes to the complete order
book to exploit the comprehensive nature of my dataset. Therefore, from this
point of the chapter, the term ‘level’ refers to one of the five levels of the order
book. Latter in the chapter, I study the marginal effects of AT in the quality of
the market measured by execution risks. Before that I believe it is important to
provide a global view of liquidity, which is a determinant of execution risk, and
algorithmic trading in the market. In this context, I first analyze where in the
book liquidity is created and how this liquidity evolves over the maturity of the
contracts. I summarize my findings in Figure 3.5, where I plot the weekly average
of the liquidity measures calculated using the information on every contract in
my sample. In general, the patterns of the different liquidity measures are con-
sistent with each other. Both the bid-ask spreads and quoted half spreads are
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quite volatile and slowly get narrower and more consistent over time among the
five levels. Near to two years before maturity, quoted spreads become narrower
indicating greater market liquidity. Then, one week before settlement liquidity
suddenly drops again. In terms of quoted depth, there is a clear increasing trend
from six years to maturity that is broken only few days before maturity. Follow-
ing my results it is possible to conclude that the largest liquidity in the market
is provided in level two which exhibits the highest depth during these six years
and also decreases one week before maturity.
The maturity effect behavior can be clearly seen in the plots of effective half
spread, realized half spreads (5 mins and 30 mins) and adverse selection indicators
(5 mins and 30 mins). For all levels, Figure 3.5 shows a monotonic decreasing
trend during the last five years of the life-cycle of contracts. The narrowest
effective half spreads, realized half spreads and adverse selection indicators are
observed in level one of the order book. It is worth noting that level one and level
two tend to converge, which again highlights the importance of level two.
I now explore the characteristics of AT in the market. In particular, I want to
provide a general idea on how much AT activity is observed in the Eurodollar
Future market, where in the book the ATs sit (i.e. are they more active on the
ask than in the bid or vice versa, do they trade more on a level than other, etc).
Table 3.3 presents some descriptive statistics on the order book updates I used to
compute the AT proxy (for reference these can be compared with the timestamps
of variance ratios from the inside spread data in Table 2.7). The Table shows that
although the 200ms limit is lower than the average human reaction time reported
by literature on physiology, it is not really a collection point for AT because on the
average message updates happen much quicker. In fact, the majority of quotes
under 200ms are also under 100ms.
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Figure 3.5: Liquidity Spreads
Notes: This figure displays the weekly average of liquidity measures at the five levels for
all the contracts including bid-ask spreads, quoted half spreads, quoted depth, effective
half spreads, realized spreads (5 mins and 30 mins) and adverse selection (5 mins and
30 mins). Theses spreads are averaged by time to maturity across 40 contracts, hence
the x axis is the year to maturity.
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Figure 3.6: Ask Side Algorithmic Trading Fraction
Notes: This figure portrays the weekly average proportion of algorithmic trading in ask sides
from level 1 to level 5 across all the contracts. The fraction of algorithmic trading A˜ is calculated
as A˜jt∆k = M˜
A˜
jt∆k/M˜jt, where M˜jt is the total number of messages for ask side level j for the
day t; and M˜A˜jt∆k is the algorithmic trading messages, defined as a message with time stamp
updates ∆k of less than the different thresholds (200ms, 150ms, 100ms, 75ms, 50ms and 25ms)
for ask level j for the day t. The value of x axis is the years to maturity. The red dashed line
represents the proportion of AT proxy from the CME Group [2010], which they report that the
proportion of algorithmic activities is 64.46% on Eurodollar futures markets.
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Figure 3.7: Bid Side Algorithmic Trading Fraction
Notes: This figure portrays the weekly average proportion of algorithmic trading in bid sides
from level 1 to level 5 across all the contracts. The fraction of algorithmic trading A˜ is calculated
as A˜jt∆k = M˜
A˜
jt∆k/M˜jt, where M˜jt is the total number of messages for bid side level j for the
day t; and M˜A˜jt∆k is the algorithmic trading messages, defined as a message with time stamp
updates ∆k of less than the different thresholds (200ms, 150ms, 100ms, 75ms, 50ms and 25ms)
for bid side level j for the day t. The value of x axis is the years to maturity. The red dashed
line represents the proportion of AT proxy from the CME Group [2010], which they report that
the proportion of algorithmic activities is 64.46% on Eurodollar futures markets.
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Figure 3.8: Total Messages by Quote Depth Level
Notes: These two graphs capture the weekly average of total messages (per minute)
in both ask and bid sides at five different levels. The total messages per minute (M˜∆jt)
can be calculated as M˜∆jt = M˜jt/T
∗
t , where M˜jt is the total number of messages for bid
or ask side level j for the day t; and T ∗t is the length of the first order to the last order
on an individual day t and measured in minutes, j is the order book level. The value
of x axis is the years to maturity.
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Strikingly, my results also show that censoring at 25ms collects messages that
happen on average at 8ms, with most taking place in less than 18ms. This
threshold exhibits a median update time between 3ms and 5ms for all levels. The
lowest mode update time for all contracts at a 25ms threshold is 2.69ms. Given
these results, I turn to a graphical analysis of the activity of AT in each level
of the order book. In Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, I present the weekly average
of algorithmic trading at different thresholds (200ms, 150ms, 100ms, 75ms, 50ms
and 25ms) for both the ask and the bid sides.
The fraction of algorithmic trading is quite high for all the five order book levels,
even when the AT proxy is set to identify messages at or below 25ms. The
chances that with only around 300 active accounts in the market at any given time
that the proxy is picking up accidental simultaneous executions seems unlikely
as these averages are over an entire day. The variation in the fraction of AT
quoting follows a definite term structure and a day of the week effect (Sundays
being constantly lower). Considering the 200ms threshold shows that for both
the bid and the ask sides the proportion of AT is relatively low (between 20%
and 40% for levels 1 and 2 and lower or not existing for the rest of the levels)
during the first 2 years of the contracts life-cycle. Then, the proportion of AT
increases as maturity approaches, reaching a maximum of around 90% when 2
years remain to maturity. The maximum this time involves all the five levels as
AT activity gradually appears in different levels of the order book from 8 to 2
years to maturity. For a 25ms threshold, the maximum proportion of AT is 80%
at level 5 and level 4 and 65% at level 2. It is important to note that level 2 is
the most rapidly and actively messaged so that as a result it is very consistent
with the 64.46% reported by CME Group [2010].
In terms of the total messages, it is observed in Figure 3.8 that shows that level
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2 of the order book has the most number of messages per minute. At level 2
for both bid and ask sides, the total messages spike around 200 messages per
minute in two years before maturity. What is interesting here is that although
level 2 seems to be the predominant one the fraction of the algorithmic trading
is still very high at level 4 and level 5 (see Figure 3.8). This means that level 2 is
not the major drive for the AT proxy. Therefore, total messages can be treated
as an instrument variable to deal with the endogeny effects of AT proxy in the
regression, which I will present the estimation results in the next section.
3.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided a theoretical prediction of the marginal effects of the
informed traders on the quality of Eurodollar future market, and also conducted
the analysis on the high-frequency trading behavior and a broad battery of liq-
uidity provision measurements in this market. I have analyzed the entire market
depth of this market from 2008 to 2014 and introduced a new algorithmic trading
proxy and battery of tests to assess its impact on the quality of the market. This
chapter conducts a population study, in that I have every trade and inside quote
from 1996 to 2014 and every message update in the order-book from 2008 to 2014.
Importantly, this is the first study to combine both the best-bid best-ask and the
order-book data to proxy the influence of high speed quoting on the market. The
Globex platform from which most of the orders emanate, does not have direct
market order, rather limit orders, market orders with limit protection, market to
limit stop limit and stop order with protection, therefore the tapes observe the
entire activity of the market over the 2008 to 2014 period, I believe that such a
study on the impact of AT on market quality has never before been attempted.
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Theoretically, this chapter provides a theoretical prediction that there are non-
linear effects of the informed traders on the market quality over the term structure
of the Eurodollar contracts. Empirically, I provide a comprehensive view of the
liquidity and the algorithmic trading activities in the market using every messag-
ing update at each level within the limit order book from 2008 to 2014.
For the market liquidity, I find the basic bid-ask spread and several others liquidity
measures are consistent over the term structure of Eurodollar futures. Liquidity in
the initial three to four years is relative stable and low. As the contracts move to
the maturity, the liquidity spreads get narrower and more volatiles across all the
levels of the order book, especially for those two-year tenor contracts. However,
the spreads substantially decrease for the one-week tenor contracts. Besides, my
results suggest that the quotes at level two show the highest depth to provide the
largest liquidity in the market.
For the high-speed algorithmic trading behavior, this chapter explore that the
messaging updating time for the majority of quotes in the limit order book is
under 200 milliseconds. It also worth noting that the most active level of the
order book for the overall volume of quotes and in particular high speed quoting
is level two. Indicating that studies on this contract that ignore quoting outside
the best bid best ask are possibly missing some interesting features of the market.
My results paint a fascinating picture of the changing behavior of traders in these
very actively traded contracts and the impact of algorithmic traders – defined as
updating the order-book with update times of under 25ms or 200 ms– on proxies
for execution risk and market quality.
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Chapter 4
High Frequency Trading and
Execution Risk Dynamics: Using
an Adapted Semi-parametric
Model
Using a novel semi-parametric partial linear model, this chapter as-
sesses the marginal effects of the fraction of high-speed algorithmic
traders for execution risks and the quality on Eurodollar future mar-
ket. I utilize the entire activity within the limit order book and trans-
action data of the Eurodollar future market from 2008 to 2014. The
empirical finding suggests that non-linear relations and certain levels
of saturation exist regarding the impact of HFTs on market quality,
and this may explain the contradictory evidence found in prior stud-
ies of this type. Lower proportions of high-speed algorithmic trading
can damage the market quality and increase the execution risks for
other traders; higher proportions has the positive marginal effect on
the market quality; the impact disappears once the proportions reach
certain saturation points.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a semi-parametric empirical model designed to capture
the effects predicted by the theory model from the preceding chapter. I present a
new form of the bootstrap estimator based on the original Robinson type estima-
tor with a new bootstrap interval calculation to generate confidence bounds. The
semi-parametric estimator has an instrumental variable specification designed to
account for endogeneity in the in the proxy I use for high frequency trading (mes-
saging updates under 25 milliseconds or 200 milliseconds). I find that the pattern
predicted by the theory model of HFT saturation is supported by empirical evi-
dence over a variety of market quality indicators.
Motivated by the theoretical prediction, I conduct a novel semi-parametric par-
tially linear approach utilizing the fraction of algorithmic trading as an explana-
tory factor for a series of market characteristics across all 40 Eurodollar quarterly
contracts from July 2008 to January 2014. I will demonstrate that: a) that
there are critical levels of saturation of algorithmic trading; lower fractions have
a detrimental marginal effect on market quality and higher fractions have a posi-
tive marginal effect. I believe that this transmission structure may explain many
of the contradictory results found in the extant literature. b) I will show that
there is a significant term structure effect to the temporal distribution of high
frequency trading and that the differential impact on market quality may also go
some way to explaining the mixed results on the futures maturity effect conducted
on lower frequency data.
I have implemented an adaptation of the conventional semi-parametric partially
linear models to account for the instrumental variable approach. To measure
the quality of the market, I employ a battery of indicators that make use of a
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variety of variance ratios and spreads. For the variance ratios for daily trading in
each maturity, I utilize the variance and covariance ratios results from Chapter 2
following the approach of Hasbrouck [2014]. Specifically, the variance-covariance
ratio analysis documents the change in the expected level of quadratic variation
at different time scales and could be used to determine the impact of high speed
quoting on very short term volatility. Additionally, the analysis of the covariance
ratio between the quotes on bid and ask side of the inside-spread, provides insight
into the time-scale at which there is a breakdown in an agreement between the
buy and sell side of the order book, an important measurement of market liquidity
and the informativeness of quotes. In supplement to the variance-covariance ratio
analysis, I also utilize the battery of liquidity spreads from Chapter 3 implemented
in Hendershott et al. [2011], which include the basic bid-ask spread in addition
to several others that measure complementary aspects of liquidity and execution
risks and costs. I build upon the prior approach of Hendershott et al. [2011] by
applying these spread measures to every level of the limit order book.
When I apply the partially linear semi-parametric analysis with the fraction of
high frequency trading as an explanatory variable my results are startlingly con-
sistent across measures. When levels of high frequency trading are low (i.e. when
the fraction of low frequency traders is higher) the marginal effect of additional
high frequency traders reduces market quality across all measures. Interestingly,
I find that the level-wise impact on variance ratios as I increase the proportion
of high frequency traders is positive (generally considered a deleterious effect),
however, the degree of correlation between the bid and ask prices, in contrast
decreases (also a deleterious effect). However, this marginal effect completely
reverses as the number of high frequency traders passes into the majority. I term
this a critical saturation point and postulate that the competition amongst traders
results in market outcomes usually deemed as being preferred (higher market liq-
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uidity, lower levels of volatility and better agreement between the bid and ask
prices). This pattern is also observed across a variety of market indicators.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 proposes a
novel semi-parametric partially linear regression with instruments to capture the
relations between the fraction of algorithmic traders and execution risks in the
Eurodollar future markets. Section 4.3 provides the analysis of the algorithmic
trading at high frequencies and execution risks on Eurodollar future market,
whilst Section 4.4 provides some summary comments. For robustness I have
conducted a significant number of ancillary treatments and robustness checks,
and these are presented in an extensive online appendix.
4.2 A Semi-parametric Model of Market Qual-
ity and Algorithmic Trading
My prediction is that the AT proxies influence on the market quality indicators is
mostly likely to be a non-linear relation and as previously stated, my AT proxies
may exhibit significant endogeneity. I therefore utilize an instrumental variable
(IV), partially linear semiparametric regression, to estimate the potentially non-
linear relationship between execution risks measures and the level of algorithmic
trading from the Eurodollar Futures order book.
Figures 2.5 to 3.7 plot, respectively, the estimated wavelet variance ratios across
all 40 contracts sorted by time to maturity for wavelet levels one to nine, my eight
different spreads measured by order-book level, the fraction of messages (averaged
by the 40 contract types) in the order-book classified by speed of update from
25ms to 200ms (the preferred threshold) for the asks and the same set of plots
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for the bid side of the order-book.
The variance ratios and the spreads form the dependent variables in the regression
and the AT proxy forms the explanatory variable, where the dependent variables
are collected in the vector Yit = {S˜ Qit , S˜ Q
1/2
it , S˜
D
it , S˜
E
it , S˜
R,5
it , S˜
R,30
it , S˜
AS,5
it ,
S˜ AS,30it , R˜A1it, R˜A4it, R˜A9it, R˜B1it, R˜B4it, R˜B9it, R˜AB1it, R˜AB4it, R˜AB9it}. How-
ever, as I do not have access to the specific account identifiers for each message
update in the order-book I cannot tell for certain whether a message has been
created by an algorithmic trader operating at high speed or is just the product of
two low-frequency traders coincidently submitting an order. I therefore introduce
an instrumentation step, which utilizes the logarithm of total volume of traffic
within a day and the logarithm of time to maturity (in days) of the contract as I
would anticipate this will be correlated with the dependent variable, but should
be orthogonal to the error term if the AT proxy is to be, in part determining the
level of execution risk.
The regressions are computed as a contract-day panel across the 40 contracts
by day, from July 2008 to January 2014 (the sample period for the order-book
data). For my purposes I adapt the time series version of the fractional poly-
nomial estimator for my panel based analysis. The focus of this chapter is not
the specification of a new estimator, but to implement a contract-day panel and
time series semi-parametric model with instrumental variables with possibly en-
dogenous regressors, I did adapt part of the state-of-the-art in this area to my
needs and I shall briefly overview this estimator (as it is not so commonly used in
this context) and my approach for generating confidence intervals and marginal
effects. The estimator in general terms is expressed as follows:
Yi,t = Xi,tβ + G (Zi,t) + εi,t, E[εi,t|Wi,t] = 0 (4.1)
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where Yi,t is my measure of execution risks/market quality for the i contract type
(analogous to the ten year term structure of the futures prices) for day t, Xi,t
are my e = 2 linear regressors (in my case the lagged dependent variable and a
constant) and Zi,t is my f = 1 algorithmic trading proxy. Flattening the data
set to an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where N is the total number of day-contracts and
the index i represents the set of N tuples of (i, t) contract-days.1
Before estimating the semiparametric regression, the endogeneity problems be-
tween independent variables Xi (the lagged execution risk measurements) and
Zi (algorithmic trading proxies) with the error terms εi need to be concerned.
To obtain unbiased estimates, there are some conditions to be satisfied. One is
the no multicollinearity between independent variables, E[εi|Xi, Zi] = 0. The
other is the error term should not be correlated with each independent variable,
cov(εi|Xi, Zi) = 0. To be more strict, the second assumption should be that
the error term should have zero mean conditional on the independent variables,
E(εi|Xi, Zi) = 0.
To address the endogeneity issue, I employ the logarithm of time to maturity
and/or the logarithm of total number of messages per day as instrument variables,
where denoted as Wi. As valid instrument variables, Wi need to satisfied two
conditions: one is the instrument variables Wi should be partially correlated
with the endogenous variable Zi, cov(Wi, Zi) 6= 0. In my case, both the log total
number of messages per day and the log time to maturity are correlated with
the AT proxy. The other condition requires that cov(Wi, εi) = 0. However, this
condition can not be tested due to the unobservable of error term εi.
1A word on notation. I will use mathscript capitals A to denote functions, vector operators
(followed by :→) and densities (which have no following parentheses), E[x|y] to denote the
expectation of a variable x conditioned (potentially non-parametrically) on y, I denotes a
suitably sized identity matrix. Lowercase greek letters denote parameter vectors.
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I therefore collect my data set into the vectors Y = (Y1, ..., Yi) ∈ R, X =
(X1, ..., Xi) ∈ Re and Z = (Z1, ..., Zi) ∈ Rf . Therefore β is a vector of un-
known linear parameters, G (.) is an unknown nonparametric function, where εi
is the error term satisfying the condition that E[εi|Xi] = 0 and E[εi|Zi] = 0. Let
W = (W1, ...,Wi) ∈ Rg be the g = {1, 2} instruments (in my case the log time to
maturity and/or the log total number of messages per day), where E[εi|Wi] = 0.
The following presents a brief summary of my semi-parametric estimator and
summarize my implementation.
4.2.1 My Adapted IV Robinson Estimator
I adjust the standard instrumental variable semi-parametric partially linear for
my purposes. The estimator runs over both panel and time series data, and I have
tested a variety of different Kernels with similar results. In my online appendix,
I compare my results to the conventional Robinson estimator implemented in
Stata 13. One of the major issues with the standard implementations is speed;
this approach is usually designed for smaller panel datasets than the one I have
deployed here. Furthermore, I need to be able to compare instrumental variables
across a number of equations describing the market quality and execution risk
and my approach to dealing with this problem is below.
The conditional expectation is unknown as such I utilize the Robinson [1988]
double residual methodology by applying a nonparametric conditional mean esti-
mator E[Yi|Zi], E[Xi|Zi] and E[εi|Zi] on Equation (4.1). I will follow Newey and
Powell [2003] and adhere to the exponential family of kernels and more specifi-
cally a Gaussian kernel. My major departure from Robinson [1988] and Florens
et al. [2012] will be in the bootstrapping procedure I implement to generate the
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confidence bounds of the model. To begin with I will outline the family of models,
using an adaptation of notation in Florens et al. [2012] and then introduce my
bootstrap procedure. Let the general instrumented semi-parametric regression
be denoted in expectations as:
E[Yi|Zi] = E[Xi|Zi]β + G (Zi) + E[εi|Zi] (4.2)
By subtracting (4.2) from (4.1), I can build an ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation of model as follows,
Yi − E[Yi|Zi] = (Xi − E[Xi|Zi])β + (εi − E[εi|Zi]) (4.3)
where I define Y˜i = Yi−E[Yi|Zi], X˜i = Xi−E[Xi|Zi] and ε˜i = εi−E[εi|Zi]. I can
recover Y˜i, X˜i from the nonparametric regressions of Yi and Xi on Zˆi. Then the
estimated coefficients vector β can be estimated by Equation (4.3) in the absence
of the nonparametric function G (Zi). Let β be the standard OLS estimates:
β =
(∑
i
X˜iX˜
′−1
i
)(∑
i
X˜iY˜
′
i
)
(4.4)
I then regress Zi onto the filtered values of Yi to provide an estimate of the
non-parametric function G (Zi),
Yi −Xiβ = G (Zi) (4.5)
However, prior to this estimation stage I need to deal with the problem of the
variables Xi and Zi being endogenous with respect to the disturbance term, as
such E[εi|Xi, Zi] 6= 0, E[Yi|Zi] and E[Xi|Zi] cannot be estimated consistently via
the non-parametric approach proposed herein.
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My approach is in the spirit of Florens et al. [2012] in that I estimate a time
series/panel version of the instrumented semi-parametric model with linear co-
variates specifically. The target function G (·) and parameter β are the solution
of the functional equation
E[Yi|Wi] = E[G (Zi)|Wi] + E[Xiβ|Wi] (4.6)
therefore the optimal non-parametric function should be such that the model
disturbances are uncorrelated with the time to maturity and/or the total messages
per day. As such, following Florens et al. [2012] who in turn derived their approach
from Robinson [1988] therefore Equation (4.6) can be rewritten as the following
indefinite integrals:
∫
dy y
FY |W (y, ·)
FW (·) =
∫
dz G (z)
FZ|W (z, ·)
FW (·) +
∫
dx xβ
FX|W (x, ·)
FW (·) (4.7)
∫
dy y KY |W (y) =
∫
dz G (z) KZ|W (z) +
∫
dx xβ KX|W (x) (4.8)
where FY |W denotes the joint density of Y and W , and similarly for FZ|W and
FX|W , and KY |W , KZ|W and KX|W indicate the conditional densities of Yi, Xi
and Zi given Wi respectively. Computing the instrumental version of the partially
linear semi-parametric model is non-trivial as both the first and second steps much
account for the non-parametric element recalling the objective of othogonalizing
the disturbances with respect to the instruments.
I define L2V (Rf ) and L2U (Rg) as the Hilbert spaces of square integrable functions
with respect to the two densities V and U . Florens et al. [2012] indicate that V
and U are the functions FZ and FW respectively then the approach is identical
to Darolles et al. [2011], or if the functions V and U are indicator functions then
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the approach tends to that of Hall et al. [2005]. Indeed, these two cases can be seen
as points at the end of a continuum of model choices the econometrician faces.
If V and U are identified in the continuous domain [0, 1] I can also recover the
approach of Newey and Powell [2003], which is a fully non-parametric approach
across the model space.
By multiplying with functions of W , integral Equation (4.8) can be formalised as
equation of operators as follows,
R = OZG + OXβ, (4.9)
with
R = E[Y |W ]FW/U (4.10)
OX : Re → L2U (Rg) : β˜ 7→ E[X ′β˜|W ]FW/U (4.11)
OZ : L
2
V (Rf )→ L2U (Rg) : G˜ 7→ E[G˜ (Z)|W ]FW/U (4.12)
where R ∈ L2U (Rg), G ∈ L2V (Rf ), β ∈ Re, and R ∈ R(OX) +R(OZ) where R(O)
is the range or co-domain of the operator O. Let O∗X and O
∗
Z for OX and OZ , be
the following corresponding adjoint operators
O∗X : L
2
U (Rg)→ Re : J 7→ E[XJ (W )] (4.13)
O∗Z : L
2
U (Rg)→ L2V (Rf ) : J 7→ E[J (W )|Z]FZ/V (4.14)
I can identify the operatorsOX ,O∗X ,OZ andO
∗
Z using the i.i.d. vectors (Yi, Xi, Zi,Wi)
from the partially linear model (4.1) in the first step. Recall from Equation (4.9),
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the normal equations can be expressed as below,
O∗ZR = O
∗
ZOZG + O
∗
ZOXβ (4.15a)
O∗XR = O
∗
XOZG + O
∗
XOXβ (4.15b)
Florens et al. [2012] demonstrate that if OX is orthogonal to OZ (namely O∗ZOX =
0 with R(OX) ⊥ R(OZ), where O∗ZOX is a dot product), then I can avoid having
to try an iterate estimating G (·) whilst simultaneously estimating β. So the
normal Equation (4.15a) - (4.15b) is equivalent to
O∗ZR = O
∗
ZOZG (4.16a)
O∗ZR = O
∗
ZOZG (4.16b)
Using kernel estimators to replace the operators O∗X , OXand O
∗
XR, yields
∑
i,j
YiXj
Kh(Wi −Wj)
U (Wi)
=
∑
i,j
XiX
t
j
Kh(Wi −Wj)
U (Wi)
β (4.17)
β =
(∑
i,j
XiX
t
j
Kh(Wi −Wj)
U (Wi)
)−1(∑
i,j
YiXj
Kh(Wi −Wj)
U (Wi)
)
where the kernel K is a Gaussian kernel function with bandwidth parameter h
(h > 0) and where the scaled kernel Kh(w) = h−gK (w/h). After identifying the
parameter β, estimation of G can be obtained by purely nonparametric regression
[Darolles et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2005].
I can now presume that R(OX) 6⊥ R(OZ) with O∗ZOX 6= 0 , then so the normal
equation (4.15a) - (4.15b) can be expressed as
O∗Z(I −PX)R = O∗Z(I −PX)OZG (4.18a)
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O∗X(I −PZ)R = O∗X(I −PZ)OXβ (4.18b)
where PX and PZ are the orthogonal projections for the OX and OZ , respec-
tively. Hence, PX = OX(O∗XOX)
−1O∗X and PZ = OZ(O
∗
ZOZ)
−1O∗Z . I define the
parameter estimators β based on equation (4.18b),
β =
O∗X(I −PZ)R
O∗X(I −PZ)OX
=
O∗X(I − OZ(αI + O∗ZOZ)−1O∗Z)R
O∗X(I − OZ(αI + O∗ZOZ)−1O∗Z)OX
(4.19)
where α is the positive regularization parameter, which relates to the value of
n. I follow the standard approach and assume that the operator R belongs to
L2U (Rg), functions E(P(Z)|W = ·)FW (·)/U (·) and E(Xi|W = ·)FW (·)/U (·)
belong to L2U (Rg) for all P ∈ L2V (Rf ), and i ∈ {1, ..., e}. The unknown nonpara-
metric densities estimators (i.e. OX ,O∗X ,OZ and O
∗
Z) can be identified by kernel
estimators from the data vectors (Yi, Xi, Zi,Wi) from the partially linear model
as follows:
OXβ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xiβ
KhW (Wi)
U
(4.20)
O∗XW =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
∫
KhW (Wi − w)W (w)dw (4.21)
O∗ZG =
1
n
n∑
i=1
KhW (Wi)
U
∫
KhZ (Zi − z)g(z)dz (4.22)
O∗ZW =
1
n
n∑
i=1
KhZ (Zi)
V
∫
KhW (Wi − w)W (w)dw (4.23)
R =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi
KhW (Wi)
U
(4.24)
where W ∈ L2U (Rg), G ∈ L2V (Rf ) and the bandwidth parameters hW , hZ are
dependent on sample size N , and the kernel K . The kernels can be any of the
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standard kernels, Epanechnikov’s, Gaussian or fractional polynomials. For the
results presented in this chapter I implemented a gaussian kernel weighted local
polynomial fit.
To provide easy to compare results across different models I report the marginal
effects of changes in z on y, hence I set M = dy/dz as a function of the depen-
dent variable. If the bootstrapped confidence interval straddles the abscissa axis
across its domain then the independent variable has no marginal impact on the
dependent variable.
I compute confidence bounds for the partially linear semi-parametric regressions
via an i.i.d. bootstrap with 99 resamples. Monte-Carlo studies for this estima-
tor utilizing the function G˜ = B(Z,V , 2V )× sin(HV Z), where B(z, a, b) is the
probability density function of the beta distribution with shape parameters a, b,
the dependent variable is Z ∈ [0, 1] and the frequency scaling parameter set to
H = 10.
The bootstrap consistency theory for these types of models is somewhat sparse;
however, most implementations use bootstrap to determine the confidence inter-
vals, for single index models a consistency proof for i.i.d. bootstrap is available
from Yu and Ruppert [2002].1 Whilst the choice that I make is the ‘third best’ ap-
proach for providing evidence for the consistency of the bootstrap, it does provide
a useful guide across the sets of choices available for my customized implemen-
tation versus those in other software packages. I compute the i.i.d. bootstrap in
the following steps.
1For instance the semipar implementation in Stata uses this approach, I have included some
models estimated via a Gaussian Kernel in Stata in the Online Supplement to illustrate that
the pattern of the marginal effects is very similar.
137
Step 1 : Estimate the semiparametric regression using the original sample
(Yi, Xi, Zi,Wi),
and compute the fitted value Yˆi and the residual ri for each observation.
Yˆi = Xiβ + G (Zi) + εi (4.25)
ri = Yi − Yˆi (4.26)
Step 2 : For each fitted value Yˆi, randomly choose a residual rci to build the
bootstrapped Y ∗ value,
Y ∗ = [Yˆ1 + rc1, Yˆ2 + rc2, ..., Yˆi + rci, ..., Yˆn + rcn] (4.27)
where random number c ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Hence, the bootstrap data sample in-
cludes the bootstrapped Y ∗ value with fitted dependent variables.
Step 3 : Refit the model using the bootstrap data sample, (Y ∗i , Xi, Zi,Wi), and
compute the marginal effects M.
Step 4 : Repeat the resampling procedure 99 times. The standard deviation of
marginal effects σM can be computed as:
σM =
√∑
(M−M)2
N − 1 (4.28)
Several prior studies, see Florens et al. [2012] for overview have indicated that
the distribution of the marginal effects is normal. Therefore, the 95% lower and
upper confidence bounds, CL and CH , can be calculated by the the 2.5 and 97.5
138
percentiles of the distribution of M.
For each plot, I overlay on a second set of abscissa and ordinate axes the variation
of the AT proxy with respect to time to maturity from 10 to 0 years. Inference via
confidence bounds is inherently more difficult than via a specific test, such as a
standard Wald test, Lagrange multiplier or likelihood ratio. However, my regres-
sion framework is relatively simple in construction, with a one contemporaneous
non-parametric and one lagged independent variable. For optimal specification
of the non-parametric function I use the Akiake Information Criteria (this is used
within each bootstrap too hence the variation in the pattern of the confidence
bounds).
4.3 Marginal Effects and Execution Risks
In this section, I discuss the marginal effects of algorithmic trading on the mar-
ket quality indicators that proxy for execution risk utilizing the partially linear
semi-parametric model described in Section 4.2. In this framework, execution risk
is measured via the variance/covariance ratios and the various of liquidity mea-
sures. AT proxies account for the non-parametric component of the regression
and the lagged market quality indicators account for the parametric component.
Additionally, both the log of total messages and the log of time to maturity are
used as instruments to deal with potential endogeneity between the execution
risk residual and the algorithmic trading proxy.
On any given day across the forty traded contracts with quarterly delivery, the
vast majority of the market. I run regressions on both a 2,339-day market wide
average and on 35,491 contract-day panel. The contract-day panel allows me to
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instrument the time to maturity directly, whilst the market average I account
for possible reverse causality by instrumenting only with the logarithm of total
messages for this day. In addition to both datasets, I can instrument for both
the volume to message ratio and the total number of traders in the market active
at each level within the order book, and report the results of these regressions in
the online appendix.
4.3.1 Marginal Effects of AT Proxy Thresholded at 25ms
Table 4.1 records the results of my semi-parametric regressions. The results
illustrate the case that, when the AT proxy is regressed against the standard
measures of liquidity the coefficients are generally positively and significant. The
coefficients attached to AT range from 0.071 to 0.926 for the ask side and from
0.072 to 0.926 for the bid side and, are all significant at a 99% confidence level.
When compared, side-by-side, the coefficients on the AT proxy are slightly higher
for the bid side when using the volume weighted dataset. This effect is not
observed in the panel dataset where there is almost no difference between the
explanatory power of AT over execution risk between the bid and the ask sides.
Notice that the R2 for the panel regression is noticeably higher than the market
average. We can see from the sum of evidence in the plots for both execution risk,
liquidity and the algorithmic trading proxy that the term structure effect is very
strong. Indeed, for any given day the varying effects across the contracts will, to a
high level of likelihood, exist and invariably in the most actively traded contracts.
As would be expected from a large panel, such as the one to which I have fitted
with the single indexed instrument from the first regression are highly significant
and I will deal with the non-parametric component forthwith. It is interesting,
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albeit expected, to note that the R2 for the higher variance/covariance ratios are
effectively zero, as much of the signal has already been extracted. Recall, that
as I add increasing wavelet levels the local price level signal disappears and the
remainder tends towards noise as the sample is more aggressively partitioned and
the average extracted; level one only partitions the sample across a single division
point.
I now move on to the non-parametric component of the regression. In my online
appendix, I present all of the underlying plots of the estimated non-parametric
function. However, for comparison herein, I present only the marginal effects
data with the variation of the bid and ask AT proxy overlaid in red. In the online
appendix, I also present the regressions using the average of bid and the ask AT
proxy.
The first point of note, as mentioned in Section 4.2 regression models of this
type can suffer from overfitting outside of the bulk of the data, this is so called
‘Trimming’ problem. The distribution of the AT proxy is, in the main, bounded
between approximately 20% and 90% of transactions, see Figure 3.4 and indeed
this is the case when choosing any refresh rate from 25 ms to 200 ms, see pre-
vious discussion and Figures 3.6 to 3.7 for more details. I see that in several
plots the fitted function does exhibit a substantial level of oscillation, however,
the bootstrapped confidence bounds appear to correctly identify this as insignifi-
cant (subject to the usual caveats regarding confidence bounds versus parametric
identification of significance). However, in the main, the non-parametric function
does appear to capture a great deal of the complex interactions that would dimin-
ish the ability of a linear regression to capture them, or for a certain subsamples
result in a misleading indication of a significant linear correspondence. Indeed,
my results may provide some insight into why many studies on algorithmic trad-
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ing yield diametrically opposite results as it appears that the marginal effect not
only changes sign when the AT proxy is increasing; however, the effect of high
speed quoting on the bid and ask side is subtly different, I will now explore these
results in more detail.
In Figure 4.1 the black line represents the marginal effects of algorithmic trading
on the bid-ask spreads. The marginal effects of algorithmic trading on the bid-ask
spreads have been measured by two sets of data, one is the volume weighted aver-
age dataset in Subplots (a) and (b), the other is the panel dataset in Subplots (c)
and (d). The red dashed line shows the proportion of daily AT proxy thresholded
at 25 ms for the order book level 2.
Figure 4.1 Subplots (a) to (d) indicate that a small number of algorithmic traders
at high frequency have effects on the bid-ask spreads. With the volume weighted
average dataset, Subplot (a) and (b) suggest that AT has negative effects on the
bid-ask spreads when the AT proxy below 10%. Then the marginal effects on the
bid-ask spreads increase to the peak when ask-side AT proxy reaches around 24%.
Whereas it drops to the bottom when the AT proxy is across 27% on the ask side,
which suggests the algorithmic traders at high frequency provide liquidity into
the market, narrow bid-ask spreads, and decrease the trading costs. However,
the marginal effect of the AT proxy on the bid-ask spreads suddenly spikes at the
AT proxy increasing to 41%. In this period, algorithmic traders at high speeding
level act as informed traders to submit and cancel quotes orders, which increase
the transact costs and reduce the market liquidity. Once the AT proxy increases
over 50%, the ask-side AT has limited effects on the bid-ask spreads. Subplot (b)
indicates the effects of bid-side AT proxy on the bid-ask spreads show the similar
patterns compared to the ask sides with the volume weighted average dataset.
The marginal effects of the bid-side AT on the bid-ask spreads spike around the
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24% and 39% proportion and drop to the bottom around 31% proportion.
Figure 4.1 Subplot (c) and (d) present the marginal effects on the bid-ask spreads
using the panel dataset. The results suggest that a small proportion of algorithmic
traders at high-speeding level have the influence on the bid-ask spread, especially
on the bid side; whereas once the AT proxy increases over 40%-45%, the marginal
effects on bid-ask spread are limited. Subplot (d) demonstrates that when the
AT fraction is between 11% and 18%, the marginal effects of the bid-side AT
proxy on the bid-ask spreads decrease dramatically. In this low AT fraction
period, high-speeding algorithmic traders act as liquidity providers to reduce the
bid-ask spreads and decrease the transaction costs in the market. From 18%
to 26%, the marginal effects on the bid-ask spreads suddenly increase, which
could be caused by the algorithmic traders acting as the inform traders receiving
information earlier than other traders. These front-run high-frequency traders
usually dominate quote-matching strategy to submit and cancel a large amount
of orders, which increase the trading costs for other traders and reduce market
liquidity.
Figure 4.2 represents the marginal effects of algorithmic trading on adverse section
(5 mins) in Subplots (a) and (b) and, on adverse selection (30 mins) in Subplots
(c) and (d), both with the volume weighted average dataset. This Figure indicates
that the increasing AT activities have effects on both adverse selections within
both 5 minutes and 30 minutes. The red dashed line shows the proportion of
daily AT proxy thresholded at 25 ms for the order book level 2.
Subplots (a) and (b) suggest that AT has limited effects on the adverse selection
(5 mins) when the AT proxy below 40%. Once the AT proxy increases over 40%,
the effect of AT on adverse selection (5 mins) rises dramatically to the peak.
This indicates that ATs increase trading costs, decrease the market liquidity, and
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damage the price efficiency with more informative quotes in the market. At this
stage, the increasing algorithmic traders act as informed traders to submit and
cancel quotes orders. The degree of asymmetric information in the market reaches
a higher level with increased the transaction cost to execute orders. However, the
marginal effect suddenly drops as the ask-side AT proxy increases to about 46%
- 53%. In this period, ATs provide liquidity to the market and increase price
efficiency with less informative quotes.
In Subplots (c) and (d), we can see that the bid side AT proxy, the marginal
effects are markedly more volatile than those computed from the ask side. There
are no distinct effects of ask side AT proxy on the adverse selection (30 mins)
when the proportion of algorithmic traders is below around 36%. Within 36% to
44% proportion, the marginal effects are positive. Once the fraction of AT passes
44%, the impact of ask side AT proxy on adverse selection (30 mins) drops until
the AT fraction reaching around 55%.
Overall, the proportion of algorithmic trading significantly impacts on the ad-
verse selection (5 mins and 30 mins) and market liquidity. AT shows limited
impacts when the AT proxy is relative low. As the increase of AT proportion,
the algorithmic traders act as liquidity demanders, which ATs act as informed
traders and its impacts on adverse selection increase. Once the AT reaches a cer-
tain critical point, the algorithmic traders act as liquidity providers, which leads
to the shrinkage of asymmetry information and the increasing market liquidity.
When the most traders in the market are ATs, the marginal impacts effectively
drop to zero.
In the vast majority of the cases neither the bid AT proxy nor the ask AT proxy is
significant, therefore suggesting that execution risk is not related to the presence
of AT in these futures market. A notable exception is the case where execution
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Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of Bid-Ask Spreads Thresholded at 25 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at
25 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on the bid-ask spreads in Subplots
(a) to (b) with the volume weighted average dataset and Subplots (c) and (d) with the
panel dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds
of bid-ask spread marginal effects.
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Effects of Adverse Selection (5 mins and 30 mins) Thresh-
olded at 25 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at
25 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on adverse selection (5 mins) in
Subplots (a) to (b) and, on adverse selection (30 mins) in Subplots (c) and (d), both
with the volume weighted average dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower
and upper confidence bounds of adverse selection marginal effects.
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risk is considered at level 4, therefore at medium frequencies, and defined either
as ask variance ratios or as bid variance ratios. In this case, both bid and ask AT
have a significant impact on execution risk. Although, in general, the results from
variance ratio are not as good as the ones observed using the liquidity measures,
the marginal effect analysis shown in Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.5 clearly reveals
that the variance-covariance measures tell only a part of the story and cannot
be dismissed. See Budish et al. [2013] for materially similar results in a different
setting.
Each of these Figures combines the information on how the activity of algorithmic
traders evolves with the time to maturity of futures contracts and the informa-
tion about the marginal effects of algorithmic trading on my variance-covariance
measures of execution risk. It is worth to remind that the salient characteristic
of these measures is their capacity to isolate the level of decoupling between both
sides of the book affecting solely high frequency traders. 1
Following on from my preliminary analysis which revealed that most of the AT
activity happens at the second level in the order book, all the Figures on this
section show evidence that level two is critically important in explaining the
market characteristics. The information provided by each of these Figures allow
me to describe in more detail how the decoupling between both sides of the book
depends on the proportion of AT actively placing orders in the market and, how
the AT activity evolves over the life-cycle of the futures contract.
In Figure 4.3 the dashed red line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy
for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots
1In the thesis, I only report the results of high frequency traders defined as traders placing
orders within a threshold equal or lower than 25ms or 200ms. However, Figures would be
qualitatively similar for alternative thresholds such as 50ms, 75ms,100ms and 150ms.
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(a) to (d) and, on covariance ratio in Subplots (e) to (f), both at timescale 1
with the contract-day panel dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower
and upper confidence bounds of marginal effects. Subplots (a) and (b) suggest
that AT marginal effects on ask variance ratio level 1 depend on the proportion
of algorithmic trading activities in the market. When this proportion is lower
than approximately 20%, the evidence suggests that AT has limited effect on the
variance ratio of the spreads. Once this proportion of AT is higher than 20%, there
is an increase in the marginal effect on the variance ratio revealing AT increase
the high-frequency microstructure noises and volatilities in the market. At the
same time, higher variance ratios are symptomatic of less informative quotes
and, therefore, higher execution risk as the fundamental price of the contracts
is more difficult to observe in the market. However, as the proportion of AT
increases further (to around reaches 23 - 25%) the effect on the variance ratio
drops dramatically most likely because the high proportion of AT results in their
orders cancelling each other, shrinking liquidity and, in turn, the spreads variance.
The marginal effects for the bid variance ratio level 1 in Subplots (c) and (d)
present the similar pattern compared with the ask variance ratio. When the ask
side AT proxy is below 20%, the impact of algorithmic trading on bid variance
ratio is relatively weak. When the proportion of ATs is around 24%, its impacts
on bid variance suddenly spike to the top. Once the fraction of ATs is higher than
24%, the marginal effects drop dramatically. Then the marginal effects on the
bid variance ratio level one increase, when the ask side AT proxy passes around
27%. Eventually, there are no much effects on the bid variance ratio at level 1,
when the ask side AT proxy is higher than 30%. For the impact of the bid side
AT proxy on the bid variance ratio at level 1, the pattern is similar to the ask
side; however, the point of inflection is lower than for the ask side, at around 10%
- 20% of messages being ascribed to be algorithmic in origin.
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The evidence suggests that once the AT proxy reaches the critical point 20%,
variance ratios will stabilize. I conjecture that this is because once the majority
of quoted volume belongs to algorithmic traders using the similar algorithms the
arms race has saturated the market as each sends out the similar signals. I define
this critical point as AT market saturation, I believe that it is this population
measurement that explains the differing results from prior papers in the literature
that have only had access to short snippets of the order-flow over say a single
month or in some cases only a few days.
Subplots (e) and (f) tell a similar story but in terms of decoupling of the bids and
asks. As in the previous case, the effect of AT on the covariance ratio at time
scale 1 are virtually non-existent before the proportion of AT reaches around
28% and after it increases further than 48-50% approximately. Within a 28%
to 33% proportion the impact of AT is negative as the proportion of AT results
in a significant decoupling of bid - ask spreads. Then, up to a proportion of
42% AT substantially increases the covariance ratio, therefore reducing the de-
coupling; one of key interest here is the shape of the transmission function for the
covariance versus the variance, notice that in keeping with the saturation argu-
ment the deterioration in market quality (the reduction in covariation evidencing
a decoupling) occurs at lower fractions of high speed messages. However, the
points of inflection for the bid versus the asks are markedly different and indeed
these points differ from the inflection points for the variances. The reduction
in covariation of the level 1 bid-ask spread is impacted at a substantially lower
fraction of high speed AT messages than for the bid AT proxy. The separation of
the volatility and correlation effects at level one is quite fascinating and indicates
that the mix strategies employed by HFTs obviously have markedly differentiated
impacts.
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(f) Bid Ask Covariance Level 1 - Panel
Figure 4.3: Marginal Effects of Variance and Covariance at Timescale Level 1
Thresholded at 25 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at 25 ms
for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black continuous line
depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots (a) to (d) and, on covariance
ratio in Subplots (e) and (f), both at timescale 1 with the panel dataset. The blue dashed lines
are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds of marginal effects.
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Which strategies may cause these effects? Evidence from a variety of legal actions
have suggested that HFT strategies broadly fall into two categories, trading across
markets, such as spot-future arbitrage or trading within a single market. The
obvious causation for excess variance in the spread would be from momentum
ignition strategies, whereby the algorithm generates quotes (usually at level 2, so
they are no transacted) and uses this volume impact on the order-flow to force the
mid-price and inside quotes in a specific direction (e.g. add a number of standard
deviations worth of bid (ask) volume at or near the level two price, but less than
the level one price to push the price up (down).
I see that the volume of messages in the limit order book at level 2 (not to be
conflated with the level 2 wavelet decomposition) is by far the highest, approach-
ing double that of the level 1 messages at or around two years from maturity.
However, the peaks for the bids and the asks are not strictly concurrent and I
suggest that it is this aesthetic choice in which the side of the order-book in which
the algorithms with operate is a key driver of the asymmetries between the bid
and ask AT proxies impact on the various market characteristics and in particular
that level one variance and covariance ratios and effect that is strongly suggested
in Figure 4.3.
As previously indicated, the variance ratios at medium frequencies have significant
impacts at execution risk. Figure 4.4 Subplot (a) to (f) reveal the marginal
effects of algorithmic trading on variance and covariance ratios at level 4 with the
panel dataset. Subplots (a) and (b) indicate that AT has impacts on the asks
side variance ratio depending on the proportion of algorithmic trading active
in the market. As ask side AT proxy approaches around 32% and 35%, there
is a substantial increase in the marginal effects for the ask variance ratio level
4, which indicates that algorithmic traders increase the ask-side volatility and
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provide substantial microstructure noises into the markets, recall that by level
four, the variance scaling is a comparison to a degree of 1/16 of trading day, hence
the local volatility is substantially scaled at this point.
Once the proportion of ask side AT increases further around 36% to 40%, the
marginal effects for the ask variance ratio decrease substantially. This could be
caused by the ATs saturate the market and their orders start to cancel each other
out. Hence, the liquidity providing from AT will drop off and the spreads variance
will shrink. As AT proxy gets higher, they will fully saturate the market, and
eventually no extra effects on the variance ratios. Subplots (c) and (d) present
the effects of AT on the bids side variance ratios at level 4. Compared to the ask
variance ratios, the critical points of bids variance happen earlier, around 20% to
40%.
In Subplots (e) and (f), the marginal effects of AT proxy on bid–ask covariance
ratio level 4 also illustrate the decoupling of the bid and ask at medium frequen-
cies. The ask side AT proxy has no impact on the bid-ask covariance ratio at
wavelet level 4 when the proportion of ask AT is less than 30% and after it in-
creases further than 48% approximately. This tells a similar story with bid–ask
covariance ratio at level 1. Within a 30% to 33% proportion the impact of ask
side AT is positive as the proportion of AT decreases the decoupling of the bid
and ask. The proportion between 33%and 40% AT substantially decreases the
covariance ratio, therefore the fraction of AT leads to a significant decoupling of
the bid-ask spreads. For the impacts of bid side AT proxy on bid–ask covari-
ance ratio at level 4, the decoupling happens much at a lower proportion of AT,
around 13% to 27% (see Figure 4.4 Subplot (f)). Broadly speaking, Figure 4.4
reveals that the proportion of AT activity in the market has saturation points,
and decouples bid and ask movements.
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(f) Bid Ask Covariance Level 4 - Panel
Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects of Variance and Covariance at Timescale Level 4
Thresholded at 25 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at
25 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots (a)
to (d) and, on covariance ratio in Subplots (e) and (f), both at timescale 4 with the
panel dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds
of marginal effects.
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For longer time frequencies, Figure 4.5 illustrates the effects of algorithmic trading
variance ratio in Subplots (a) to (d) and bid–ask covariance ratio in Subplots (e)
and (f) at the longest timestamp level 9 with the panel dataset. When the fraction
of ask side AT proxy is lower than 30%, there is a limited influence of AT on ask
variance ratio at level 9. Within a proportion of 30% to 35% ask side AT, there
is a substantial increase in the marginal effects for the ask variance ratio. Once
the ask AT proxy increases around 36% to 40%, the marginal effects of AT on
ask variance ratio substantially decrease. When the fraction of AT proxy is over
44%, the marginal effects shift around and the algorithmic trading activity in
the market has limited influence on the ask variance ratio at level 9. For the
impacts coming from the bid side AT proportion, there is no significant effects
on ask variance ratio when the fraction of bid side AT is below 16% and above
60%. However, the bid side AT proxy has positive effects on the ask variance
ratio within a proportion of 17% to 22%, 26%to 34% and 39% to 43%. In these
periods, algorithmic traders play a liquidity supplier role in the market, and result
in the increasing both market liquidity and variance ratio.
Following each marginal effects increasing period, there is also a drop down pe-
riod for the ask variance ratio in the rest proportion within 44% and 55%. The
bid side AT proxy brings negative impacts on the ask variance ratio and results in
dramatically decreases. The reason could be that the market reaches its satura-
tion limits and orders from bid side ATs start to cancel each other out, therefore
the liquidity contracts and the ask variance decreases. The effects from AT pro-
portion on the bid variance ratio at level 9 display more fluctuations and less
extreme than the ask variance ratio, and become stable above the proportion of
60% ATs. Subplots (e) and (f) describe that the fraction of AT has the ability
to decouple between bids and asks of the book. The evidence indicates that ask
side AT has limited impacts on the bid–ask covariance ratio at time scale level
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Figure 4.5: Marginal Effects of Variance and Covariance at Timescale Level 9
Thresholded at 25 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at
25 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots (a)
to (d) and, on covariance ratio in Subplots (e) and (f), both at timescale 9 with the
panel dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds
of marginal effects.
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9 before the proportion of AT below 14% and above 52% approximately. When
the fraction of ask side AT is between 14% - 19%, 25% - 29% and 37% - 43%,
the impact of AT on bid–ask covariance ratio is negative. This means the pro-
portion of AT results in the bid–ask spreads decoupling. When the fraction of
ask side AT is within 20% - 25% and 30% - 36%, the AT substantially increases
the bid–ask covariance ratio, which indicates that the proportion of AT decreases
the decoupling degrees of the bid–ask spreads. For the impacts from bid side AT
activities, when the bid AT proxy increases to 18% - 26% and 33% - 38%, the
marginal effect on bid–ask covariance ratio is substantially increased. Once the
proportion of AT is between 27% - 32% and 38% - 42%, the bid–ask covariance
ratio dips and results in the increasing degrees of bid–ask decoupling.
4.3.2 Marginal Effects of AT Proxy Thresholded at 200ms
In this section, I discuss the marginal effects of algorithmic trading proxy thresh-
olded at 200ms on the diverse market quality indicators. Table 4.2 records the
results of my semi-parametric regressions with AT proxy thresholded at 200ms.
The results is similar with the one thresholded at 25ms. Table 4.2 illustrates
the case that, when the AT proxy is regressed against the standard measures
of liquidity the coefficients are generally positively and significant; only when
regressed against the lagged effective spread is the AT proxy not significant for
the volume weighted average dataset. For the remaining cases, the coefficients
attached to AT range from 0.065 to 0.917 for the ask side and from 0.073 to
0.920 for the bid side and, are all significant at a 99% confidence level. When
compared, side-by-side, the coefficients on the AT proxy are slightly higher for
the bid side when using the volume weighted dataset. This effect is not observed
in the panel dataset where there is almost no difference between the explanatory
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power of AT over execution risk between the bid and the ask sides.
Figure 4.6 to 4.10 presents parts of the estimated non-parametric function with
the algorithmic trading thresholded at 200ms. In Figure 4.6, the black line rep-
resents the marginal effects of algorithmic trading on the bid-ask spreads with
AT proxy thresholded at 200 ms. The marginal effects of algorithmic trading on
the bid-ask spreads have been measured by two set of data, one is the volume
weighted average dataset in Subplots (a) and (b), the other is the panel dataset
in Subplots (c) and (d). The red dashed line shows the proportion of daily AT
proxy thresholded at 200ms for the order book level 2.
Figure 4.6 Subplots (a) to (d) indicate that the increase of high-speeding algo-
rithmic traders has effects on the bid-ask spreads. In Subplot (b) the marginal
effects of the bid-side algorithmic trading fraction on the bid-ask spreads reach at
the peak when the bid-side AT proxy at 26%. Once the AT fraction across 26%,
the marginal effects on the bid-ask spreads suddenly drop to the bottom around
33% proportion. This could be the high-frequency algorithmic traders provide
liquidity to the market, decrease the transaction costs and narrow bid-ask spread.
Once the bid-side AT fraction passes 33%, the impact of bid side AT proxy on the
bid-ask spreads spikes until the AT fraction reaching around 37%. The increasing
of algorithmic traders could create more informed traders existed in the market,
which could lead to higher transaction costs, lower market liquidity and widen
bid-ask spreads. It is worth to note that there is another critical point when
the bid-side algorithmic traders fraction is around 66%. Furthermore, Subplot
(c) and (d) capture the non-parametric results from the panel dataset. For both
ask-side and bid-side, the increase of high frequency algorithmic traders has the
influence on the bid-ask spreads when the AT proxy is below 50%.
In Figure 4.7 the black line represents the marginal effects of algorithmic trading
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on adverse selection (5 mins) in Subplots (a) and (b) and, on adverse selection (30
mins) in Subplots (c) and (d), both with the volume weighted average dataset.
The red dashed line shows the proportion of daily AT proxy for the order book
level 2. Figure 4.7 indicates that the increasing AT activities have effects on both
adverse selection within both 5 minutes and 30 minutes. Subplots (a) and (b)
suggest that AT has limited effects on the adverse selection (5 mins) when the
AT proxy below 60%. Once the AT proxy increases over 60%, the effect of AT
on adverse selection (5 mins) increases dramatically to the peak. This indicates
that ATs increase trading costs, decrease the market liquidity, and damage the
price efficiency with more informative quotes in the market. At this stage, the
increasing algorithmic traders act as informed traders to submit and cancel quotes
orders. The degree of asymmetric information in the market reaches a higher level
with increased the transaction cost to execute orders. However, the marginal
effects on adverse selection (5min) suddenly drops, as the ask-side AT proxy
increases to about 73% - 78%. In this period, ATs provide liquidity to the market
and increase price efficiency with less informative quotes.
In Subplots (c) and (d), the effects of AT proxy on adverse selection (30 mins)
show the similar patterns. There are no distinct effects of bid side AT proxy
on the adverse selection (30 mins) when the proportion of algorithmic traders is
below around 60% (see Figure 4.7 Subplot (d)). Within 60% to 67% proportion,
the marginal effects are positive. Once the AT fraction passes 67%, the impact
of bid side AT proxy on adverse selection (30 mins) starts to drop until the AT
fraction reaching around 77%.
Overall, the proportion of algorithmic trading significantly impacts on the ad-
verse selection (5 mins and 30 mins) and market liquidity. AT shows limited
impacts when the AT proxy is relative low. As the increase of AT proportion,
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the algorithmic traders act as liquidity demanders, which ATs act as informed
traders and its impacts on adverse selection increase. Once the AT reaches a cer-
tain critical point, the algorithmic traders act as liquidity providers, which leads
to the shrinkage of asymmetry information and the increasing market liquidity.
When the most traders in the market are ATs, the marginal impacts effectively
drop to zero.
In Figure 4.8 the dashed red line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy
for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The blue
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots
(a) to (d) and, on covariance ratio in Subplots (e) and (f), both at timescale 1
with the panel dataset. Subplots (a) and (b) suggest that AT effects on both
the variance and the covariance ratios depend on the proportion of algorithmic
trading active in the market. When this proportion is lower than approximately
40%, the evidence suggests that AT has limited effect on the variance ratio of the
spreads. Once this proportion of AT is higher than 20%, there is an increase in
the marginal effect on the variance ratio revealing AT increase the high-frequency
microstructure noises and volatilities in the market. At the same time, higher
variance ratios are symptomatic of less informative quotes and, therefore, higher
execution risk as the fundamental price of the contracts is more difficult to observe
in the market. However, as the proportion of AT increases further (to around
reaches 48 - 50%) the effect on the variance ratio drops dramatically most likely
because the high proportion of AT results in their orders cancelling each other,
shrinking liquidity and, in turn, the spreads variance.
The marginal effects for the bid variance ratio level 1 in Subplots (c) and (d)
present the similar pattern compared with the ask variance ratio. When the ask
side AT proxy is below 42%, the impact of algorithmic trading on bid variance
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(d) Bid-Ask Spreads - Panel
Figure 4.6: Marginal Effects of Bid-Ask Spreads Thresholded at 200 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded
at 200 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The
black continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on the bid-ask spreads in
Subplots (a) to (b) with volume weighted average dataset and Subplots (c) and
(d) with the panel dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower and upper
confidence bounds of bid-ask spreads marginal effects.
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Figure 4.7: Marginal Effects of Adverse Selection (5 mins and 30 mins) Thresh-
olded at 200 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded
at 200 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The
black continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on adverse selection (5 mins)
in Subplots (a) to (b) and, on adverse selection (30 mins) in Subplots (c) and (d), both
with the volume weighted average dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower
and upper confidence bounds of adverse selection marginal effects.
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ratio is relatively weak. When the proportion of ATs is around 43% to 47%, its
impacts on bid variance suddenly spike to the top. Once the fraction of ATs
is higher than 47%, the marginal effects drop dramatically. Then the marginal
effects on the bid variance ratio level 1 increase, when the ask side AT proxy
passes around 52%. Eventually there are no much effects on the bid variance
ratio at level 1, when the ask side AT proxy is higher than 56%. For the impact
of the bid side AT proxy on the bid variance ratio at level 1, the pattern is similar
to the ask side; however, the point of inflection is lower than for the ask side, at
around 33% - 43% of messages being ascribed to be algorithmic in origin.
The evidence suggests that once the AT proxy reaches the critical point 43%,
variance ratios will stabilize. I conjecture that this is because once the majority
of quoted volume belongs to algorithmic traders using the similar algorithms the
arms race has saturated the market as each sends out the similar signals. I define
this critical point as AT market saturation, I believe that it is this population
measurement that explains the differing results from prior studies in the literature
that have only had access to short snippets of the order-flow over say a single
month or in some cases only a few days.
Subplots (e) and (f) tell a similar story but in terms of decoupling of bids and
asks. As in the previous case, the effect of AT on the covariance ratio at time
scale 1 are virtually non-existent before the proportion of AT reaches around
60% and after it increases further than 72-75% approximately. Within a 60%
to 65% proportion the impact of AT is negative as the proportion of AT results
in a significant decoupling of bid - ask spreads. Then, up to a proportion of
75% AT substantially increases the covariance ratio, therefore reducing the de-
coupling; one of key interest here is the shape of the transmission function for the
covariance versus the variance, notice that in keeping with the saturation argu-
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ment the deterioration in market quality (the reduction in covariation evidencing
a decoupling) occurs at lower fractions of high speed messages. However, the
points of inflection for the bids versus the asks are markedly different and indeed
these points differ from the inflection points for the variances. The reduction
in covariation of the level 1 bid-ask spread is impacted at a substantially lower
fraction of high speed AT messages than for the bid AT proxy. The separation of
the volatility and correlation effects at level one is quite fascinating and indicates
that the mix strategies employed by HFTs obviously have markedly differentiated
impacts.
As previously indicated, the variance ratios at medium frequencies have significant
impacts at execution risk. Figure 4.9 reveals the marginal effects of algorithmic
trading on variance and covariance ratios at level 4 with the panel dataset. Sub-
plots (a) and (b) indicate that AT has impacts on the asks side variance ratio
depending on the proportion of algorithmic trading active in the market. As
ask side AT proxy approaches around 57% and 62%, there is a substantial in-
crease in the marginal effects for the ask variance ratio level 4, which indicates
that algorithmic traders increase the ask-side volatility and provide substantial
microstructure noises into the markets. The higher variance ratios indicate the
more opportunities for a sophisticated trader to arbitrage.
Once the proportion of ask side AT increases further around 63% to 76%, the
marginal effects for the ask variance ratio decrease substantially. This could be
caused by the ATs saturate the market and their orders start to cancel each other
out. Hence, the liquidity providing from AT will drop off and the spreads variance
will shrink. As AT proxy gets higher, they will fully saturate the market, and
eventually no extra effects on the variance ratios. Subplots (a) and (b) present
the effects of AT on the bids side variance ratios at level 4. Compared to the ask
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(c) Bid Variance Level 1 - Panel
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(d) Bid Variance Level 1 - Panel
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(e) Bid Ask Covariance Level 1 - Panel
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(f) Bid Ask Covariance Level 1 - Panel
Figure 4.8: Marginal Effects of Variance and Covariance at Timescale Level 1
Thresholded at 200 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at
200 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots (a)
to (d) and, on covariance ratio in Subplots (e) and (f), both at timescale 1 with the
panel dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds
of marginal effects.
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variance ratios, the critical points of bids variance happen much earlier, around
20% to 25%.
In Subplots (e) and (f), the marginal effects of AT proxy on bid–ask covariance
ratio level 4 also illustrate the decoupling of the bid and ask at medium frequen-
cies. The ask side AT proxy has no impact on the bid-ask covariance ratio at
wavelet level 4 when the proportion of ask AT is less than 60% and after it in-
creases further than 72% approximately. This tells a similar story with bid–ask
covariance ratio at level 1. Within a 60% to 64% proportion the impact of ask
side AT is positive as the proportion of AT decreases the decoupling of the bid
and ask. The proportion between 65%and 72% AT substantially decreases the
covariance ratio, therefore the fraction of AT leads to a significant decoupling of
the bid-ask spreads. For the impacts of bid side AT proxy on bid–ask covari-
ance ratio at level 4, the decoupling happens much at a lower proportion of AT,
around 41% to 45% (see Figure 4.9 Subplot (f)). Broadly speaking, Figure 4.9
reveals that the proportion of AT active in the market has saturation points, and
decouples bid and ask movements.
For longer time frequencies, Figure 4.10 illustrates the effects of algorithmic trad-
ing variance ratio in Subplots (a) to (d) and bid–ask covariance ratio in Subplots
(e) and (f) at the longest timestamp level 9 with the panel dataset. When the
fraction of ask side AT proxy is lower than 55%, there is a limited influence of AT
on ask variance ratio at level 9. Within a proportion of 55% to 61% ask side AT,
there is a substantial increase in the marginal effects for the ask variance ratio.
Once the ask AT proxy increases around 62% to 66%, the marginal effects of AT
on ask variance ratio substantially decrease. When the fraction of AT proxy is
over 66%, the marginal effects shift around and the algorithmic trading activity
in the market has limited influence on the ask variance ratio at level 9. For the
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(d) Bid Variance Level 4 - Panel
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(e) Bid Ask Covariance Level 4 - Panel
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(f) Bid Ask Covariance Level 4 - Panel
Figure 4.9: Marginal Effects of Variance and Covariance at Timescale Level 4
Thresholded at 200 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at
200 ms for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black
continuous line depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots (a)
to (d) and, on covariance ratio in Subplots (e) and (f), both at timescale 4 with the
panel dataset. The blue dashed lines are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds
of marginal effects.
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impacts coming from the bid side AT proportion, there is no significant effects
on ask variance ratio when the fraction of bid side AT is below 51% and above
83%. However, the bid side AT proxy has positive effects on the ask variance ratio
within a proportion of 51% to 56%, 59%to 63% and 67%to 74%. In these periods,
algorithmic traders play a liquidity supplier role in the market, and result in the
increasing both market liquidity and variance ratio.
Following each marginal effects increasing period, there is also a drop down pe-
riod for the ask variance ratio in the rest proportion within 55% and 79%. The
bid side AT proxy brings negative impacts on the ask variance ratio and results in
dramatically decreases. The reason could be that the market reaches its satura-
tion limits and orders from bid side ATs start to cancel each other out, therefore
the liquidity contracts and the ask variance decreases. The effects from AT pro-
portion on the bid variance ratio at level 9 display more fluctuations and less
extreme than the ask variance ratio, and become stable above the proportion of
80% - 85% ATs. Subplots (e) and (f) describe that the fraction of AT has the abil-
ity to decouple between bids and asks of the book. The evidence indicates that
ask side AT has limited impacts on the bid–ask covariance ratio at time scale
level 9 before the proportion of AT below 42% and above 82% approximately.
When the fraction of ask side AT is between 42% - 45%, 50% - 60% and 66% -
74%, the impact of AT on bid–ask covariance ratio is negative. This means the
proportion of AT results in the bid–ask spreads decoupling. When the fraction of
ask side AT is within 45% - 50% and 60% - 66%, the AT substantially increases
the bid–ask covariance ratio, which indicates that the proportion of AT decreases
the decoupling degrees of the bid–ask spreads. For the impacts from bid side AT
activities, when the bid AT proxy increases to 40% - 52% and 62% - 68%, the
marginal effect on bid–ask covariance ratio is substantially increased. Once the
proportion of AT is between 52% - 62% and 68% - 74%, the bid–ask covariance
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(e) Bid Ask Covariance Level 9 - Panel
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(f) Bid Ask Covariance Level 9 - Panel
Figure 4.10: Marginal Effects of Variance and Covariance at Timescale Level 9
Thresholded at 200 ms
Notes: The red dashed line represents the evolution of daily AT proxy thresholded at 200 ms
for order book level 2 in function of the average time to maturity. The black continuous line
depicts the marginal effects of AT on variance ratio in Subplots (a) to (d) and, on covariance
ratio in Subplots (e) and (f), both at timescale 9 with the panel dataset. The blue dashed lines
are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds of marginal effects.
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ratio dips and results in the increasing degrees of bid–ask decoupling.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of the relations
between algorithmic trading at high frequencies with execution risks on the Eu-
rodollar Futures markets. I have analyzed the entire limited order book and
transactions of this market from 2008 to 2014, then estimated the marginal ef-
fects of the HFT activities on a series of market quality indicators using a novel
semi-parametric partially linear approach. The market quality indicators contain
both nine different quotes variance-covariance ratios and eight different market
liquidity spreads, which have been measured in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. I also
adopted the AT proxies (the fraction of algorithmic trading thresholded under 25
to 200 milliseconds) as the dependent variable from Chapter 3.
I find that the AT proxy does impact various market quality measures, but overall
it is not in a direction that will fully satisfy the detractors of high speed automated
quoting or its backers. Therefore, I demonstrate that there are critical levels of
the saturation of algorithmic trading in terms of the impact of HFTs on market
quality. This may explain the contradictory evidence found in prior studies of this
type. Specifically, a lower proportion of HF algorithmic trading has a detrimental
marginal effect on market quality, a relative higher fractions of AT has a positive
marginal effect, and once the AT proxy passes a certain saturation point the
marginal effect disappears. I also have applied a large number of robustness checks
by alternating the specification and applying differing instrumental variables in
the semi-parametric analysis. In addition, I decompose the analysis by delivery
date and found that my results are not a statistical artefact.
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I have illustrated that the direction and non-linear nature to the effects are pre-
dicted by a standard adjustment to a model of asymmetric information and trad-
ing capacity within a standard rational expectations framework. Hence, whilst
the results maybe surprising from the viewpoint of a linear analysis, they have
a sound theoretical explanation based on expected trading patterns. There is
substantial evidence that at long maturities high frequency transacting behavior
is associated with deteriorations in market quality. However, when the majority
of traders are operating in this manner, their impact is at worst insignificant, but
can improve liquidity, by reducing a variety of measures of market illiquidity and
increasing market depth. One significant result is, however, that for measures of
correlation scaling, high frequency trading, at critical saturation points, is asso-
ciated with a significant degree of decoupling between inside best bids and asks,
but this is not a ubiquitous finding and indeed at points the opposite relationship
is observed.
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Chapter 5
High Frequency Price Discovery
and Price Efficiency on Interest
Rate Futures
In this chapter I examine the impact of price efficiency of high-frequency
trading in the Eurodollar futures market. In a high-frequency world,
the price can be decomposed into the efficient price (long term) and the
pricing error (short term). To capture price efficiency, I calculate the
mid-price return autocorrelation following the intervals: tick-by-tick,
1 ms, 2 ms, 5 ms, 10 ms, 15 ms, 20 ms, 25 ms, 50 ms, 75 ms, 100 ms,
150 ms, 200 ms, 500 ms, 750 ms, 1 sec, 5 sec, 15 sec, 30 sec, 60 sec,
300 sec, 600 sec, 900 sec, 1,200 sec, 1,500 sec, and 1,800 sec. Then, I
utilize a vector autoregression to estimate the pricing error as the de-
viation of transaction prices from the efficient prices to illustrate the
structure of these costs. I have constructed a unique dataset using the
complete messaging history (quotes and transactions) for the Eurodol-
lar futures limit order book from 2008 to 2014. The findings suggest
that the mid-quoted return autocorrelations are positive and gradually
increase from the shortest time interval to the longest time interval.
The adjustment time of trade returns reverts to equilibrium in a very
short time interval of one second or less. Considering the maturity
effect in the futures market, I find that the trade prices are less sensi-
tive to incorporating any available information into the market as the
Eurodollar future approaches its maturity.
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5.1 Introduction
The speed of access to financial markets through electronic communication net-
works (ECNs) and the frequency of updating from automated algorithms is in-
creasing dramatically. For instance, in Eurodollar future market, the average
updating speeds has dropped from about 20 minutes to 600 milliseconds (ms)
from 1996 to 2014. Futures contracts have always been active and liquid mar-
kets; however, their microstructure and the subsequent understanding of how
prices are formed have only recently been brought into focus. This chapter pro-
vides a comprehensive empirical microstructure analysis to answer how fast you
need to be in the Eurodollar future market. My approach is to apply a set of
empirical measurements to evaluate both quotes and trades efficient reaction time
in this Eurodollar future market. I demonstrate that the trading reaction time is
below one second, for the contracts close to maturity, the trading reaction time
even within 100 milliseconds. Furthermore, the quoting reaction time is faster
than trades. For instance, the mid-quote can incorporate new information and
adjust itself to a relative efficient price with 15 milliseconds.
This chapter looks at a very large market for interest rate derivatives, the Eu-
rodollar futures market on Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and undertakes an ex-
tensive analysis at a very high-frequency domain. The empirical contribution of
this chapter is threefold. First, I document the high-frequency price formation
mechanism for the ED market and determine the effectiveness of various trade
direction indicators (including a new version designed specifically for this market)
in determining the future direction of prices. Second, I utilize information from
the complete limit order book to assess the impact of high-frequency transactions
on the instantaneous level of liquidity for the market. Finally, I document the de-
gree of predictability inherent in the order-book as shocks to order-flow permeate
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across the term structure and through time.
Comprehensive analytical work on data sets of over a billion observations are
still rare in financial economics and econometrics. This chapter presents one of
the first studies of this type on the most actively traded of markets, futures, in
particular futures on interest rates. When working in this domain, even simple
tasks, such as computing auto-correlations requires careful implementation and,
in part, the major innovation of this work is in carefully documenting the appro-
priate strategies for this type of analysis. Methodologically, I will also introduce
a new trade direction indicator for use in adverse selection and intra-day price
impact models. In many respects this is the key contribution as this trade direc-
tion indicator is fundamental to determining buy and sell trades with very high
frequency data. To this end I will use a Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP)
from the entire limit order book (buy and sell side) and then identify each trade
as a buy or sell side based on its volume weighted position in the order book.
With the progress of technology in the financial markets, the microstructure
plays a starring role because of its faster trading speed. High-frequency trading
causes some fundamental changes in asset pricing, especially in liquidity and the
price discovery process (see O’Hara, 2003; Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012). For
instance, informed traders no longer only indicate those with access to private
inside information and those who take the opportunity of arbitrage; in a high-
frequency world, if some HFTs receive, react, and process information faster
than other traders, they are also treated as informed traders. Hence, informed
traders do not necessarily hold fundamental information, which can generate
adverse selection and increase trading costs in the market for hedgers. Besides
the informed trading, HFTs tend to submit large amounts of orders and then
cancel them instead of executing them, which creates a phantom liquidity and
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gives other traders a false impression about the market liquidity.
Since high-frequency traders can play the role of informed traders, this can re-
sult in asymmetric information, decrease the capacity of price to incorporate the
available information, and eventually harm the market efficiency and increase
trading costs, see Chapter 3 and 4 for discussion on this. However, some HFTs
also act as liquidity providers, rather than relying on informed trading to gain
profits. In this case, HFTs do have benefits for the market liquidity and decrease
the trading costs. This is one of my motivations - to figure out the high-frequency
price discovery in the Eurodollar future market. Furthermore, as one of the most
liquid and actively traded contracts in global financial markets, the three-month
Eurodollar futures contract does not get enough academic attention. I construct
a unique limit order book dataset of Eurodollar futures from 2008 to 2014, in-
volving $7.66 quintillion ask total volumes, $7.56 quintillion bid total volumes,
and $2 quadrillion trade volumes.
The increasing margin costs and strict regulations on interest rate swaps will
cause the significant transfer of trading activities from the opaque OTC-IRS to
Eurodollar strips to construct synthetic swaps. The significance of the Eurodollar
futures market is one reason I study the microstructure of this particular market.
Additionally, in my Eurodollar futures dataset, 65% of total activity is from
traders at high-frequency when measured by fraction of messages on the order
book at 25ms or faster, a fraction that is consistent with the evidence from CME
Group [2010], where 64.46% message updates are from accounts registered as
being automated trading accounts in the 2010 Eurodollar futures market. The
large proportion of HFTs among the total traders is another reason this study
focuses on the high-frequency price discovery process in the Eurodollar futures
market.
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Pricing models of the type used in this chapter decompose the observed price into
the efficient price (long term) and the pricing error (short term fluctuation from
the efficient price). As previously noted, the absolute degree of autocorrelation
in the mid-price returns provides evidence on the level of price efficiency. Higher
absolute magnitudes in returns indicate persistent fluctuations away from the
mid price. In this chapter I provide evidence of the price efficiency from the
mid-price return autocorrelations following a full range of time intervals: tick-
by-tick, 1 ms, 2 ms, 5 ms, 10 ms, 15 ms, 20 ms, 25 ms, 50 ms, 75 ms, 100 ms,
150 ms, 200 ms, 500 ms, 750 ms, 1 sec, 5 sec, 15 sec, 30 sec, 60 sec, 300 sec,
600 sec, 900 sec, 1,200 sec, 1,500 sec, and 1,800 sec. I illustrate this approach
using the complete messaging history (quoted in five levels and transactions)
for the Eurodollar futures limit order book from 2008 to 2014. The findings
indicate that the mid-quoted return autocorrelations are positive and gradually
increase from the shortest time interval to the longest time interval, except for the
negative return autocorrelation at the tick level. Compared with other studies in
the same field (see Anderson et al., 2013; Chakrabarty et al., 2014; Hendershott
and Jones, 2005), most of them only measure quoted return autocorrelations in
seconds or minutes, even at a daily level, because of the challenge to process
massive quantities of microstructure data and the lack of clean processed data
from the equity market.
Several interesting stylized facts emerge from preliminary analysis of this type
of order-book data. One important implication of the decomposition of autocor-
relation is for standard trade direction algorithms such as the Lee-Ready trade
direction indicator. Standard implementations appear to give erroneous results
(for instance all the trades are classified as buys or all sells for an entire day).
Hence, one of the major contributions of this chapter is to introduce a new trade-
direction indicator that takes advantage of the complete limit order book and
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its statistical properties. I have developed a new volume weighted average trade
classification algorithm specially designed for the Eurodollar future market. The
algorithm eliminates the iceberg trades and utilizes the volume weighted average
price over five levels of Eurodollar limit order book to classify trades directions.
The efficiency rate of this algorithm, 95.88%, is three times efficient as the tradi-
tional Lee-Ready algorithm using the Eurodollar futures (see Table 5.1).
To measure the deviation of the trade prices from the actual efficient prices, I
implement the vector autoregression (VAR) to estimate the pricing error and ex-
amine the impulse responses of trade return to trade directions, trade volume,
square root of trade volume, and ask and bid market concentrations1. The re-
sponses imply that all factors have an impact on trade returns and the speed
of the trade return adjustment is very fast, occurring within one second. This
also indicates that the price discovery studies need to be conducted within very
short time intervals due to the current high-speed trading. Finally, one of the
major differences between equity assets and future assets is that the future has
its own time to mature. Therefore, I conduct the research to verify the effects of
the days to maturity on the price discovery and market quality indicators for the
Eurodollar futures contracts.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the rel-
evant high-speed market microstructure literature, especially regarding the high-
frequency price discovery. Section 5.3 presents varying methodologies and the
construction of variables to examine price discovery in the Eurodollar market.
For instance, I use the price and return autocorrelations as measurements for
price efficiency, and then decompose transaction prices and employ a vector au-
1As the number of buyers and sellers is significant for shifting trade prices, I consider the
signed bid-side and ask-side market concentrations as dependents on price discovery mechanisms
via the VAR model and impulse response functions
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toregression model to proxy the pricing errors as the deviation of the transaction
price from the efficient price. Following the VAR model, I also examine the trade
price dynamics via impulse response functions and then utilize a multivariate
linear regression to estimate the impact from the days of maturity of the Eu-
rodollar market microstructure. Section 5.4 describes the data with descriptive
statistics and focuses on the results interpretation with the price discovery and
market quality of the Eurodollar future markets. Section 5.5 summarizes the
implications of my findings in general and provides some comments.
5.2 The Dynamics of Price Discovery
Market liquidity and market informativeness are the fundamental attributes of
financial markets. The purpose of buying and selling in a continuous limit order
book, such the Globex platform, is to provide a mechanism for processing infor-
mation and subsequently to efficiently value the assets in question. As one of
the desirable features of financial markets, market liquidity is the ability to pur-
chase or sell a substantial amount of financial assets without causing the dramatic
shifting of asset prices. Bessembinder and Venkataraman [2010] and Hendershott
et al. [2011] provide the measurements of a range of common liquidity spreads,
including bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, effective spreads, realized spreads, and
adverse selection spreads. Whether the increasing proportion of HFTs does con-
tribute to the market liquidity or damage the liquidity in the financial markets,
it has recently been brought into focus, especially after the 2010 Flash Crash in
the E-mini S&P 500 future market. Jovanovic and Menkveld [2010], Hendershott
et al. [2011], Carrion [2013], and Menkveld and Zoican [2014] demonstrate that
HFT can narrow bid-ask spreads, increase liquidity, reduce trading costs, and
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make the market more efficient. Whereas, HFT can access information faster
than other traders, which could result in the asymmetric information across mar-
ket participants. Brogaard et al. [2014] propose that the HFTs generate adverse
selection costs to other investors, associated with the reduction of market liquidity
and the increasing transaction costs, because the HFTs hold better information
than other investors. In addition to the liquidity effects on asset prices, the rest
of this section will introduce and focus on another function of markets on asset
price behavior, the dynamics of price discovery, and the effects of HFTs on the
price efficiency in the financial markets.
The price discovery function is the process of determining a price that balances
the supply and demand of futures contracts. Prior research uses the term ‘price
discovery’ to describe a variety of empirical characteristics. For instance, price
discovery can be considered as a process of finding an equilibrium price [Schreiber
and Schwartz, 1986]. Hasbrouck [1995] provides the definition the ability of fi-
nancial markets to impound new information. Similarly, Baillie et al. [2002] also
mention that price discovery reveals the relation between prices and information
from one or multiple markets. Lehmann [2002] describes price discovery as the
ability to efficiently incorporating information (learning from investors trading
behavior) into the market prices. These explanations suggest that price discov-
ery is a dynamic process to reach a state of equilibrium with the rapidly adjusting
market prices to replace the old equilibrium with the new one through new in-
formation.
Prior studies mainly utilize four types of measurements to interpret the efficiency
of price discovery: the return autocorrelations (see Anderson et al., 2013; Eom
et al., 2004; Foley and Putnin¸sˇ, 2014; Hendershott and Jones, 2005), the vari-
ance ratio (see Castura et al., 2010; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988), the price delay
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(see Hou and Moskowitz, 2005), and pricing error (see Hasbrouck, 1993). This
chapter employs both the autocorrelation and the price error methods to assess
the efficiency of price discovery in the Eurodollar future market and is the first
to do so on ultra-high frequency data.
The first method, the autocorrelation of mid-price returns within a certain time
interval, can reflect the degree of quotes prices deviating from the random walk,
and imply the predictability of short-term returns (see Anderson et al., 2013;
Foley and Putnin¸sˇ, 2014; Hendershott and Jones, 2005). Small return autocorre-
lation indicates the better price discovery capacity of this market. Hendershott
and Jones [2005] employ the mid-quote return autocorrelation approach to as-
sess the association between price efficiency and market transparency, using both
transactions and quotes data of the three U.S. exchange-traded funds (ETFs)
from August 2002 to October 2002. They state that when the Island electronic
communications network stops displaying the limit order book and goes dark, the
ETF market reduces the transparency, decreases the efficiency of price discovery
and worsens trading costs. Once the Island redisplays its limit order book, price
efficiency increases, and trading costs drop. Anderson et al. [2013] demonstrate
that the return autocorrelation has the explanation power for the efficiency of
price adjustment. They break down the return autocorrelation into four com-
ponents: the partial price adjustment, the non-synchronous trading effect, the
bid-ask bounce and the time-varying risk premia. Using 16 years of TAQ data
from 1993 to 2008 and eight groups within a two-year sub-period, they calculate
the daily return autocorrelations and suggest that the partial price adjustment
to new information is the main contributor to the predictability of a return au-
tocorrelation.
Consistent with the Hendershott and Jones [2005] study, Foley and Putnin¸sˇ [2014]
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also measure the absolute mid-quote return autocorrelation to investigate the ef-
fects of dark trading on the Canadian markets quality, where a minimum price
improvement rule has been approved. In addition to the absolute return auto-
correlation approach, Foley and Putnin¸sˇ [2014] conduct an experiment adopting
the variance ratios, high-frequency volatility and delays in reflecting market-wide
information as proxies of information efficiency. Using the tick-by-tick Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSX) Composite Index data in Canada between August 2012
and December 2012, they suggest that the dark trading on limited orders has
a positive impact on information efficiency, which indicates prices are closer to
follow the random walk under the assumption of the information efficiency theory.
The second approach utilized in this chapter is the Hasbrouck’s vector autore-
gression model to estimate the empirical pricing error. Hasbrouck [1991a,b, 1993]
introduce a vector autoregression and vector moving average (VMA) framework
to measure the price errors as an indicator of price discovery. Hasbrouck [1991a]
proposes a new measurement of trades information based on the variance decom-
position of efficient prices, where prices can be separated into the trade-correlated
components and trade-uncorrelated components. Hasbrouck [1991a] also points
out that trade direction indicator is also associated with the changes in quoted
prices. Furthermore, Hasbrouck [1993] decomposes the trade prices into a random
walk component and a stationary stochastic component.
The first random walk component can be the indicator for an efficient price follow-
ing the information efficiency assumption, and the second stochastic component
measures the deviations from the efficient prices, which is also called as a pricing
error. He points out the standard deviation of pricing error as a proxy to indicate
the distance between the effective price and the actual trade price. Hence, the
lower standard deviation of the pricing error, the more efficiency of price discovery
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process in the market. If the pricing error is high, then they observed transac-
tion price would be considered to be far away from the efficient price. Using a
VARMA model with a sample of NYSE stocks order flow information, Hasbrouck
[1993] considers the relation between trade returns and the trade classification
indicators, and compute the average pricing error standard deviation is around
0.33 in the NYSE equity market.
The VAR model of Hasbrouck [1991a,b, 1993] has been widely utilized to assess
the price discovery in microstructure studies (see Barclay and Hendershott, 2003;
Boehmer and Kelley, 2009; Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Chakrabarty et al., 2014;
Dufour and Engle, 2000; Engle and Patton, 2004; Krishnamurti et al., 2003).
Dufour and Engle [2000] utilize this VAR technique in the equity markets, and
demonstrate that the increasing trading speed enhances the ability of price ad-
justment to new information. To investigate the price discovery of trades after
hours, Barclay and Hendershott [2003] employ the vector autoregression tech-
niques to decompose the information into public and private components in the
Nasdaq equity market. Krishnamurti et al. [2003] adopt the Hasbrouck’s VAR
model and the pricing error approach to compare the market quality of two major
Indian stock exchanges with the different governance structures. Their finding
suggests that demutualized stock exchanges have a better market quality with
the lower average standard deviation of pricing error and the more efficiency price
adjustment. Boehmer and Kelley [2009] and Boehmer and Wu [2013] also provide
empirical evidence with the Hasbrouck pricing error method to assess the quality
of the NYSE equity market in the market microstructure area.
In the high-frequency market microstructure domain, the market is fundamentally
different from the low frequency world. A serial empirical studies are focusing on
the high-frequency algorithm trading and the price efficiency in financial markets
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(see Brogaard et al., 2014; Castura et al., 2010; Chaboud et al., 2014; Frino and
McKenzie, 2002; Gru¨nbichler et al., 1994; Hendershott and Riordan, 2011; Huang
and Stoll, 1994). Gru¨nbichler et al. [1994], Huang and Stoll [1994] and Frino
and McKenzie [2002] devote to the impacts of the screen trading and suggest it
benefits the efficiency of the prices. Gru¨nbichler et al. [1994] explore the relation
between the price formation and the speed of trading utilizing the German stock
index (DAX). Because the underlying asset and the future asset of DAX index are
traded in different trading platforms, they find the existence of a lead-lag relation
between the spot and future prices for DAX index. The results suggest that the
reaction of the screen traded future prices to information are 15-20 minutes faster
than the spot prices of floor traded DAX index. Therefore, the screen trading
increases the price efficiency and accelerate the price discovery process. The lead-
lag relation between the spot and future market has been supported by Harris
[1989], Stoll and Whaley [1990], Chan [1992], Huang and Stoll [1994], and Frino
and McKenzie [2002]. Consistent with Gru¨nbichler et al. [1994] study, Frino and
McKenzie [2002], employing both screen-traded cash and future markets of FTSE
100 index, put forward that the screen trading can enhance the price discovery
in both spot and future markets.
The impact of high-speed algorithmic trading on the incorporation of information
into asset prices has been widely studied (see Brogaard et al., 2014; Castura et al.,
2010; Chaboud et al., 2014; Hendershott and Riordan, 2011. Castura et al. [2010]
adopt the variance ratio method from Lo and MacKinlay [1988] to test the effects
of HFT on price efficiency. Variance ratio refers to the price variance at different
time intervals. The theoretical expectation of a variance ratio means that the
variance at various intervals should follow a linear relation in an efficient market.
Castura et al. [2010] compute 1-, 10-, 60- and 600-second variance ratios using the
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 between 2006 and 2009. The findings suggest that
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the increase of HFT activities has benefited the U.S. equity markets efficiency.
Utilizing DAX 30 stocks as a case study on the Deutsche Boerse, Hendershott
and Riordan [2011] conclude that the algorithmic traders can efficiently place
quotes and have an influence in adjusting the liquidity to bring the price closer
to the efficient price. This indicates that the algorithmic traders have the im-
pacts on improving market liquidity and enhancing quote efficiency. Additionally,
Chaboud et al. [2014] analyse the relation between algorithmic trading and price
discovery process with a comprehensive dataset in the foreign exchange market,
Euro-Dollar, Dollar-Yen, and Euro-Yen from 2003 to 2007. Using a structure vec-
tor autoregression model, they suggest that the algorithmic trading is associated
with the reducing frequency of arbitrage opportunities and the reduction in the
autocorrelation of high-frequency returns. Hence, the high-speed of algorithmic
trading improves the price discovery process and the information efficiency in the
market.
Recent work by Chakrabarty et al. [2014] and Brogaard et al. [2014] point out
some mixed empirical results on the impacts on the price formation and market
qualities from the HFT and its trading strategies. Brogaard et al. [2014] suggest
that HFT trading strategies have a multitude of effects on price efficiency.
If prices are separated into the efficient prices and the pricing errors, and the
pricing errors can be viewed as an implicit trading cost to long-term investors
then the HFT trade direction is consistent with the pricing error. HFT will
subsequently play a role in increasing the trading cost for long-term investors.
In contrast, if HFT traders go against this pricing error, HFT can be treated
as decreasing trading costs for investors and providing liquidity to the market.
By controlling the trading speeds, Chakrabarty et al. [2014] compare the equity
market quality between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pre-ban
185
and post-ban period. Their findings suggest that lowering down the trading speed
has no effects on the long-term price efficiency, but the price efficiency at short
timeframe decreases at the post-ban period. In other words, the price formation
within short period can be benefit from the high-frequency trading. However,
Chakrabarty et al. [2014] find little evidence of a deleterious effects of banning
naked access to US equity exchanges by the SEC and cite serval positive outcomes
from this regulatory action, including reducing the adverse selection effects and
trading costs.
Following the Hendershott and Jones [2005] autocorrelation and the VAR model
of Hasbrouck [1991a,b, 1993], I assess the information incorporated in the order
flow and trade prices. This chapter not just includes the trades return autocor-
relation, but also a battery of the quote price autocorrelations from tick-by-tick
interval to half hour interval. For the VAR model and pricing error approach
in this chapter, I also measure the effect of a shock or impulse response to the
trading process. Moreover, this chapter includes the trade direction indicator and
trade volume, and also adds bid-side market concentration and ask-side market
concentration, as factors in the VAR model. The next section will describe these
measurements in detail.
5.3 Empirical Methodology
My analysis is in four parts. First, using high-frequency limit order book data,
I generate a series of mid-price autocorrelation and mid-price return autocorre-
lation at different time intervals. Second, I introduce a new volume weighted
average trade classification algorithm, and then utilize it to calculate multiple
market liquidity spreads and a series of spreads autocorrelation at varying time
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intervals. Third, I use the vector autoregression and the impulse response func-
tion to proxy the tick-by-tick pricing error to assess the trade price dynamics.
Finally, I use multivariate linear regression to estimate the impacts of the dis-
tance to maturity on price discovery and price efficiency. To maintain consistency,
there are two notational conventions for the time. One is the daily time index,
denoted as subscript t, where t ∈ {t, . . . , T}, t ∈ Z+. The other is the subscript
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} is the intraday time index to deal with the high-frequency intra-
day transactions and limit order book data, where k ∈ Z+. Individually, each of
these steps is not methodologically new, however, their use with a dataset that
has well over a billion observations, presents many challenges in terms of imple-
mentation. In the online appendix, I document the various strategies needed to
overcome these challenges. This, in part, is the core novelty of the research.
5.3.1 Price Efficiency
One of the most common approaches in market microstructure is documenting
return autocorrelations. Classical representations of market efficiency suggest
that when information is efficiently incorporated into asset prices then autocorre-
lations in returns will disappear rapidly. However, when the trading mechanism
prevents the efficient incorporation of new information into observed prices, it is
likely that these prices will deviate from the random walk. Hence, the return au-
tocorrelation can be an indicator to measure the degree of quotes prices against
the random walk. Eom et al. [2004], Hendershott and Jones [2005], Anderson
et al. [2013], and Foley and Putnin¸sˇ [2014] employ the mid-price return auto-
correlation at varying time interval to determine the predictability of short-term
return.
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In this chapter I will estimate models directly onto the trade and quote data for
the market at high frequency, in contrast to the daily aggregate measures used
in the preceeding chapters. The most challenging intra-day regressions I have
undertaken up to now (for instance the wavelet analysis) were estimated for a
single days activity. For computational reasons I have decided to utilize a linear
parametric representation for the price process and then analyze the direction of
returns at various frequencies. It is now important to define what is meant by
the ‘price process’. In this case I will study the mid-price return, denoted rτk.
Adjustments to this price are formed by adjustments in the price and volume
within the quotes forming the limit-order book of the market. Unlike trade ticks,
this price is update at an almost continuous level and is as close to a continuous
diffusion as is possible in this context.
Let the intraday time interval be denoted by τ , for τ ∈ {tick-by-tick, 1 ms, 2 ms,
5 ms, 10 ms, 15 ms, 20 ms, 25 ms, 50 ms, 75 ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 200 ms, 500
ms, 750 ms, 1 sec, 5 sec, 15 sec, 30 sec, 60 sec, 300 sec, 600 sec, 900 sec, 1,200
sec, 1,500 sec, and 1,800 sec}. Additionally, I measure both the volume weighted
average mid-price returns at diverse time intervals τ , denoted as rvτk, and mid-
price return for each order book level j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} at diverse time intervals
τ , denoted as rjτk. The mid-quote return autocorrelations can be expressed as:
ΩRτηk = ρ(rτk, rτk−η) (5.1)
where ΩR stands for the autocorrelation of mid-price returns, ρ is the autocorrela-
tion function, r is the logarithm of price changes, rτk ∈ {rvτk, rjτk}, τ is the length
of mid-price returns time intervals, k is the intraday time index, η is the orders
of autocorrelations η ∈ {1st, 5th, 10th}, and j is the level of the order book. I
estimate the volume-weighted average autocorrelation across the five levels order
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book and the autocorrelation of each level order book (level one to level five). To
estimate the daily mid-quoted return autocorrelation, I calculate the first-order,
fifth-order, and tenth-order autocorrelations, and report the daily mean value and
median value.
Unlike other studies, I do not take the absolute value of the autocorrelation yields,
because I will use the sign of the autocorrelation as an extra piece of information
to be incorporated into prices. Indeed, because I observe many negative autocor-
relations are the very highest frequency, this inversion is deemed to be important.
As such, I calculate the bid price, ask price, and mid price autocorrelations at
the tick-by-tick time interval
ΩPηk = ρ(pk, pk−η) (5.2)
where ΩP is the autocorrelation of prices, ρ is the autocorrelation function, η is
the orders of autocorrelations η ∈ {1st, 5th, 10th}, k is the intraday time index, the
price p ∈ {pva, paj, pvb , pbj, pvm, pmj} involves ask, bid, and mid prices, pva is the vol-
ume weighted average ask prices over the five levels, paj is the ask prices for each
level j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} in the limit order book, pvb is the volume weighted average
bid prices, pbj is the bid prices for each level j, p
v
m is the volume weighted average
mid prices, and pmj is the mid prices for each level j. This chapter explores the
first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order bid, ask, and mid-quote autocorrelations
using both the volume weighted average prices and quotes in the level one to level
five market data in the limit order book, and report the daily mean value and
median value.
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5.3.2 Market Quality Indicators
Following the comprehensive liquidity measures provided by Hendershott et al.
[2011], I generate different market liquidity spreads (S˜ ) and spreads autocorre-
lation (ΩS˜ ) then use these indicators as dependent variables in the regression,
including bid-ask spreads (S˜ Q), quoted half-spread (S˜ Q
1/2
), quoted depth (S˜ D),
effective half-spreads (S˜ E), realized spreads (S˜ R), and adverse selection (S˜ AS).
Both realized spreads and adverse selection are measured at varying 26 time in-
tervals from tick-by-tick to 30 minutes. It is worth to mention that I alter the
Lee-Ready algorithm [Lee and Ready, 1991] using the volume-weighted average
price across five levels order book, because of the inaccuracy of the Lee-Ready
algorithm for high-frequency data.
O’Hara [2015] outlines that the modalities of market making and trading ac-
tivities is changing rapidly and quite radically. The low-latency trading could
fundamentally change the rules in the market microstructure world. Some exist-
ing basic microstructure models and approaches are not able to efficiently capture
the market dynamics via the high-speed trading, such as the Lee-Ready algorithm
trader classification. Figure 5.1 compares the volume weighted average trade clas-
sification algorithm with the Lee-Ready algorithm. Previous studies are likely to
employ the inside quotes data, hence in Figure 5.1 Subplot (a) I use the first level
limit order book data (best-bid best-ask in the equity markets) to illustrate the
Lee-Ready algorithm, namely as the pa1k and pb1k. Lee and Ready [1991] propose
that if a trade price (p) is higher (lower) than the midpoint of the inside spreads
pm1k, and then this trade belongs to a buyer-side (seller-side) initiated trade. If a
trade price equals to the mid-quoted price, then the trade classification depends
on the tick rule and the comparison with the previous trade price. In this case,
if the trade price is above (below) its previous trade price, then it is a buy-side
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Best Ask (pa1k)
Mid Price (pm1k)
Best Bid (pb1k)
p1 : Buy
p2 : Sell
VWA Ask (pvak)
VWA Mid Price (pvmk)
VWA Bid (pvbk)
Best Ask (pa1k)
Best Bid (pb1k)
p1 : Buy
p2 : Sell
p3 : Buy
p4 : Sell
(a) Lee-Ready Algorithm (b) Volume Weighted Average Trade Classification
Figure 5.1: Trade Classification Algorithms
Notes: This figure represents the traditional Lee-Ready trade classification algorithm
(Subplot (a)), and the modified volume weighted average trade classification method
(Subplot (b)). Assuming bid and ask prices are constant and follows the independent
Poisson processes. Trade prices p1, p2 arrival within the inside quotes and t prices
p3, p4 are outside the inside quotes. In Subplot (a), I only using the inside spread
with its midpoints to illustrate the Lee-Ready algorithm, where the best ask and best
bid are denoted as pa1k and pb1k respectively, and k is the intraday time index. The
dotted line refers to the mid-price pm1k of the inside spread. Subplot (b) depicts the
volume weighted average trade classification method. First of all, the volume weighted
average asks and bid prices across five levels limit order book can be expressed as:
pvak =
∑
j pajkvajk∑J
j=1 vajk
and pvbk =
∑
j pbjkvbjk∑J
j=1 vbjk
, where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} is the jth level of the
order book; pajk and pbjk are the ask price and bid price for level j at intraday time
k; and vajk and vbjk are the ask volume and bid volume for level j. The dashed line
represents the volume weighted average mid-price pvmk which equals to the average
of both pvak and p
v
bk. There is a small fraction of trades locating outside the volume
weighted average spreads. I eliminate these iceberg orders before classifying trades
directions.
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(sell-side) trade. Therefore, in Figure 5.1 Subplot (a), trade p1 is a buyer-initiated
transaction and trade p2 is a seller-initiated transaction.
However, Lee and Ready [1991] suggest that their algorithm should implement
with quotes and trade updating frequency above five seconds to have the ac-
curate trade classification. As it is important to look deep into the tick level
to understand the market microstructure world, I construct the Eurodollar con-
tracts dataset in millisecond timestamps. Unlike other studies, I adopt all five
levels order book data in this study so that one trade price corresponds with five
different level mid-point prices. Therefore, the Lee-Ready algorithm is unable to
handle my dataset.
To replace the Lee-Ready algorithm, this chapter adopts a modified version of
trade classification algorithm, using the volume weighted average quotes and
eliminating iceberg orders (see Figure 5.1 Subplot (b)). The volume weighted
average trade classification algorithm can be measured in the following steps.
Step 1: Clean the Eurodollar dataset and eliminate bid prices pbjk, ask prices
pajk, and trade prices pk containing NaN (not a number), zero, and infinity for
each order book level.
Step 2: Match the timestamps k between trades and quotes to obtain the equal
length of quotes and trades.
Step 3: Calculate the volume weighted average bid prices pvbk, ask prices p
v
ak, and
mid prices pvmk,
pvak =
∑
j pajkvajk∑J
j=1 vajk
, pvbk =
∑
j pbjkvbjk∑J
j=1 vbjk
, pvmk = (p
v
ak + p
v
bk)/2 (5.3)
where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} is the jth level of the order book; pvak and pvbk are the
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volume-weighted average ask price and bid price at the time of the kth trade; p
v
mk
is the volume-weighted average mid price at the time of the kth trade; pajk and
pbjk are the ask price and bid price for level j at intraday time k; and vajk and
vbjk are the ask volume and bid volume for level j at intraday time k.
Step 4: Eliminate the iceberg orders and outliers. If any trade price is smaller
than volume weighted average bids, pk < p
v
bk, or larger than volume weighted
average asks pk > p
v
ak, I define it as an iceberg order. It locates outside the
volume weighted average bid-ask spreads; hence I delete this transaction pk and
corresponding quotes (pvbk, p
v
ak, and p
v
mk) at the time k from the dataset.
Step 5: Calculate the buy-sell trade direction indicator qk with the following
expression:
qk = sign(pk − pvmk) (5.4)
where sign(.) is the signum function with the value of {-1, 0, 1}. Therefore, if
the qk equals to +1, it means the trade price pk at time k is above the volume
weighted average mid-price pvmk and belongs to a buyer-initiated trade. If the qk
equals to -1, it indicates the trade price pk at time k is below the volume weighted
average mid-price pvmk and belongs to a seller-initiated trade. If the qk equals to
0, it is defined as no trades.
Following these rules, it is possible to see p1 and p3 are defined as the buy-side
trades and p2 and p4 are the sell-side trades in Figure 5.1 Subplot (b). Table 5.1
demonstrates the comparison between the original Lee-Ready algorithm and the
new volume weighted average trade classification algorithm. As one relatively
active traded day, there are 7.1 million observations for five levels bids and asks
and 29,793 trades on June 05, 2009 of GEH0 Eurodollar contract, which is around
eight months before its settlement. Hence, the Lee-Ready algorithm can classify
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Trade Classification Algorithms
GEH0 Lee-Ready Volume Weighted
(June 05, 2009) Algorithm Average Algorithm
Total Asks 7,082,965
Total Bids 7,082,965
Total Trades 29,793
Buy-side Trades (+1) 4,949 12,741
Sell-side Trades (−1) 4,805 15,824
Excluded Ask Side 98
Excluded Bid Side 205
Trades Direction Indicator (q) 9,754 28,565
Algorithm Efficiency Ratio 32.74% 95.88%
Notes: This table compares the trade classification by the Lee-Ready algorithm and
the volume weighted average algorithm. I use the full order flow and executed prices
of GEH0 on June 05, 2009 as a toy example to examine the reliability of both trade
classification algorithms. Because of eight months before GEH0 maturity, this contract
is relative active on this day with 29,793 trades observations. Total asks, total bids, and
total trades are the total number observation of asks, bids, and transactions within one
day. Buy-side and sell-side trades report how many trades are classified as buyer-side
(+1) initiated trades or seller-side (−1) initiated trades. The volume weighted average
trade classification method eliminates the iceberg trades as the outside the spread;
therefore the number of iceberg trade is reported as the excluded ask side and excluded
bid side. Trade direction indicators refer to the sum of buy-side and sell-side trades,
and algorithm efficiency ratio is the number of trade direction indicator to the total
trades.
9,754 trades with 4,949 buy-side trades and 4,805 sell-side trades. The efficiency
ratio of Lee Ready algorithm is only around 32.74%, if I compute the ratio as
the total number of trade direction indicator to the total number of trades. How-
ever, there are 28,565 trades defined by my new volume weighted average trade
classification algorithm, with 12,741 buy-side transactions and 15,824 sell-side
transactions (see Table 5.1). Additionally, the efficiency ratio of my algorithm is
around 95.88%, which is three times higher than the Lee-Ready algorithm.
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Besides, I also calculate both the daily average (dotted line) and the weekly mov-
ing average (black line) trade direction indicators across all Eurodollar contracts
from 2008 to 2014 (see Figure 5.2). For each contract each day, the average of
trade direction indicator can be expressed as qit =
∑
k qik/nit, where i is contract
type, k is intraday time index, t is daily time index, nit is the number of trades
of contract i on day t. Then, I take the average value of daily trade direction
indicator over 40 contracts, as qt =
∑
i
∑
k qik
nit
nct
, where nct is the total number of
contracts on day t. In Figure 5.2, if the trade direction indicator is below zero, it
illustrates the ask-side trades are more than bid-side trades on that day. If the
trade direction indicator is above zero, it means the amount of buyer-initiated
trades is larger than sell-initiated trades. Overall, it seems like that the buyer-
initiated trades and seller-initiated trades maintain the balance, except for the
tendency of heavy seller-initiated trades during the period between March 2009
– August 2009 and May 2013 – October 2013.
After classifying the transaction using the new volume weighted average algo-
rithm, I can measure the market liquidity spreads for each level or for the av-
erage across the whole limited order book. Denoted S˜ is the set of liquidity
spreads, where S˜ ∈ {S˜ Q, S˜ Q1/2 , S˜ D, S˜ E, S˜ Rτ , S˜ ASτ }. The bid-ask spreads
(S˜ Q), quoted half spreads (S˜ Q
1/2
), quoted depth (S˜ D) and effective spreads
(S˜ E) are measured at the tick-by-tick level, and both realized spreads (S˜ Rτ ) and
adverse selection indicators (S˜ ASτ ) are measured at varying 26 time intervals.
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Figure 5.2: Average Trade Direction Indicator
Notes: This figure depicts both the daily average (dotted line) and the weekly moving
average (black line) trade direction indicators across 40 contracts from 2008 to 2014.
Using the volume weighted average trade classification algorithm, I classify each trans-
action as buyer-initiated trades (+1) and seller-initiated trades (-1) at tick level and
denote as the trade direction indicator (q). The average of all 40 Eurodollar contract
daily trade direction indicator is
∑
i(
∑
k qik/nit)/n
c
t , where i is contract type, k and t
are intraday time index and daily time index, nit is the number of trades of contract i
on day t, and nct is the number of contracts on day t.
Therefore, the market liquidity spreads can be expressed as follows
S˜ Qjk = 100(pajk − pbjk)/(pmjk) (5.5)
S˜ Q
1/2
jk = 100(pajk − pbjk)/2(pmjk) (5.6)
S˜ Djk = pajkvajk + pbjkvbjk (5.7)
S˜ Ejk = qjk(pjk − pmjk)/pmjk (5.8)
S˜ Rj,k,τ = qjk(pjk − pmjk+τ )/pmjk (5.9)
S˜ ASj,k,τ = qjk(pmjk+τ − pmjk)/pmjk, (5.10)
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where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} is the jth level of the order book; k is an intraday time
index; t is a daily time index; pajk and pbjk are the ask price and bid price for
level j at intraday time k, pmjk is the quoted mid price for level j at the time
of the kth trade, pjk is the actual transaction price for level j at the time of the
kth trade; vajk and vbjk are the ask volume and bid volume for level j at intraday
time k; qjk is the buy-sell trade direction indicator, that +1 for buyer-initiated
trades, -1 for seller-initiated trades, and 0 for no trades; and τ is the length of
intraday time intervals, τ ∈ {tick-by-tick, 1 ms, 2 ms, 5 ms, 10 ms, 15 ms, 20 ms,
25 ms, 50 ms, 75 ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 200 ms, 500 ms, 750 ms, 1 sec, 5 sec, 15
sec, 30 sec, 60 sec, 300 sec, 600 sec, 900 sec, 1,200 sec, 1,500 sec, and 1,800 sec}.
I also consider liquidity spreads autocorrelations as indicators to assess the in-
formation efficiency with liquidity dynamics. The spreads autocorrelation can be
computed as:
ΩS˜ηk = ρ(S˜k, S˜k−η) (5.11)
where ΩS˜ is the liquidity spreads autocorrelations, η is the orders of autocor-
relations η ∈ {1st, 5th, 10th}, and S˜k is the varying spreads at intraday time k
and S˜k ∈ {S˜ vk , S˜jk}, S˜ vk is the volume weighted average spreads autocorrela-
tions at time k, and S˜jk is the spreads autocorrelations in each order book level
j ∈ {1, ..., 5}.
Besides these common liquidity indicators, I also consider other factors, includ-
ing volatility, quote-to-trade ratio, bid-ask market concentration index, and the
inverse of price. The daily price volatility, V, is the daily high transaction price
minus low transaction price, scaled by the high price, as defined in Hendershott
et al. [2011]:
Vt = p
h
t − plt (5.12)
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where pht is the daily highest trade price at day t, and p
l
t is the daily lowest trade
price at day t. Moreover, the quote-to-trade ratio, Q, also is an indicator of the
ratio of the number of quotes to the total number of trades,
Qt = n
q
t/nt (5.13)
where nqt is the daily number of quotes at day t, and n is the daily number of
trades.
The bid-side (ask-side) market concentration ratio, Cb (Ca), is the volume of bids
(asks) divided by the number of buyers (sellers), and can be estimated as
Cat =
vat
nat
, Cbt =
vbt
nbt
(5.14)
where vat and vbt are the daily total volume in ask-side and bid-side at day t, and
the nat and nbt are the total daily number of sellers and buyers at day t.
5.3.3 Vector Autoregression Models of Pricing Errors
Under the random walk hypothesis, the observed transaction prices can be decom-
posed into random walk component and stationary component (see Hasbrouck,
1991a,b, 1993). The random walk component, mk, is regarded as an indicator the
efficient price based on the information efficiency theory, where the efficient price
is the expectation of price incorporating all the information at time k. The sta-
tionary component, sk, reflects the deviation of the trade prices from the efficient
prices at time k, which is the pricing error. The higher pricing error is, the lower
efficiency and less sensitivity of the transaction price absorbing new information.
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Notationally, the observed logarithm of transaction prices is defined by:
pk = mk + sk (5.15)
The random-walk efficient prices, mk, can be written as:
mk = mk−1 + wk (5.16)
where wk is the uncorrelated increments with E[wk] = 0, E[w2k] = σ2w, E[wkws] = 0
for k 6= s, and wk ∼ N(0, σ2w). The stationary pricing error component, sk, is
zero mean covariance-stationary process. Hasbrouck [1993] considers the mi-
crostructure effects of pricing error, and points out the pricing error includes an
information correlated part, αwk, and an information uncorrelated part, ηk, hence
it decomposes into the following expression
sk = αwk + ηk (5.17)
where ηk is a disturbance uncorrelated with wk. The information uncorrelated
pricing errors is likely sourced from noise trading and inventory control impacts;
and the information correlated component mainly comes from adverse selection
effects and the lagging adjustment for new information. The return, rk, is the
difference between the logarithmic prices at time k and time k − 1. The corre-
spondence from Equation (5.15) to Equation (5.17) establishes that
rk = pk − pk−1 = (mk + sk)− (mk−1 + sk−1) = wk + sk − sk−1 (5.18)
where wk and sk are serially uncorrelated and rk possesses nonzero auto-covariance
at the first order only. The first-order moving average representation of return rk
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is
rk = k − ak−1 (5.19)
Combined these two return expressions in Equation (5.18) and Equation (5.19),
I now have the following relations:
k − ak−1 = wk + sk − sk−1 (5.20)
Under the interpretation of Beveridge and Nelson [1981] decomposition, the
source for the pricing error, sk is belongs to the information-correlated source,
set ηt = 0 therefore
sk = αwk (5.21)
Therefore the equation (5.20) can also be represented as follow:
k − ak−1 = (1 + α)wk + αwk−1 (5.22)
where this equation also can split into two parts: k = (1 + α)wk and ak−1 =
αwk−1. Hence, the following identities can be verified
α =
a
1− a (5.23)
wk = (1− a)k (5.24)
σ2w = (1− a)2σ2 (5.25)
σ2s = a
2σ2 (5.26)
To explain the dynamic of trade prices and estimate the pricing error, I follow
the Hasbrouck [1993] VAR framework on the tick-by-tick basis to compute the
variance of the pricing error. Unlike the Hasbrouck’s univariate autoregression,
this chapter considers the dynamic relation among six factors: trade returns (r),
200
signed trade direction indicator (q), signed trade volume (v), signed square root
of trade volume (v1/2), signed ask-side market concentration (Ca), and signed
bid-side market concentration (Cb), respectively.
The basic λ-lag vector autoregression model can be written as follow:
Yk = c+B1Yk−1 +B2Yk−2 · · ·+BλYk−λ + uk (5.27)
where Yk = [rk, qk, vk, v
1/2
k ,Cak,Cbk]
′ denotes as the vector-valued time series vari-
ables; k is the intraday time index; c is the constant matrix; B is the coefficient
matrices and u is an error term. The concise matrix form of VAR model is
Y = BX + U (5.28)
where the dependent variables vector Y is Yk = [rk, qk, vk, v
1/2
k ,Cak,Cbk]
′, the
lagged set of explanatory variables X is X = [Yk−1, Yk−2, . . . , Yk−λ], and B is the
coefficient matrices of the lagged terms with
B = [c, B1, B2, . . . , Bλ] =

c1 b
1
1,1 b
1
1,2 . . . b
λ
1,1 b
λ
1,2 . . . b
λ
1,6
c2 b
1
2,1 b
1
2,2 . . . b
λ
2,1 b
λ
2,2 . . . b
λ
2,6
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
c6 b
1
6,1 b
1
6,2 . . . b
λ
6,1 b
λ
6,2 . . . b
λ
6,6
 (5.29)
and U is the white noise disturbances matrix with uk = [u1,k, u2,k, . . . , u6,k]
′ and
uk ∼ N(0, σ2).
Any VAR(λ) can be rewritten as a VAR(1) with companion matrix represent-
ing the vector projection. Following the description of Hamilton [1994], let the
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centered VAR system of equations be (5.27) be given by:
Yk − µ = c+B1(Yk−1 − µ) +B2(Yk−2 − µ) · · ·+Bλ(Yk−λ − µ) + uk (5.30)
hence, the VAR(1) format can be compactly rewritten in companion form as
follows:
Yˆk = FYˆk−1 + Vk (5.31)
where Yˆk = [Yk − µ, Yk−1 − µ, . . . , Yk−λ+1 − µ]′, F is companion matrix
F ≡

B1 B2 . . . Bλ−1 Bλ
I 0 . . . 0 0
0 I . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . I 0

(5.32)
I is a identity matrix and Vk ≡ [uk, 0, . . . , 0]′.
If the eigenvalues of F are within the boundary of the unit circle, F s → 0 as s→
∞, the VAR(1) will be stationary. Under the Wold Theorem, if the VAR(λ) is
stationary, then VAR model has an infinite order moving average representation:
Yk = µ+ uk + Bˆ1uk−1 + Bˆ2uk−2 · · ·+ Bˆλuk−λ + . . . (5.33)
= Bˆ(L)uk (5.34)
where L is the lag operator and Bˆ(L) matrix polynomial in L. Using this VMA
format, it is convenient for me to figure out the reaction of this system to a shock,
namely the impulse response. Assuming the time is k + s now, the VMA system
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can be expressed as
Yk+s = µ+ uk+s + Bˆ1uk+s−1 + Bˆ2uk+s−2 + · · ·+ Bˆsuk + Bˆs+1uk−1 + . . . (5.35)
= Bˆ(L)uk+s (5.36)
hence, the VMA format can be equivalently rewritten as follow:
Yk − µ = Bˆ(L)uk (5.37)
where Bˆ ∈ {Bˆ1, Bˆ2, . . . , Bˆs, Bˆs+1, . . . }, the operators Bˆ(L) and B(L) are related
by Bˆ(L) = [B(L)]−1. Bˆs = F
(s)
11 is the s order moving average matrix, and F
(s)
11
denotes the upper left block of F s. Therefore, the Bˆ
(s)
ij is the impulse response of
Yi,k+s to one unit change in Yjk at the s step.
Following Hasbrouck [1993] pricing error method, the variance of the random-
walk component (mt) can be computed as
σ2w = [B]1Cov(u)[B]
′
1], (5.38)
where [B]1 is the first row of B matrix. The pricing error variance can be calcu-
lated as
σ2s =
∞∑
j=0
[Bˆ]Cov(u)[Bˆ]′, (5.39)
where Bˆj = −
∑∞
k=j+1[Bj]1.
After the calculation of the variance of the pricing error from the vector autore-
gression, I adopt the Boehmer and Wu [2013] method to produce a proxy of the
relative pricing error, E, as the ratio of standard deviation of the pricing error
σs, to the standard deviation of trade price σp, as follow E = σs/σp. This pricing
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error proxy, E, measures the distance of the real trade prices tracking the efficient
prices, hence, the smaller the E, the more efficient the price formation process
and the better the market quality.
5.3.4 Multivariate Linear Regression
Maturity effects are an important empirical artefact that must be counted for in
any study of a futures market (see Bessembinder et al., 1996; Chen and Zheng,
2013; Kalev and Duong, 2008). Most prior studies focus on the relations between
price volatility and time to maturity. This study demonstrates that the efficiency
of price discovery varies over the time to maturity. To analyse this effect, I utilize
a multivariate linear regression to identify the decomposition maturity effects on
price discovery and market quality.
Y˜ = c+ T˜ + p−1 + V (5.40)
The dependent variables (Y˜ ) include two components: the price discovery indi-
cators and the market quality indicators. The price discovery indicators cover
the pricing error (E), the autocorrelation of quote prices (tick-by-tick bids, asks,
and mid prices) and the autocorrelation of mid-price return at 26 varying time
intervals from tick-by-tick to 30 minutes. The market quality indicators include
the number of quotes (nq) and the number of trades (n) , pricing error (E), quote-
to-trade ratio (Q), liquidity spreads (bid-ask spreads, quoted half spreads, quoted
depth, effective half spreads, realized spreads, and adverse selection) and the au-
tocorrelation of liquidity spreads. Both realized spreads and adverse selection are
also generated at 26 different time intervals. The explanatory variables contain
the days to maturity (T˜ ), the inverse of transaction prices (p−1), and the daily
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volatility (V).
All variables are the daily volume-weighted average results across five level order
book data. Quote price autocorrelation, mid-quote return autocorrelation, and
liquidity spreads autocorrelation are computed at first order, fifth order, and
tenth order. The number of trades and quotes, pricing error, the inverse of price,
the days to maturity, and the quote-to-trade ratio take the logarithm value.
5.4 Data Integrity and Economic Implications
In this section I will introduce the facets of the data that vary from the preced-
ing chapter and then proceed with the interpretation of empirical results. The
quoting and trading activity (in terms of numbers of quotes and trades and their
individual and aggregate volume) places the data set in the domain of ultra-high
frequency analysis. The Eurodollar futures tick data in millisecond timestamps
is the same dataset used previously. However, for this exercise, I will not be ag-
gregating the market indicators to the daily level, but instead I will analyze the
market data at the tick frequency of the trades. This chapter combines the trade
data and limit order book data described in the previous chapters from January
1, 2008 to July 31, 2014.
5.4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Figure 5.3 presents the daily average quotes messages per minute and the median
of updating speeds from 1996 to 2014 for the whole market across the main 40
quarterly dated deliveries. Figure 5.3 Panel (a) depicts the inside quotes activities
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and Panel (b) describes the whole limit order book quotes activities from 2008 to
2014. The average number of messages per minute is below 100 messages before
2004, and once it passes 2004, the number of messages within one minute increases
dramatically from 115 messages in 2004 to 1,464 messages per minute in 2014.
The median of inside quotes updating frequency drops from 19.86 minutes in 1996
to 600 milliseconds in 2014; after 2008 the median of inside quoting frequency
maintains a level within 5 minutes and after 2010 the updating speed drops below
in 17 seconds. Figure 5.3 Panel (b) represents a faster updating speed based on the
whole limit order book from 2008 to 2014. After taking the average across the five
levels of the order book, the median of Eurodollar quotes updating speeds are now
all below 0.5 seconds. Therefore, Figure 5.3 demonstrates the quarterly settled
Eurodollar future are traded with the ultra-high-frequency speeds in milliseconds.
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics for the 40 Eurodollar contracts from 2008
to 2014. The table displays the maturity, the average volume and observation
of market depth asks and bids, the average of trades volume, and the average
observation of trades for GE contracts having their delivery months in the same
year. Specifically, GE?0 includes four 10-year future contracts, namely, GEH0,
GEM0, GEU0, and GEZ0 (see Table 5.2). Their delivery months are March
2010, June 2010, September 2010, and December 2010, respectively. The average
number of GE?0 bids and asks are both 20.46 million approximately, and the
number of trades is 4.10 million. The average volume of GE?0 trades, asks, and
bids are $59.91 trillion, $58.75 quadrillion, and $58.58 quadrillion, respectively.
Across the 40 GE contracts by year of delivery, GE?4 has the largest bid and
ask volume with $631.86 quadrillion and $618.16 quadrillion. The largest trades
volume is the GE?5 contract with $75.12 trillion. Meanwhile, GE?5 (all quarters
delivering in 2015) contract has the largest average number of bids, ask, and
trades, with approximately 57.13 million observations for bids sides and asks
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Figure 5.3: Quotes Activities
Notes: This figure depicts both the frequency and the speed of Eurodollar future quotes
activities from 1996 to 2014. The continuous red line represents the daily average of
quotes messages per minute across all ED contracts, the black line is the median of
quotes updating speed, and the two grey dotted lines are the 5% and 95% median
quotes updating speeds. Panel A illustrates the inside quotes (best-bid and best-ask)
messages and its updating speeds (in minutes) from 1996 to 2014. Panel B presents the
average of five levels limit order messages and the median updating speed (in seconds)
of the whole limit order book from 2008 to 2014.
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sides, and 11.43 million observations of trades. In total, there are 32,712 days
with all 40 contracts for the final daily frequency regression analysis.
5.4.2 Market Quality and Price Discovery
Figure 5.4 and Table 5.3 report the daily average quotes number, trades num-
ber, volatility, and quotes to trades ratio sorted by days to maturity across 40
contracts. Table 5.3 indicates that the average and median of these four mea-
sures over different periods, from 30 days before maturity to the whole 10-year
sample period. The mean and median of the number of quotes are 569,754 and
474,484 for the entire sample, respectively; the mean and median of the number
of trades are 8,107 and 4,195. In Figure 5.4, daily quotes and trades number reach
the peak around 1.336 million observations at 644 days to maturity and 28,707
observations 593 days to maturity. This indicates that the highest number of
traders submit orders and make transactions around 1.7 – 1.8 years to maturity.
It is useful to note the number of quotes is generated by the average or median
value across five order book levels. On the 644 days to maturity, the total quotes
observation of the full limit order book is around 6.681 million, which translates
into nearly 77 quotes entering the order book every second.
Meanwhile, the mean and median of the volatility are 0.09 and 0.08 for the entire
sample period. Figure 5.4 indicates that the trade prices volatility has the increas-
ing trend before 1,500 days to maturity, and reaches the highest volatility around
three years to two and half years and then drops after two years to maturity.
Quote-to-trade ratio describes that the degree of the volume of orders entering
the market filled in the transaction executions. The higher value of the quote-
to-trade ratio, the lower trade volumes, and the higher quotes volumes. Table
209
5.3 indicates that the mean and median of the quote-to-trade ratio is 274.83 and
125.35 for the 10-year sample. Quote-to-trade ratio reaches a peak with 6,729.6
on the 2,878 days to maturity, which means the volume of quotes is 6,729.6 times
the volume of trades executions (see Figure 5.4). As the contracts approach
maturity, the volume of trades rises dramatically. Until 115 days to maturity,
the quote-to-trade ratio is 6.7909 around three orders of magnitude lower than
the highest quote-to-trade ratio. Table 5.3 also provides the quotes and trades
number, volatility, and quotes-to-trades ratio with ten subsamples from 30 days
before maturity to 1,800 days before maturity. The number of trade and quotes
rises from 30 days to 1,080 days group, and then has a slight decrease at 1,800
days to the maturity group. Both trade price volatility and quote-to-trade ratio
monotonously increase from the 30 days subsample to the 1,800 days subsample.
From classical market efficiency analysis when markets are strong form price ef-
ficient, previous prices should have no information incorporated in the current
prices. To analyze the price efficiency in the Eurodollar future market, I mea-
sure the tick-by-tick autocorrelation of bid-price, ask-price , and mid-price with
different subsamples from 30 days before the maturity to 1,800 days to maturity.
Table 5.3 includes the mean and median of mid-price first-, fifth-, and tenth-order
autocorrelations for both the volume-weighted average and each order book level.
The volume-weighted average mid-price first-order autocorrelation of the entire
sample is 0.9267, which is much lower than it in other lag length subsamples. The
mean of VWA mid-price autocorrelation rises from 0.9910 in 30 days group to
0.9945 in 180 days group and then drops to 0.9687 in the 1,800 days group. This
translates into the efficiency of price being improved from 30 days to 180 days,
but it becomes worse after half year to maturity. The median results point out
the similar transformation with a different turning point. The median of VWA
mid-price autocorrelation rises from 0.9984 in 30 days group to 0.9995 in 480 days
210
05001000150020002500300035004000
Days to maturity
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14 ×10
5
Number of quotes
(a) Number of Quotes (nq)
05001000150020002500300035004000
Days to maturity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3 ×10
4
Number of trades
(b) Number of Trades (n)
05001000150020002500300035004000
Days to maturity
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Volatility
(c) Volatility (V)
05001000150020002500300035004000
Days to maturity
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Quote to Trade Ratio
(d) Quote-to-trade Ratio (Q)
Figure 5.4: Basic Market Quality Indicators
Notes: This figure represents the daily average quotes number, trades number,
volatility, and quotes to trades ratio over 40 Eurodollar contracts sorted by days
to maturity. The daily trade price volatility is the difference between the highest
transaction price and the lowest transaction price within one day t, V = pht − plt,
where pht and p
l
t refer to the highest and lowest trade prices at day t. The quote-
to-trade ratio is the number of quotes to the number of trades, Q = nqt/nt, where
nqt is the daily number of quotes at day t, and n is the daily number of trades at
day t.
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Table 5.3: Eurodollar Contracts Basic Statistics Description
Number of quotes Number of trades Volatility Quote-to-trade Ratio
nq n V Q
Mean
Full samples 569,753.63 8,106.83 0.09 274.83
30 days 74,397.26 7,737.58 0.03 18.78
60 days 177,120.80 8,605.24 0.03 36.26
90 days 221,844.08 9,280.79 0.04 40.66
180 days 325,023.59 11,299.10 0.04 44.72
360 days 473,406.13 13,601.79 0.05 50.32
480 days 559,660.88 14,729.08 0.06 53.78
720 days 684,475.94 15,146.39 0.07 67.36
900 days 737,442.63 14,711.78 0.08 81.94
1080 days 766,987.31 14,034.30 0.08 95.79
1800 days 681,650.81 10,266.01 0.09 158.71
Median
Full samples 474,483.50 4,194.50 0.08 125.35
30 days 53,084.00 6,348.50 0.01 7.49
60 days 106,559.50 6,447.00 0.01 20.22
90 days 184,772.00 6,983.00 0.02 22.07
180 days 307,517.50 8,607.00 0.03 25.40
360 days 422,164.50 10,794.00 0.03 29.57
480 days 485,629.00 11,591.00 0.04 32.06
720 days 614,361.50 11,802.50 0.04 38.78
900 days 684,061.00 11,515.00 0.06 45.32
1080 days 736,653.00 11,068.00 0.06 52.14
1800 days 641,881.00 7,022.00 0.08 87.39
Notes: This table demonstrates reports the average and median of quotes number (nq),
trades number (n), volatility (V), and quotes to trades ratio (Q) across 40 Eurodollar
contracts. These four measurements have been reported based on the different days to
maturity subsamples, from 30 days before maturity to the 10-year Eurodollar contract
life cycle. The volatility is the daily highest transaction price subtracting the daily
lowest transaction price, V = pht − plt; and the quote-to-trade ratio is the daily total
quotes number divided by the daily total trades number, Q = nqt/nt, where p
h
t and p
l
t
refer to the highest and lowest trade prices; nqt and nt are the daily number of quotes
and transactions at day t, and t is daily time index.
group, and then drops to 0.9983 in the 1,800 days group. A similar trend has been
found in each level results and in fifth-order and tenth-order autocorrelations.
Looking at Table 5.3 horizontally, the autocorrelations of mid prices decrease
monotonically from level one to level five in all subsamples. However, the results
from the whole sample do not follow this rule. Both average and median mid-price
autocorrelations decline from level one to level two, then increase at level three
and level four and drops to the bottom at level five. For instance, the first-order
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autocorrelation of the mid-price in the full sample decreases from 0.2670 at level
one to 0.7963 at level two, then increases to 0.8886 at level four, and finally drops
to 0.4650 at level five. This indicates that the price in level two is more efficient at
absorbing current information and exhibits less influence from the previous price,
which indicates the importance of the level two in the limit order book compared
with the inside quotes (best bid and best ask). The drop at level five is mainly
due to the lack of trading activities and the low quotes updates frequency.
Besides the mid-price autocorrelations, this chapter also explores the bid prices
(pb) and ask prices (pa) autocorrelations using tick-by-tick time intervals. Figure
5.5 portrays both the volume-weighted average of bid-side and ask-side price
autocorrelation and quotes price autocorrelation from level one to level five of
the limit order book. Subplots in the first row are the volume-weighted average
of quotes price first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order autocorrelations. The
blue line represents the bid-side autocorrelation, and the red line is the ask prices
autocorrelation, while the second row presents the quotes price autocorrelations in
each order book level. Each subplot displays a butterfly pattern in where the right
wing represents bid-side prices autocorrelations, and the left wing represents ask-
side prices autocorrelations. For both sides, quotes autocorrelations are increasing
as the tenor decreases.
More specifically, the highest ask price and bid price first-order autocorrelations
are 0.9997 on around one year before maturity (364 days and 376 days before ma-
turity, respectively). Figure 5.5 also presents negative autocorrelations in each
subplot. For the first-order volume-weighted average autocorrelation, the lowest
ask-side and bid-side price autocorrelations are -0.3601 on 3,022 days to maturity
and -0.2474 on 3,304 days to maturity. The one with negative autocorrelation
with the nearest day to maturity are -0.0569 on 2,857 days for ask-side and -0.0696
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on 2,667 days for bid-side. The fifth-order and tenth-order price autocorrelations
have lower and more negative autocorrelation compared with first-order autocor-
relations. Ask-price and bid-price autocorrelations in levels (see the second row
in Figure 5.5) show the similar pattern with the volume-weighted average ones.
The closer to the maturity date, the higher price autocorrelations are for both
sides. Besides, the fifth-order and tenth-order autocorrelations are lower than at
first-order autocorrelations for each level.
Prior studies point out that the return autocorrelation is a core indicator as a
proxy for price efficiency [Anderson et al., 2013; Foley and Putnin¸sˇ, 2014; Hen-
dershott and Jones, 2005]. A relatively small return autocorrelation (less than
0.2) indicates the higher efficiency of the prices and the better price formation
process in the market; whereas, the higher autocorrelation is, the lower efficiency
of the future prices. Hendershott and Jones [2005] report the first-order autocor-
relation of mid-quote returns over a quarter-minute, half-minute and one-minute
intervals from the NBBO of the US ETFs. Their findings suggest that the quote
return autocorrelation at 30 seconds interval is between 0.04 and 0.19. Foley and
Putnin¸sˇ [2014] illustrate that the mean and median of absolute autocorrelations
in the mid-price returns span between 0.04 and 0.06 at a ten-second time interval.
In this chapter, I calculate the first-order, fifth-year and tenth-order autocorrela-
tions of mid-quote returns at varying timescales from tick-by-tick to half hour. I
also measure the return autocorrelations in different subsamples (such as 30-day,
60-day, 90-day, . . . , 1,800-day before maturity). To avoid unnecessary replication,
here, I only report the full sample return autocorrelations. However, the results
are consistent across the several subsamples and available in the online appendix.
Table 5.5 summarizes both the average and median of mid-quote return auto-
correlations utilizing the volume weighted average mid prices and mid prices of
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each level in the limit order book. Figure 5.6 also portrays the change of the
volume weighted average return autocorrelations across different time intervals.
On a tick-by-tick timescale, both the volume-weighted average mid-quote return
and mid-quote return in each order book level are all negatively correlated with
the previous return. The average of first-order mid-price return autocorrelation
is -0.0526 at tick-by-tick time scale, which is consistent with prior studies (see
Bianco and Reno`, 2006; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988). The return autocorrelation
across five levels also are negative. This indicates the previous first-order return
decreasingly impacts the current return.
The negative mid-price return autocorrelation also suggests that, if the previous
return is above the average level, the current return is more likely to be below
the average. In a high-frequency market, this is a common situation on short-
horizon returns, implying a fast speed mean-reversion of the bid-ask price at the
tick level in the Eurodollar market. Furthermore, the price is efficient in terms of
reflecting available information in the market due to the small absolute value of
autocorrelation. I can conclude from this structure that the deviations from the
efficient price are persistent and significant, but short lived. However, there is a
noticeable term structure of this persistence.
Recall, that the use of the ED contract in constructing synthetic swaps results in
clustering of necessary transactions over the term structure (at regular intervals
by IMM date and at regular tenors, such as one, three and five years, it appears
that this increases in liquidity draws in trading that is both faster and results
in more significant deviations from efficiency, but the deviations decay rapidly.
We can see that the autocorrelations reported herein are substantially higher
than those reported in the equity markets by [Anderson et al., 2013; Foley and
Putnin¸sˇ, 2014; Hendershott and Jones, 2005], by an order of between 3 and 5
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times; a range of ≈ 0.3 to ≈ 0.9 for time frames above tick versus 0.04 to 0.19 in
the equity literature.
Except for the results at tick-by-tick, the others are all positively autocorrelated.
From the shortest time interval (1 ms) to the longest time interval (1,800 sec), the
autocorrelations are positive and gradually increase. More specifically, Table 5.5
describes that the first order autocorrelations of VWA mid-price returns increase
from 0.3549 (1 ms interval) to 0.8925 (1,800 sec interval). In Figure 5.6, the return
autocorrelations rise monotonously at the tick-by-tick level. The autocorrelation
increases rapidly from 1 ms to 2 ms. It experiences a slower increase from 5 ms to
10 ms, and then increases steadily until 1,800-second timescale (see Figure 5.6).
Negative tick by tick autocorrelations are fascinating, but consider that in the
most active periods the negative autocorrelation will last for less than 1 to 10ms
on average, which is very quick.
The mid-price return the autocorrelations decrease from level one to level two,
subsequently increase from level three to level four and finally drop at level five.
Table 5.5 and Figure 5.5 provide very similar patterns in the first-order, fifth-
order, and tenth-order autocorrelations. Both the red line (fifth-order autocor-
relations) and black line (tenth-order autocorrelations) are below the first-order
return autocorrelations, which suggests that the fifth-order and tenth-order au-
tocorrelations are more efficient of the price adjustment. However, the median
fifth-order and tenth-order autocorrelations in Figure 5.6 are lower than the mean
autocorrelations from 1 ms to 10 ms.
Figure 5.7 presents the daily volume-weighted average of mid-quote return auto-
correlation across 40 Eurodollar contracts in six selected time intervals (tick-by-
tick, 25 ms, 200 ms, 1 sec, 60 sec, 1,800 sec). The mid-quote return autocorre-
lation plots with other timescales are available in the online appendix. We can
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see the highest mid-quote return autocorrelation in each subplot occurs at the
first-order autocorrelation within one year to the maturity period. Since the time
interval increases, the mid-quote return autocorrelation also increases, which is
consistent with Table 5.5. More specifically, the tick level return autocorrelations
have a large amount of negative results, especially in the first-order autocorrela-
tions. When contracts approach the maturity days, the autocorrelation at three
different orders seems to converge to zero, which implies higher efficiency of the
price to incorporate available information in the market.
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Figure 5.6: Volume Weighted Average Mid-quoted Return Autocorrelation (Mean
and Median of All 40 Eurodollar Contracts)
Notes: This figure portrays both the average and median of first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-
order volume weighted average mid-quote return autocorrelations for the full sample. The
volume weighted average mid-price is calculated by the sum of pmjkvmjk and weighted by the
daily total quotes volume for the day, where k is the intraday time index and j is the order book
level. This plot represents the average and median of return autocorrelations over 40 Eurodollar
contracts. The first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order mid-quote return autocorrelations are
marked with blue, red, and black dashed lines. Each order mid-quote return autocorrelations
are measured at 26 time intervals, including tick-by-tick, 1 ms, 2 ms, 5 ms, 10 ms, 15 ms, 20
ms, 25 ms, 50 ms, 75 ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 200 ms, 500 ms, 750 ms, 1 sec, 5 sec, 15 sec, 30 sec,
60 sec, 300 sec, 600 sec, 900 sec, 1,200 sec, 1,500 sec, and 1,800 sec.
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Table 5.5: Mid-quoted Return Autocorrelation (Full sample)
Mean Median
VWA Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 VWA Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Tick -0.0526 -0.0889 -0.1425 -0.1470 -0.1242 -0.3651 -0.0163 -0.0919 -0.1076 -0.1132 -0.1014 -0.4167
1ms 0.3549 0.3221 0.3210 0.3271 0.3337 0.2457 0.3737 0.3334 0.3333 0.3340 0.3627 0.1996
2ms 0.4602 0.3864 0.3825 0.3957 0.4085 0.2611 0.4998 0.4375 0.4349 0.4496 0.4708 0.2691
5ms 0.4947 0.4479 0.4371 0.4634 0.4843 0.2843 0.5351 0.4994 0.4988 0.5001 0.5327 0.3143
10ms 0.4974 0.4826 0.4699 0.5045 0.5299 0.3383 0.5464 0.5268 0.5134 0.5576 0.5871 0.3633
15ms 0.5042 0.4960 0.4801 0.5212 0.5514 0.3643 0.5587 0.5430 0.5287 0.5744 0.6123 0.3889
20ms 0.5254 0.5176 0.5005 0.5444 0.5780 0.3887 0.5928 0.5714 0.5602 0.6100 0.6492 0.4166
25ms 0.5331 0.5260 0.5089 0.5557 0.5910 0.4099 0.6079 0.5866 0.5719 0.6284 0.6679 0.4358
50ms 0.5825 0.5797 0.5586 0.6132 0.6538 0.4747 0.6811 0.6670 0.6577 0.7194 0.7579 0.4996
75ms 0.6080 0.6018 0.5805 0.6398 0.6839 0.5044 0.7119 0.6946 0.6808 0.7540 0.7939 0.5283
100ms 0.6234 0.6153 0.5931 0.6560 0.7028 0.5205 0.7296 0.7082 0.6938 0.7728 0.8120 0.5463
150ms 0.6417 0.6328 0.6094 0.6746 0.7230 0.5370 0.7504 0.7236 0.7115 0.7924 0.8329 0.5678
First 200ms 0.6524 0.6434 0.6189 0.6864 0.7338 0.5473 0.7624 0.7323 0.7217 0.8030 0.8445 0.5847
Order 500ms 0.6795 0.6684 0.6404 0.7117 0.7600 0.5751 0.7964 0.7533 0.7437 0.8275 0.8669 0.6253
750ms 0.6869 0.6760 0.6474 0.7185 0.7680 0.5867 0.8065 0.7604 0.7509 0.8332 0.8735 0.6384
1s 0.6914 0.6805 0.6504 0.7218 0.7716 0.5938 0.8119 0.7638 0.7539 0.8363 0.8764 0.6476
5s 0.7157 0.7019 0.6657 0.7378 0.7876 0.6253 0.8393 0.7873 0.7813 0.8503 0.8902 0.6768
15s 0.7420 0.7296 0.6868 0.7542 0.8037 0.6464 0.8646 0.8185 0.8119 0.8685 0.9019 0.6959
30s 0.7607 0.7505 0.7020 0.7680 0.8163 0.6567 0.8823 0.8426 0.8356 0.8854 0.9136 0.7027
60s 0.7821 0.7737 0.7205 0.7840 0.8300 0.6625 0.9044 0.8691 0.8625 0.9052 0.9265 0.7061
300s 0.8370 0.8369 0.7669 0.8184 0.8604 0.6666 0.9561 0.9368 0.9315 0.9509 0.9601 0.7037
600s 0.8606 0.8635 0.7860 0.8323 0.8725 0.6661 0.9723 0.9581 0.9543 0.9660 0.9718 0.7008
900s 0.8732 0.8774 0.7950 0.8363 0.8770 0.6650 0.9789 0.9673 0.9643 0.9728 0.9773 0.6998
1200s 0.8824 0.8862 0.8009 0.8407 0.8805 0.6669 0.9827 0.9726 0.9698 0.9768 0.9806 0.7023
1500s 0.8880 0.8924 0.8051 0.8429 0.8829 0.6660 0.9849 0.9760 0.9734 0.9794 0.9828 0.7010
1800s 0.8925 0.8970 0.8083 0.8448 0.8857 0.6645 0.9867 0.9784 0.9760 0.9814 0.9846 0.7004
Tick -0.0039 -0.0142 -0.0131 -0.0154 -0.0173 -0.0059 0.0001 -0.0144 -0.0095 -0.0123 -0.0144 0.0000
1ms 0.1233 0.0586 0.0581 0.0605 0.0626 0.0088 0.0664 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
2ms 0.1310 0.0940 0.0920 0.0983 0.1038 0.0218 0.0644 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
5ms 0.1538 0.1405 0.1374 0.1525 0.1653 0.0585 0.0613 0.0250 0.0188 0.0540 0.0799 0.0000
10ms 0.1832 0.1751 0.1708 0.1947 0.2146 0.0993 0.0713 0.0647 0.0567 0.1028 0.1366 0.0000
15ms 0.2049 0.1957 0.1905 0.2204 0.2446 0.1205 0.0889 0.0896 0.0795 0.1348 0.1760 0.0229
20ms 0.2288 0.2180 0.2127 0.2463 0.2744 0.1396 0.1149 0.1234 0.1112 0.1726 0.2227 0.0499
25ms 0.2437 0.2299 0.2240 0.2615 0.2922 0.1505 0.1332 0.1382 0.1247 0.1955 0.2504 0.0666
50ms 0.3058 0.2829 0.2757 0.3242 0.3633 0.1882 0.2225 0.2367 0.2193 0.3149 0.3747 0.1213
75ms 0.3350 0.3038 0.2961 0.3511 0.3949 0.2049 0.2684 0.2707 0.2499 0.3641 0.4341 0.1478
100ms 0.3514 0.3159 0.3078 0.3670 0.4138 0.2157 0.2960 0.2864 0.2666 0.3919 0.4655 0.1630
150ms 0.3724 0.3324 0.3241 0.3880 0.4378 0.2319 0.3345 0.3055 0.2877 0.4258 0.5051 0.1882
Fifth 200ms 0.3851 0.3433 0.3345 0.4016 0.4529 0.2422 0.3565 0.3210 0.3022 0.4471 0.5286 0.2047
Order 500ms 0.4185 0.3723 0.3623 0.4359 0.4915 0.2732 0.4150 0.3591 0.3405 0.4943 0.5811 0.2532
750ms 0.4293 0.3823 0.3722 0.4477 0.5053 0.2868 0.4338 0.3730 0.3575 0.5096 0.5978 0.2696
1s 0.4360 0.3876 0.3771 0.4536 0.5119 0.2962 0.4481 0.3774 0.3642 0.5186 0.6048 0.2848
5s 0.4651 0.4154 0.4020 0.4822 0.5436 0.3428 0.5026 0.4154 0.4016 0.5501 0.6400 0.3499
15s 0.4917 0.4464 0.4282 0.5090 0.5725 0.3773 0.5552 0.4720 0.4576 0.5862 0.6700 0.4015
30s 0.5151 0.4742 0.4517 0.5339 0.5968 0.4011 0.5977 0.5212 0.5061 0.6280 0.7010 0.4301
60s 0.5459 0.5101 0.4836 0.5652 0.6284 0.4216 0.6547 0.5843 0.5700 0.6815 0.7424 0.4543
300s 0.6370 0.6212 0.5779 0.6495 0.7104 0.4583 0.8160 0.7745 0.7611 0.8250 0.8535 0.4824
600s 0.6792 0.6709 0.6181 0.6834 0.7436 0.4675 0.8785 0.8452 0.8341 0.8766 0.8961 0.4852
900s 0.7029 0.6985 0.6387 0.6984 0.7582 0.4711 0.9054 0.8771 0.8680 0.9007 0.9156 0.4852
1200s 0.7190 0.7161 0.6523 0.7086 0.7682 0.4767 0.9219 0.8959 0.8869 0.9146 0.9276 0.4925
1500s 0.7307 0.7297 0.6621 0.7153 0.7753 0.4774 0.9321 0.9087 0.8996 0.9241 0.9356 0.4922
1800s 0.7399 0.7396 0.6698 0.7203 0.7810 0.4790 0.9399 0.9178 0.9098 0.9311 0.9422 0.4917
Tick -0.0016 -0.0063 -0.0056 -0.0059 -0.0064 -0.0018 0.0005 -0.0048 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0026 0.0000
1ms 0.0586 0.0220 0.0217 0.0229 0.0239 -0.0009 0.0092 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
2ms 0.0600 0.0363 0.0357 0.0387 0.0413 0.0023 0.0088 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
5ms 0.0788 0.0677 0.0664 0.0745 0.0822 0.0192 0.0118 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
10ms 0.1051 0.0960 0.0942 0.1088 0.1218 0.0450 0.0165 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0228 -0.0001
15ms 0.1243 0.1135 0.1112 0.1307 0.1476 0.0606 0.0233 0.0000 0.0000 0.0253 0.0506 0.0000
20ms 0.1434 0.1304 0.1279 0.1510 0.1710 0.0730 0.0320 0.0174 0.0135 0.0474 0.0804 0.0000
25ms 0.1568 0.1404 0.1378 0.1641 0.1865 0.0804 0.0387 0.0286 0.0234 0.0649 0.1037 0.0000
50ms 0.2115 0.1833 0.1803 0.2169 0.2469 0.1074 0.0838 0.0868 0.0772 0.1520 0.2053 0.0191
75ms 0.2390 0.2018 0.1988 0.2414 0.2757 0.1185 0.1132 0.1109 0.0999 0.1912 0.2524 0.0319
100ms 0.2547 0.2121 0.2092 0.2552 0.2925 0.1255 0.1305 0.1244 0.1114 0.2148 0.2831 0.0400
150ms 0.2740 0.2257 0.2227 0.2735 0.3141 0.1373 0.1561 0.1410 0.1288 0.2440 0.3200 0.0559
Tenth 200ms 0.2856 0.2343 0.2313 0.2848 0.3271 0.1441 0.1754 0.1529 0.1390 0.2608 0.3409 0.0661
Order 500ms 0.3162 0.2587 0.2557 0.3171 0.3646 0.1680 0.2219 0.1830 0.1695 0.3071 0.3969 0.1016
750ms 0.3266 0.2681 0.2652 0.3291 0.3785 0.1784 0.2369 0.1949 0.1819 0.3218 0.4164 0.1192
1s 0.3329 0.2729 0.2699 0.3352 0.3855 0.1852 0.2491 0.1991 0.1876 0.3305 0.4243 0.1307
5s 0.3609 0.2988 0.2942 0.3649 0.4197 0.2233 0.3009 0.2327 0.2195 0.3648 0.4660 0.1885
15s 0.3835 0.3261 0.3187 0.3915 0.4494 0.2534 0.3483 0.2817 0.2664 0.4066 0.5043 0.2357
30s 0.4034 0.3510 0.3411 0.4167 0.4762 0.2765 0.3953 0.3300 0.3135 0.4540 0.5439 0.2698
60s 0.4332 0.3864 0.3734 0.4513 0.5128 0.2988 0.4629 0.3951 0.3786 0.5172 0.5977 0.2981
300s 0.5357 0.5090 0.4823 0.5608 0.6238 0.3484 0.6798 0.6345 0.6168 0.7178 0.7611 0.3432
600s 0.5864 0.5686 0.5330 0.6076 0.6705 0.3629 0.7780 0.7407 0.7251 0.7967 0.8280 0.3485
900s 0.6146 0.6010 0.5598 0.6296 0.6926 0.3692 0.8251 0.7921 0.7772 0.8350 0.8600 0.3501
1200s 0.6334 0.6227 0.5771 0.6446 0.7072 0.3767 0.8537 0.8229 0.8082 0.8578 0.8796 0.3572
1500s 0.6468 0.6382 0.5892 0.6541 0.7173 0.3777 0.8728 0.8439 0.8301 0.8733 0.8924 0.3585
1800s 0.6581 0.6509 0.5993 0.6616 0.7255 0.3808 0.8866 0.8582 0.8452 0.8850 0.9031 0.3582
Notes: This table reports the mean and median of first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order autocorrelations of
mid-quote return for the 10-year full sample period across all 40 Eurodollar contracts, using both the volume
weighted average (VWA) mid-price (pvmk) and mid-quote prices (pmjk) in each level of limit order book, where
k is the intraday time index and j is the order book level. For each order, mid-quote return autocorrelations
are measured at varying time intervals, including tick-by-tick, 1 ms, 2 ms, 5 ms, 10 ms, 15 ms, 20 ms, 25 ms, 50
ms, 75 ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 200 ms, 500 ms, 750 ms, 1 sec, 5 sec, 15 sec, 30 sec, 60 sec, 300 sec, 600 sec, 900 sec,
1,200 sec, 1,500 sec, and 1,800 sec. This table only reports the full sample return autocorrelations; however, the
results are consistent across the diverse subsamples and available in the online appendix, including 30 days to
1,800 days before maturity.
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To have a comprehensive understanding of the market liquidity of the Eurodol-
lar market, this chapter presents a series of liquidity spreads as metrics across
the complete order book, covering the bid-ask spreads (S˜ Q), quoted half-spread
(S˜ Q
1/2
), quoted depth (S˜ D), effective half-spread (S˜ E), realized spreads (S˜ R),
and adverse selection (S˜ AS). Both realized spreads and adverse selection are
measured at diverse timescales from tick level to 1,800 seconds. I also consider
the first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order autocorrelations of these various liq-
uidity spreads. Both liquidity spreads and their autocorrelation have also been
computed with different subsamples, such as 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, 180-day,
360-day, 480-day, 720-day, 900-day, 1,080-day, and 1,800-day before maturity.
These liquidity measurements are available in the online appendix. Here I only
report the full sample liquidity spreads and its autocorrelations in different order
distance. Table 5.6 displays the average and median of the liquidity spreads be-
tween volume-weighted average across five levels and in each level. All spreads
are recorded in basis points except for the quoted depth.
In Table 5.6, the median of volume-weighted average bid-ask spreads is 190.3462
bps, while the median of bid-ask spread for each order book level is much nar-
rower, such as 0.5662 bps in level one and 1.5954 bps in level two. Both the
average and median of bid-ask spreads have a widening tendency, moving from
level one to level five. A similar pattern has been found in the quoted half spreads.
This suggests that the inside quotes of Eurodollar market are more liquid than
other levels. However, I find contrary evidence from the quoted depth. Both the
mean and median of quoted depth in level two are much larger than in the inside
quotes; the quoted depth in level two is the largest one compared with other
levels. Specifically, the depth of inside quotes is 694,049, and the average of level
two quoted depth is 1,461,332 which is more than twice higher than the depth
of level one. Moreover, the median of level two depth is approximately 3.6 times
222
larger than the median of level one quoted depth; even the median of level three
depth is higher than the first level. This implies that level two has the highest
ability to absorb large orders before moving the prices and provides the largest
liquidity in the Eurodollar market, even better than the best bids and best asks,
which again emphasizes the importance of the level two.
Millisecond
Tick 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
Ba
sis
 po
int
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
The Median of VWA Realized Spreads and Adverse Selection
Realized Spreads
Adverse Selection
Figure 5.8: Median Volume Weighted Average Market Liquidity Spreads
Notes: This figure displays the median of the volume weighted average realized spreads (blue
dashed line) and adverse selection (red dashed line) at varying time intervals of all 40 Eurodollar
contracts. Both realized spreads and adverse selection are measured with the volume weighted
average bid, ask, and mid-quote (pvbk, p
v
ak, and p
v
mk) with trade prices (pk), where k is the
intraday time index (see Equation 5.3). The directions of trades are classified by the volume
weighted average trade classification algorithm (see Equation 5.4). The 26 time intervals in-
cludes tick-by-tick, 1 ms, 2 ms, 5 ms, 10 ms, 15 ms, 20 ms, 25 ms, 50 ms, 75 ms, 100 ms, 150
ms, 200 ms, 500 ms, 750 ms, 1 sec, 5 sec, 15 sec, 30 sec, 60 sec, 300 sec, 600 sec, 900 sec, 1,200
sec, 1,500 sec, and 1,800 sec.
The median of volume-weighted average effective half spreads is 0.1933 bps. The
median of level two effective half spreads with 0.1950 bps is narrower than the
median of effective half spread in level one with 0.1970 bps. The smaller effective
half spread, the more liquid is the order book level, and the more actual transac-
223
T
ab
le
5.
6:
M
ar
ke
t
L
iq
u
id
it
y
S
p
re
ad
s
(F
u
ll
sa
m
p
le
)
M
e
a
n
M
e
d
ia
n
V
W
A
L
e
v
e
l
1
L
e
v
e
l
2
L
e
v
e
l
3
L
e
v
e
l
4
L
e
v
e
l
5
V
W
A
L
e
v
e
l
1
L
e
v
e
l
2
L
e
v
e
l
3
L
e
v
e
l
4
L
e
v
e
l
5
S˜
Q
6
1
4
.5
1
5
8
0
.8
9
6
8
2
.2
7
1
5
6
.3
1
5
0
1
2
.2
4
1
1
2
0
.8
2
2
3
1
9
0
.3
4
6
2
0
.5
6
6
2
1
.5
9
5
4
2
.6
3
1
7
3
.6
4
7
6
4
.6
5
1
6
S˜
Q
1
/
2
3
0
7
.2
5
7
9
0
.4
4
8
4
1
.1
3
5
8
3
.1
5
7
5
6
.1
2
0
6
1
0
.4
1
1
1
9
5
.1
7
3
1
0
.2
8
3
1
0
.7
9
7
7
1
.3
1
5
8
1
.8
2
3
8
2
.3
2
5
8
S˜
D
8
,0
1
3
,9
5
6
,1
0
0
6
9
4
,0
4
9
1
,4
6
1
,3
3
2
3
7
1
,4
7
7
1
1
3
,2
7
3
9
8
,9
5
5
7
7
9
,8
3
4
6
2
,6
8
9
2
2
6
,4
4
9
9
4
,1
3
1
2
6
,9
1
7
2
4
,2
1
2
S˜
E
2
.1
1
3
8
0
.1
0
2
8
-7
.7
1
9
1
-4
8
.4
4
4
0
-1
2
8
.4
0
5
0
-1
3
8
.5
2
5
5
0
.1
9
3
3
0
.1
9
7
0
0
.1
9
5
0
0
.1
9
7
6
0
.1
9
8
9
-4
.4
1
9
8
S˜
R
T
ic
k
2
.1
2
9
7
0
.1
0
6
1
-6
.8
2
2
5
-4
0
.3
6
4
1
-1
0
7
.9
6
3
5
-1
1
7
.5
5
6
3
0
.1
9
3
7
0
.1
8
6
0
0
.1
8
4
0
0
.1
8
7
3
0
.1
8
9
2
0
.0
2
1
2
1
m
s
2
.1
1
3
8
0
.1
0
2
8
-7
.7
0
7
4
-4
8
.4
6
7
4
-1
2
8
.3
9
1
1
-1
3
8
.4
4
2
4
0
.1
9
3
3
0
.1
9
7
0
0
.1
9
5
0
0
.1
9
7
5
0
.1
9
8
8
-4
.2
8
2
1
2
m
s
2
.1
1
3
8
0
.1
0
2
6
-7
.6
6
2
7
-4
8
.5
3
9
9
-1
2
8
.0
2
1
0
-1
3
8
.2
5
4
8
0
.1
9
3
2
0
.1
9
6
8
0
.1
9
4
9
0
.1
9
7
4
0
.1
9
8
6
-4
.1
8
4
5
5
m
s
2
.1
1
3
0
0
.1
0
2
1
-7
.6
2
9
2
-4
8
.4
5
1
8
-1
2
7
.8
0
1
4
-1
3
7
.6
0
9
2
0
.1
9
2
8
0
.1
9
6
3
0
.1
9
4
4
0
.1
9
6
8
0
.1
9
8
1
-3
.6
0
8
7
1
0
m
s
2
.1
1
1
3
0
.1
0
1
2
-7
.5
8
3
6
-4
8
.6
5
0
1
-1
2
7
.2
1
7
8
-1
3
8
.3
4
3
6
0
.1
9
2
2
0
.1
9
5
3
0
.1
9
3
5
0
.1
9
5
6
0
.1
9
7
1
-2
.8
8
9
4
1
5
m
s
2
.1
0
5
6
0
.1
0
0
3
-7
.5
8
1
2
-4
8
.7
4
6
8
-1
2
6
.9
9
5
6
-1
3
7
.5
3
5
9
0
.1
9
1
6
0
.1
9
4
3
0
.1
9
2
5
0
.1
9
4
4
0
.1
9
5
8
-2
.3
9
9
6
2
0
m
s
2
.1
0
4
2
0
.0
9
9
8
-7
.5
7
4
5
-4
8
.7
8
5
2
-1
2
7
.1
1
9
7
-1
3
6
.8
9
0
7
0
.1
9
1
0
0
.1
9
3
3
0
.1
9
1
3
0
.1
9
3
2
0
.1
9
4
6
-2
.0
5
9
4
2
5
m
s
2
.0
9
7
3
0
.0
9
8
5
-7
.5
2
6
1
-4
8
.8
4
0
3
-1
2
7
.2
1
0
9
-1
3
7
.1
8
4
0
0
.1
9
0
4
0
.1
9
2
1
0
.1
9
0
1
0
.1
9
1
9
0
.1
9
3
3
-1
.6
5
9
5
5
0
m
s
2
.0
8
6
7
0
.0
9
3
0
-7
.4
0
6
5
-4
8
.9
7
5
2
-1
2
6
.5
5
5
8
-1
3
7
.4
1
0
7
0
.1
8
7
9
0
.1
8
6
4
0
.1
8
4
5
0
.1
8
5
4
0
.1
8
6
4
-0
.7
5
3
0
7
5
m
s
2
.0
8
4
4
0
.0
8
8
8
-7
.3
0
3
3
-4
8
.7
9
1
0
-1
2
7
.4
5
2
2
-1
3
5
.4
8
4
4
0
.1
8
6
0
0
.1
8
1
8
0
.1
7
9
8
0
.1
8
0
2
0
.1
8
0
9
-0
.5
7
3
9
1
0
0
m
s
2
.0
7
7
1
0
.0
8
5
3
-7
.6
2
8
1
-4
8
.7
2
6
3
-1
2
6
.0
6
1
9
-1
3
3
.9
0
5
5
0
.1
8
4
5
0
.1
7
8
2
0
.1
7
6
0
0
.1
7
6
0
0
.1
7
6
7
-0
.3
9
3
1
1
5
0
m
s
2
.0
7
3
7
0
.0
8
1
0
-7
.7
2
5
0
-4
8
.2
5
4
4
-1
2
6
.0
1
7
5
-1
3
4
.9
2
5
4
0
.1
8
2
1
0
.1
7
2
6
0
.1
7
0
3
0
.1
6
9
6
0
.1
7
0
2
-0
.2
1
3
1
2
0
0
m
s
2
.0
7
2
4
0
.0
7
6
8
-7
.3
7
0
6
-4
8
.2
1
0
8
-1
2
3
.6
5
4
7
-1
3
4
.0
6
1
9
0
.1
8
0
3
0
.1
6
8
7
0
.1
6
6
2
0
.1
6
4
6
0
.1
6
5
3
-0
.1
9
6
7
5
0
0
m
s
2
.1
0
9
5
0
.0
6
9
5
-7
.5
5
3
6
-4
8
.2
9
8
0
-1
2
1
.5
8
3
9
-1
3
2
.6
0
1
2
0
.1
7
4
0
0
.1
5
6
6
0
.1
5
3
1
0
.1
4
9
2
0
.1
4
9
8
-0
.0
1
7
1
7
5
0
m
s
2
.1
1
2
8
0
.0
5
5
9
-7
.7
3
4
1
-4
7
.6
5
9
2
-1
2
1
.6
6
1
5
-1
3
2
.0
0
4
9
0
.1
7
1
1
0
.1
5
1
3
0
.1
4
7
5
0
.1
4
3
0
0
.1
4
3
5
0
.0
4
4
1
1
s
e
c
2
.0
9
9
4
0
.0
4
7
6
-7
.5
5
3
8
-4
7
.5
7
3
8
-1
2
2
.7
2
6
9
-1
3
0
.8
6
6
7
0
.1
6
8
7
0
.1
4
7
7
0
.1
4
3
7
0
.1
3
8
7
0
.1
3
9
2
0
.0
5
5
2
5
s
e
c
2
.0
7
8
8
0
.0
6
2
3
-7
.6
8
3
2
-4
6
.9
3
5
3
-1
2
3
.5
8
4
4
-1
2
7
.5
7
8
1
0
.1
5
5
2
0
.1
2
8
5
0
.1
2
2
9
0
.1
1
5
3
0
.1
1
5
5
0
.0
8
1
5
1
5
s
e
c
2
.0
5
2
3
0
.1
0
5
3
-7
.2
4
8
5
-4
5
.5
9
4
1
-1
2
0
.6
4
3
7
-1
2
7
.0
6
7
3
0
.1
4
5
2
0
.1
1
5
0
0
.1
0
9
3
0
.0
9
9
9
0
.1
0
0
0
0
.0
7
1
0
3
0
s
e
c
2
.0
0
9
0
0
.1
1
3
4
-6
.0
4
4
8
-4
7
.7
5
8
8
-1
1
8
.7
4
2
1
-1
2
5
.3
4
7
0
0
.1
3
8
7
0
.1
0
6
5
0
.1
0
1
1
0
.0
9
1
6
0
.0
9
1
8
0
.0
6
2
2
6
0
s
e
c
1
.9
3
8
5
0
.0
9
7
9
-5
.5
5
0
5
-4
6
.3
3
7
1
-1
1
5
.6
6
5
9
-1
3
0
.4
7
8
5
0
.1
3
1
6
0
.0
9
9
2
0
.0
9
4
3
0
.0
8
5
0
0
.0
8
5
7
0
.0
6
2
4
3
0
0
s
e
c
1
.9
2
1
4
0
.0
8
9
0
-4
.9
6
9
1
-4
2
.2
1
3
4
-1
0
1
.7
7
8
6
-1
1
7
.1
7
1
7
0
.1
2
0
3
0
.0
9
0
6
0
.0
8
7
2
0
.0
8
1
4
0
.0
8
1
3
0
.0
6
5
8
6
0
0
s
e
c
2
.0
2
0
2
0
.1
1
8
7
-6
.6
9
1
9
-4
0
.1
3
9
6
-9
2
.4
7
9
0
-1
1
6
.7
2
3
5
0
.1
1
9
1
0
.0
9
1
3
0
.0
8
8
1
0
.0
8
2
3
0
.0
8
3
4
0
.0
6
8
5
9
0
0
s
e
c
1
.8
0
7
1
0
.0
0
4
5
-6
.2
2
8
7
-3
4
.4
2
6
3
-8
7
.4
5
8
2
-1
0
3
.9
1
5
6
0
.1
1
9
6
0
.0
9
3
3
0
.0
9
0
4
0
.0
8
6
1
0
.0
8
5
4
0
.0
7
4
3
1
2
0
0
s
e
c
1
.8
0
1
7
0
.0
2
3
6
-6
.9
6
5
0
-3
8
.9
6
8
9
-9
1
.8
6
5
5
-1
0
7
.9
0
9
2
0
.1
2
0
0
0
.0
9
4
8
0
.0
9
1
9
0
.0
8
7
9
0
.0
8
5
9
0
.0
7
2
1
1
5
0
0
s
e
c
1
.7
7
7
3
0
.0
1
7
1
-6
.7
4
4
7
-4
1
.2
4
6
2
-8
3
.0
0
9
8
-1
0
2
.0
2
4
6
0
.1
2
0
2
0
.0
9
5
5
0
.0
9
2
8
0
.0
8
7
7
0
.0
8
7
3
0
.0
7
5
6
1
8
0
0
s
e
c
1
.7
5
4
5
0
.0
1
3
9
-5
.7
4
9
9
-4
3
.1
2
7
9
-8
2
.1
4
3
8
-1
0
6
.0
4
2
3
0
.1
2
0
8
0
.0
9
6
2
0
.0
9
4
0
0
.0
8
9
4
0
.0
8
8
4
0
.0
7
5
3
S˜
A
S
T
ic
k
0
.0
1
6
1
0
.0
0
5
4
0
.8
6
2
1
9
.9
0
4
7
1
8
.1
3
8
4
2
4
.0
0
4
5
0
.0
0
0
5
-0
.0
0
6
1
-0
.0
0
5
8
-0
.0
0
4
9
-0
.0
0
4
2
1
.3
7
4
9
1
m
s
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
-0
.0
1
1
6
0
.0
4
5
5
0
.0
1
7
5
-0
.0
8
3
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
2
m
s
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
5
5
6
0
.1
4
9
8
-0
.0
1
6
6
-0
.1
8
2
4
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
5
m
s
0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
7
-0
.0
9
0
1
0
.1
3
7
1
0
.0
2
4
2
-0
.6
9
2
3
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
1
0
m
s
0
.0
0
2
5
0
.0
0
1
6
-0
.1
3
3
9
0
.0
6
3
9
-0
.1
3
3
7
-1
.3
6
3
6
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
0
1
5
m
s
0
.0
0
8
2
0
.0
0
2
5
-0
.1
1
3
2
0
.3
0
5
8
-0
.1
8
0
3
-1
.8
2
2
2
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
0
0
2
0
m
s
0
.0
0
9
6
0
.0
0
3
0
-0
.1
2
2
3
0
.2
6
0
2
-0
.3
7
4
3
-2
.2
6
8
5
0
.0
0
1
1
0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
2
1
0
.0
0
2
1
0
.0
0
0
0
2
5
m
s
0
.0
1
6
5
0
.0
0
4
3
-0
.1
7
3
0
0
.3
5
9
5
-0
.4
1
1
7
-2
.4
0
6
3
0
.0
0
1
5
0
.0
0
2
9
0
.0
0
3
0
0
.0
0
3
1
0
.0
0
3
1
0
.0
0
0
0
5
0
m
s
0
.0
2
7
1
0
.0
0
9
6
-0
.2
9
5
5
0
.6
1
5
3
-0
.5
1
3
6
-3
.9
9
8
2
0
.0
0
3
4
0
.0
0
6
5
0
.0
0
6
9
0
.0
0
7
4
0
.0
0
7
5
0
.0
0
0
0
7
5
m
s
0
.0
2
9
4
0
.0
1
3
8
-0
.4
4
5
9
0
.5
2
8
3
-0
.2
9
2
9
-4
.4
4
8
5
0
.0
0
5
0
0
.0
0
9
4
0
.0
0
9
9
0
.0
1
0
9
0
.0
1
1
0
0
.0
0
0
0
1
0
0
m
s
0
.0
3
6
7
0
.0
1
7
3
-0
.1
3
9
3
-0
.2
0
1
5
-0
.4
1
9
9
-5
.0
8
9
2
0
.0
0
6
4
0
.0
1
1
7
0
.0
1
2
4
0
.0
1
3
7
0
.0
1
3
7
0
.0
0
0
0
1
5
0
m
s
0
.0
4
0
1
0
.0
2
1
2
0
.0
8
1
1
-0
.6
0
4
5
-0
.0
8
5
1
-5
.9
2
8
2
0
.0
0
8
6
0
.0
1
5
1
0
.0
1
6
0
0
.0
1
7
8
0
.0
1
7
7
0
.0
0
0
0
2
0
0
m
s
0
.0
4
1
5
0
.0
2
5
2
0
.0
7
2
9
-0
.7
4
2
4
-0
.5
6
9
0
-5
.4
9
1
7
0
.0
1
0
4
0
.0
1
7
7
0
.0
1
8
8
0
.0
2
1
1
0
.0
2
0
8
0
.0
0
0
0
5
0
0
m
s
0
.0
0
4
3
0
.0
3
0
7
0
.1
9
2
0
-0
.9
0
0
7
-1
.5
9
5
9
-6
.9
5
9
3
0
.0
1
6
8
0
.0
2
7
1
0
.0
2
8
9
0
.0
3
2
7
0
.0
3
2
0
0
.0
0
0
0
7
5
0
m
s
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
4
5
0
0
.2
8
1
5
-1
.0
4
6
1
-1
.9
1
6
6
-8
.4
5
8
4
0
.0
2
0
0
0
.0
3
1
6
0
.0
3
3
8
0
.0
3
8
1
0
.0
3
7
1
0
.0
0
0
0
1
s
e
c
0
.0
1
4
4
0
.0
5
2
7
0
.1
1
8
3
-1
.2
6
7
7
-1
.5
9
7
6
-8
.4
5
3
7
0
.0
2
2
2
0
.0
3
4
9
0
.0
3
7
1
0
.0
4
2
2
0
.0
4
0
8
0
.0
0
0
0
5
s
e
c
0
.0
3
5
1
0
.0
3
4
8
-0
.0
0
1
7
-2
.3
2
3
0
-3
.4
5
1
1
-1
3
.9
2
2
9
0
.0
3
6
7
0
.0
5
4
0
0
.0
5
7
8
0
.0
6
5
8
0
.0
6
3
5
0
.0
0
0
0
1
5
s
e
c
0
.0
6
1
5
-0
.0
0
5
3
-0
.2
5
7
4
-3
.9
9
0
0
-4
.8
7
2
9
-1
2
.0
5
1
6
0
.0
4
8
7
0
.0
6
9
2
0
.0
7
3
0
0
.0
8
1
8
0
.0
7
9
8
0
.0
0
0
0
3
0
s
e
c
0
.1
0
4
8
-0
.0
1
2
3
-1
.4
3
0
0
-4
.7
0
1
5
-7
.6
1
1
7
-1
6
.3
3
2
3
0
.0
5
6
7
0
.0
7
9
3
0
.0
8
2
6
0
.0
9
1
9
0
.0
8
9
2
0
.0
0
0
0
6
0
s
e
c
0
.1
7
5
3
0
.0
0
2
1
-1
.7
1
5
6
-5
.1
4
2
5
-1
0
.3
5
0
1
-1
5
.7
1
2
1
0
.0
6
4
5
0
.0
8
8
3
0
.0
9
1
2
0
.0
9
9
7
0
.0
9
6
6
0
.0
0
0
0
3
0
0
s
e
c
0
.1
9
2
4
0
.0
1
2
7
-2
.6
8
1
2
-9
.0
4
3
0
-2
1
.2
5
9
7
-1
9
.0
8
2
1
0
.0
7
7
4
0
.1
0
3
3
0
.1
0
4
1
0
.1
0
7
8
0
.1
0
5
1
0
.0
0
0
0
6
0
0
s
e
c
0
.0
9
3
7
-0
.0
1
7
3
-2
.0
0
7
7
-1
0
.8
8
8
3
-2
3
.0
6
1
3
-2
6
.3
7
5
1
0
.0
8
0
3
0
.1
0
4
6
0
.1
0
5
1
0
.1
0
6
7
0
.1
0
3
8
0
.0
0
0
0
9
0
0
s
e
c
0
.3
0
6
7
0
.0
9
8
2
-1
.6
5
6
9
-1
3
.4
5
2
1
-2
6
.4
3
4
7
-3
1
.6
5
3
3
0
.0
8
1
6
0
.1
0
4
0
0
.1
0
3
7
0
.1
0
5
2
0
.1
0
2
5
-0
.0
1
5
4
1
2
0
0
s
e
c
0
.3
1
2
2
0
.0
7
9
6
-1
.5
1
1
2
-1
2
.1
4
9
0
-2
5
.1
7
7
6
-3
4
.9
6
6
4
0
.0
8
1
9
0
.1
0
4
4
0
.1
0
3
8
0
.1
0
4
4
0
.1
0
2
3
-0
.0
1
3
4
1
5
0
0
s
e
c
0
.3
3
6
5
0
.0
8
7
5
-1
.7
3
2
5
-1
1
.1
0
2
3
-2
5
.0
9
1
6
-3
1
.4
3
8
2
0
.0
8
2
8
0
.1
0
4
6
0
.1
0
3
5
0
.1
0
4
3
0
.1
0
1
2
-0
.0
4
1
9
1
8
0
0
s
e
c
0
.3
5
9
3
0
.0
9
1
7
-2
.4
5
2
5
-1
0
.5
0
9
7
-2
8
.2
1
0
2
-3
4
.7
9
4
0
0
.0
8
3
7
0
.1
0
4
0
0
.1
0
2
4
0
.1
0
3
7
0
.0
9
9
8
-0
.0
9
3
7
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
d
es
cr
ib
es
th
a
t
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
a
n
d
m
ed
ia
n
o
f
a
ra
n
g
e
o
f
m
a
rk
et
li
q
u
id
it
y
sp
re
a
d
s
w
it
h
in
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
,
in
cl
u
d
in
g
b
id
-a
sk
sp
re
a
d
s
(S˜
Q
),
q
u
o
te
d
h
a
lf
-s
p
re
a
d
(S˜
Q
1
/
2
),
q
u
o
te
d
d
ep
th
(S˜
D
),
eff
ec
ti
v
e
h
a
lf
-s
p
re
a
d
(S˜
E
),
re
a
li
ze
d
sp
re
a
d
s
(S˜
R
),
a
n
d
a
d
v
er
se
se
le
ct
io
n
(S˜
A
S
).
A
ll
th
e
sp
re
a
d
s
a
re
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
b
y
th
e
v
o
lu
m
e
w
ei
g
h
te
d
a
v
er
a
g
e
(V
W
A
)
q
u
o
te
p
ri
ce
s
a
n
d
th
e
p
ri
ce
s
fo
r
o
rd
er
b
o
o
k
le
v
el
1
to
le
v
el
5
.
B
o
th
re
a
li
ze
d
sp
re
a
d
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
er
se
se
le
ct
io
n
a
re
m
ea
su
re
d
a
t
2
6
v
a
ry
in
g
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
ls
:
ti
ck
-b
y
-t
ic
k
,
1
m
s,
2
m
s,
5
m
s,
1
0
m
s,
1
5
m
s,
2
0
m
s,
2
5
m
s,
5
0
m
s,
7
5
m
s,
1
0
0
m
s,
1
5
0
m
s,
2
0
0
m
s,
5
0
0
m
s,
7
5
0
m
s,
1
se
c,
5
se
c,
1
5
se
c,
3
0
se
c,
6
0
se
c,
3
0
0
se
c,
6
0
0
se
c,
9
0
0
se
c,
1
,2
0
0
se
c,
1
,5
0
0
se
c,
a
n
d
1
,8
0
0
se
c.
E
x
ce
p
t
fo
r
th
e
q
u
o
te
s
d
ep
th
,
a
ll
sp
re
a
d
s
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
b
a
si
s
p
o
in
t
(b
p
s)
.
L
iq
u
id
it
y
sp
re
a
d
s
fo
r
o
th
er
te
n
o
r
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s,
su
ch
a
s
3
0
d
a
y
s
to
m
a
tu
ri
ty
a
n
d
1
,8
0
0
d
a
y
s
to
m
a
tu
ri
ty
,
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
in
th
e
o
n
li
n
e
a
p
p
en
d
ix
.
224
tion prices are near the mid price. Figure 5.8 depicts the changes in the median
of the volume weighted average realized spreads and adverse selection at varying
time-horizon. The median of realized spread (blue dashed line) displays a de-
creased tendency, and the median of adverse selection (red dashed line) increases
monotonously from the short-horizon to long-term timescale. When the time in-
terval is below 25 milliseconds, both the realized spreads and adverse selection
keep steady. Once the timescale passes 25 ms, the median of volume-weighted
average realized spreads drops from 0.1879 bps at 50 ms to 0.1196 bps at 900
seconds (see Table 5.6). The median of adverse selection rises from 0.0034 bps at
50 ms to 0.0816 bps at 900 seconds. Both realized spreads and adverse selection
become stable after the timescales are above 5 minutes or 10 minutes.
After measuring the diverse market liquidity spreads, I also compare the spreads
autocorrelation with different order distance. The autocorrelation of spreads can
reflect the spread changes over different timescales, and the spreads are calculated
by the quote price and transaction price. This means that the spread autocor-
relation also can reflect the efficiency of the price incorporating the available
information in the market. Table 5.7 to Table 5.9 illustrate the first-order, fifth-
order, and tenth-order autocorrelations of bid-ask spreads, quoted half spread,
quoted depth, effective half spreads, realized spreads at 26 time intervals and
adverse selection at 26 time intervals.
Both the average and median of the first-order autocorrelation of the bid-ask
spread, quoted half spread, quoted depth, and effective half spread are highly
positively correlated above 0.6 at tick level, while the fifth-order and tenth-order
autocorrelations of these four spreads are much lower, especially the tenth-order
autocorrelations are all below 0.5. The larger positive spreads autocorrelations
reflect the previous spread at certain timescale increasingly affects the current
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spreads, or the previous spreads is above the average level, the current spreads
are more likely to be above the average. In other words, the higher spreads
autocorrelation indicates the ability of price absorbing the available information
is low.
The three plots in the first row of Figure 5.9 also describe the volume-weighted
average of bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, and effective spread autocorrelations
by the contract maturity dates. I find the consistent evidence that the fifth-
order and tenth-order autocorrelations are below the first-order at tick level, and
the autocorrelations rise when the contracts approach the maturity date. Since
the date to maturity is less than around 500 days, the volume-weighted average
of bid-ask spread autocorrelations at all three different lag distance are highly
positive correlated and more than 0.8. In Table 5.7, the first-order bid-ask spreads
autocorrelations increase from level one with 0.7749 to level four with 0.6163, and
then drop to 0.5353 in level five. In Table 5.8, the most efficient bid-ask spreads
adjustment is the median tenth-order autocorrelation with 0.1116 in level one.
The other three spreads autocorrelation also follow this pattern.
I also compare the realized spread autocorrelation and adverse selection auto-
correlations with three different order distances in Table 5.7 to Table 5.9. Both
the first-order realized spread and adverse selection autocorrelations have an in-
creasing tendency from the tick-by-tick timescale to 1,800 seconds. For each level
autocorrelations, both spreads autocorrelations rise from level one to level four
and decline in level five. The median autocorrelations of both realized spread
and adverse selection at the tick-by-tick level are much lower than other time
intervals, which indicates the adjustment of spreads and the incorporation of in-
formation are much efficient at tick level. One point to note is that the median of
tick-by-tick adverse selection autocorrelation for each level is negatively small or
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around zero, which implies that the previous adverse selection is less correlated
or uncorrelated with the future adverse selection. In other words, the speed of
price adjustment to absorb information is at tick level.
The second and third rows of Figure 5.9 display the volume-weighted average
of realized spreads and adverse selection autocorrelation by the contract matu-
rity dates at three orders. Here I select three time-interval (tick-by-tick, 200
milliseconds, and one minute); the autocorrelation with other timescales can be
found in the online appendix. The first-order autocorrelations are higher than
the autocorrelations in the other two. This means the better spread adjustment
over time is the longer order distance. Furthermore, the realized spreads and
adverse selection autocorrelations are higher approaching the maturity dates (see
Figure 5.9). When the contract is close to maturity, the more active traders and
more information are in the Eurodollar market. The adjustments of spreads are
becoming less sensitive in the face of increasing of available information in the
market, which could be the reason for the increasing spread autocorrelation.
To capture how and in what manner the six factors affect each other, I also pro-
vide the measurements of the impulse response functions for the trade return,
signed trade direction indicator, signed trade volume, signed square root of trade
volume, signed ask-side market concentration ratio, and the signed bid-side mar-
ket concentration ratio respectively (see Figure 5.10 to Figure 5.11). I run the
first-order vector autoregression model with 1,000 steps on tick-by-tick basis data
for the full sample across 10-year life cycle of Eurodollar contract with 177.5442
million observations. Additionally, I also report the impulse response for the days
to maturity within the first year (43.5116 million observations), days to maturity
within the third year (42.5787 million observations), and days to maturity within
the fifth year (10.4092 million observations), denoted as one-year tenor with the
227
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red line, three-year tenor with the blue line, and five-year tenor with the black
line in the Figure 5.11. Moreover, I implement the 95% confident intervals for
the impulse response via i.i.d. bootstrap with 99 resamples. The dotted lines
with corresponding colors are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds for the
impulse response functions.
Here I will not report all of the impulse response plots in this chapter, but se-
lect the trade returns impulse responses. To a certain degree, the adjustment of
trade return directly reflects the price discovery and the market efficiency. How-
ever, the impulse responses of a signed trade direction indicator, signed trade
volume, signed square root of trade volume, signed bid-side and ask-side market
concentration ratio are available in the online appendix.
Figure 5.10 plots the impulse response of trade return to all six factors for the
full sample period. Subplot (a) provides a benchmark adjustment because it
is the impulse response function in trade return to shocks to itself. The results
indicate that trade return has an effect on itself before 200 milliseconds in the full
sample. As the benchmark of the response of the trade return, the effect initially
is negative below 35 ms. This means around 35 ms if a one standard deviation of
shock is given to the trade return, it will decrease 0.37 units. Between 35 ms and
55 ms, the response in trade return becomes a positive shift to a shock to itself.
When a one standard deviation shock is given to the trade return, the largest
positive impact occurs at 40 ms as the benchmark of the response of trade return.
Additionally, 40 milliseconds appears also to be a critical point for the trade return
adjustment to the shock in signed trade direction indicators for the full sample
dataset (see Figure 5.10 Subplot (b)). One unit standard deviation shock from
the trade direction indicator will cause 0.12 standard deviation units negatively
impacts on trade return around 20 ms, which is smaller than the reaction of
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Figure 5.10: Response of Trade Return (Full Sample)
Notes: This figure portrays the impulse response of trade returns to the shocks in the trade
return, signed trade direction, signed trade volume, signed square root of trade volume, and
signed asks and bids market concentration ratio for the full sample dataset across the 10-year
life cycle of 40 Eurodollar contracts. The impulse response functions are conducted with the
first-order vector autoregression with 1,000 steps on the tick-by-tick basis data, and there are
approximately 178 million observations in total. The black line represents the impulse response
of trade return to the shocks in each variables, and the dotted line are the 95% lower and upper
confidence bounds of the impulse response functions via i.i.d bootstrap with 99 resampling
bootstrap procedure.
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trade return to itself. The effect of trade return dramatically rises to the top at
40 milliseconds with positive impacts from the trader direction indicator on trade
return. After a half second, signed trade direction indicators do not impact on
trade return.
In Figure 5.10 Subplots (c) and (d), the signed trade volume and the signed square
root of trade volume affect the trade return in a very short timeframe. The trade
return increases with a shock to the signed trade volume at the beginning, with
one order of magnitude smaller than the response of the trade return to its own
shock. Specifically, the signed trade volume starts affecting trade return around
20 ms with 0.01 units positive influence on return (see Figure 5.10 Subplot (c)).
From 50 ms to 110 ms, a one standard deviation shock to trade volume results
in instant negative shifts in trade return. The lowest point is around 80ms with
negatively 0.007 units impacts on trade return. The effects of the shock from trade
volume positively increase after 110 milliseconds, and reach a peak around 200 ms
with a 0.025 units increase of the trade return. Once it passes 700 milliseconds,
trades volume has no impacts on the trade return. In Figure 5.10 Subplot (d),
the shock to the square root of trade volume starts to have adverse effects on
trade return from 20 ms to 370 ms. One standard deviation shock to the square
root of trade volume results in -0.043 standard deviation units shifts in the trade
return at 40 milliseconds. When it comes to 200 milliseconds, the negative effects
on trade return reach to -0.049. After 700 milliseconds, the square root of trade
volume is not affecting the trade return anymore.
Both signed ask-side and bid-side market concentration ratios also have influ-
ences on the trade return (see Figure 5.10 Subplot (e) and (f)). In Figure 5.10
Subplot (e), the effect of the shock to signed ask-side market concentration starts
around 20 milliseconds with negatively 0.115 units impacts in the trade return.
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Between 80 ms and 300 ms, a one standard deviation of shock to the ask-side
market concentration results in the positive increase of the trade return, with the
highest response of trade return about 0.07 at 150 milliseconds. Once it passes
600 milliseconds, the ask-side market concentration shows no instant impacts on
the trade return. For the response of trade return from the bid-side market con-
centration, it begins with a 0.15 increase in the trade return at 20 milliseconds
(see Figure 5.10 Subplot (f)). The trade return decreases with a shock to the
signed bid-side market concentration ratio from 120 milliseconds, and reaches
the bottom with -0.021 standard deviation units shift at 170 milliseconds. Af-
ter 500 milliseconds, the signed bid-side market concentration stops affecting the
trade return.
To interpret the influence of the days to maturity date on the response of trade
returns, Figure 5.11 presents the impulse response functions of trade return to
six factors with one-year tenor, three-year tenor, and five-year tenor Eurodollar
contracts. In Figure 5.11 Subplot (a), the three-year tenor contract with blue
line is the earliest one reacting to the shift from trade return, starting from -0.36
at ten milliseconds, crossing the zero line at 21 milliseconds and reaching the top
with 0.15 at 27 milliseconds. The one-year to maturity subsample with the red
line, however, shows the highest response of trade return with the -0.52 around 23
milliseconds and the 0.29 around 46 milliseconds. This suggests that if the trade
return will increase one unit standard deviation, it will decrease 0.52 standard
deviation units after 23 ms and will increase 0.29 units after 46 milliseconds. The
black line indicates that the Eurodollar contracts within the five-year to maturity
has slower speed and lower response of trade return to itself, compared with the
response of trade return with one-year and three-year tenors. Hence, Figure 5.11
Subplot (a) implies that trade return within one year to maturity period has the
largest impact on itself, but the fastest trade return adjustment is within the
235
Milliseconds
102 103 104
Im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se
s
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Resp. of TR to TR
1-year Tenor
3-year Tenor
5-year Tenor
(a) Response of Trade Return to Trade Return
Milliseconds
102 103 104
Im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se
s
-0.2
-0.18
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
Resp. of TR to DI
1-year Tenor
3-year Tenor
5-year Tenor
(b) Response of Trade Return to Trade Direction
Milliseconds
102 103 104
Im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se
s
-0.035
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Resp. of TR to TV
1-year Tenor
3-year Tenor
5-year Tenor
(c) Response of Trade Return to Trade Volume
Milliseconds
102 103 104
Im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se
s
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Resp. of TR to sqrtTV
1-year Tenor
3-year Tenor
5-year Tenor
(d) Response of Trade Return to Square Root Trade
Volume
Milliseconds
102 103 104
Im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se
s
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
Resp. of TR to AskMrkCon
1-year Tenor
3-year Tenor
5-year Tenor
(e) Response of Trade Return to Asks Market Concen-
tration
Milliseconds
102 103 104
Im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se
s
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
Resp. of TR to BidMrkCon
1-year Tenor
3-year Tenor
5-year Tenor
(f) Response of Trade Return to Bids Market Concen-
tration
Figure 5.11: Response of Trade Return (First-year, Third-year and Fifth-year Tenor)
Notes: This figure portrays the impulse response of trade returns to the shocks in the trade
return, signed trade direction, signed trade volume, signed square root of trade volume, and
signed asks and bids market concentration for the three subsamples with one-year tenor, three-
year tenor, and five-year tenor of 40 Eurodollar contracts. The impulse response functions are
conducted with the first-order vector autoregression with 1,000 steps on the tick-by-tick basis
data. The red line represents the response of trade return of one-year tenor subsample with
around 43.5 million observations, the blue line is the three- year tenor impulse response of
trade return with 42.5 million observations, and the black line is the five-year tenor impulse
response of trade return with 10.4 million observations. The dotted lines with corresponding
colours are the 95% lower and upper confidence bounds of the impulse response functions via
i.i.d bootstrap with 99 resampling bootstrap procedure.
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three-year to maturity time-window.
Subplot (b) of Figure 5.11 illustrates the impulse response of trade return to a
unit shock in the trade direction indicator with the one-year, three- year, and five-
year to maturity. Trade return appears to respond negatively to trade direction
indicator for all three different datasets. The shock in the trade direction indi-
cator starts affecting the trade return from 23 milliseconds with -0.18 standard
deviation units shift for the one-year to maturity group. The negative response
of trade return decreases and drops back to zero at two seconds. The speed of
trade return adjustment in the three-year tenor is faster than others, with the
shortest reaction time ten milliseconds with -0.2. This suggests a one standard
deviation of trade direction will cause the trade return to decrease 0.2 units with
ten milliseconds adjustment timeframe. For the five-year to maturity dataset,
the response of trade return to trade direction indicators begins at 85 millisec-
onds. The trade direction stops influencing trade return for both the three-year
and five-year tenor datasets, once the adjustment timeframe is longer than one
second.
Figure 5.11 Subplots (c) and (d) present the responses of trade return to the
signed trade volume and the signed square root of trade volume in three differ-
ent subsamples. The largest effects from the trade volume to trade return are
the -0.038 at ten milliseconds for the three-year tenor contracts, -0.027 at 23
milliseconds for one-year tenor contracts and -0.037 at 85 milliseconds for the
five-year tenor contracts (see Figure 5.11 Subplot (c)). Three lines, represented
as three different tenor contracts, converge together to zero around 900 millisec-
onds, which implies that the trade volume has no impacts on trade return after
900 milliseconds. In Figure 5.11 Subplot (d), the largest response of trade return
in facing the shock from the square root of trade volume is in the five-year tenor
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contract dataset with a 0.125 units increase on trade return around 85 millisec-
onds. For the one-year tenor contracts, a one standard deviation shock to the
square root of trade volume results in a 0.091 units increasing shift of trade return
at 23 milliseconds. Furthermore, the response of trade return in the third-year
tenor group has a 0.115 positively shift around ten milliseconds from the shock to
the square root of trade volume. Similarly with Subplot (c), the response of trade
return to the square root of trade volume seems to stop after 900 milliseconds.
Additionally, ask and bid market concentrations also have the instant impacts on
the trade returns in three subsamples (see Figure 5.11 Subplots (e) and (f)). At
80 milliseconds, one standard deviation of shock in the ask-side market concen-
tration will cause the one-year tenor trade return increasing by 0.0385 standard
deviation units. For the three-year to maturity contracts, if the ask-side mar-
ket concentration rises one unit, trade return will increase by 0.038 units at 160
milliseconds as the largest response to trade return. The ask-side market con-
centration in the five-year to maturity contracts has positive effects from 85 ms
to 100 ms, and drops to the bottom with -0.0025 around 400 milliseconds. The
impacts from the bid-side market concentration on the trade return are lower
than the impacts from the ask-side (see Figure 5.11 Subplots (f)). The highest
response of trade return is in the one-year to maturity contracts with 0.021 stan-
dard deviation units shift at 350 milliseconds. For the three-year tenor contracts,
one standard deviation shock in the bid-side market concentration leads to the
trade return increasing by 0.017 standard deviation units around 250 millisec-
onds. However, the bid-side market concentration has negative impacts on the
trade return for five-year tenor contracts between 85 milliseconds and 1.75 sec-
onds. Compared with the response in one-year and three-year tenor contracts,
the response of trade return to both-side market concentrations in the five-year
tenor have much tighter 95% confidence intervals with more significant impulse
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response results.
It is apparent from the results that all the six factors have statistically significant
effects on the trade return; however the direction and dynamics vary. For the
whole cross section of 10-year to overnight Eurodollar tenors, the largest trade
return shift is triggered by the shock in itself around ten milliseconds, with 0.35
standard deviation units decreasing of trade return. Moreover, the fastest ad-
justment of trade return is also from the shock of itself. The whole adjustments
are finished within 200 milliseconds timeframe. The slowest trade returns adjust-
ments are within 700 milliseconds, which are the responses of trade return to the
shock in both the trade volume and the square root of trade volume. This suggests
the price discovery process is very fast and instant, and is likely to finish within
one second. Furthermore, there is strong evidence of the critical turning points
in the response of trade returns to the shocks in diverse market indicators. To
capture a wide variety of the Eurodollar future market properties, I also measure
the impulse responses functions of all six factors for three different tenor Eurodol-
lar contracts. The results are consistent and complement the 10-year contracts
life-cycle. It is worth noting that the shocks in the trade direction indicators
result in negative direction adjustment in the trade return for all three different
tenor contracts. Except for the trade direction indicators, other five factors show
the existence of turning points for the trade return adjustment. Moreover, the
one-year tenor contract has the greatest response, absolute magnitude, in trade
return, and the three-year tenor contracts are the earliest one affecting the trade
return.
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5.4.3 Regression Interpretation and Robustness Checks
To provide a complementary understanding of the price discovery, this chapter
considers the maturity effects as an important factor for the efficiency of price
adjustments in the future market. Some prior literature has found it is a chal-
lenge to find the maturity effects on the future market, such as Bessembinder
et al. [1996] and Kalev and Duong [2008]. However, my empirical evidence sup-
ports Samuelson’s maturity effect theory [Samuelson, 1965] and even suggests
that maturity effects do impact the price efficiency in Eurodollar future market.
To investigate the effectiveness of price discovery can be affected by the time to
maturity, I utilize a multivariate linear regression to verify the maturity effects
on the price discovery and market quality.
The abundance of data allows for a large number of seemingly unrelated regres-
sion to be estimated. The regression includes 319 dependent variables, mainly
from price discovery factors and market quality factors. The independent vari-
ables cover the days to maturity (T˜ ), the inverse of transaction prices (p−1), and
the daily volatility (V). In all cases, robust standard errors are utilized. All vari-
ables are daily volume weighted average with 32,712 days across all 40 contracts.
Besides, I also provide the estimations on three different subsamples based on
the days before settlement dates, namely one year to maturity group (T˜ smaller
than one year), three years to maturity group (T˜ smaller than three years), and
five years to maturity group (T˜ smaller than five years). I report the coefficient
estimates of the days to maturity in Table 5.10 to Table 5.12, other estimations
and statistics are available in the online appendix.
Table 5.10 reports the coefficients of the days to maturity on the market activities
indicators (the number of trades and quotes, the quote-to-trade ratio) and the
240
Table 5.10: Market Activities and Price Efficiency Regression Results
Full Sample 1-Year Tenor 3-Year Tenor 5-Year Tenor
Panel A: Market Activities
Number of quotes (nq) 0.3325*** 0.5795*** 0.5335*** 0.4753***
Number of trades (n) -0.2010*** 0.2102*** 0.1374*** 0.0612***
Quote-to-trade ratio (Q) 0.5335*** 0.3693*** 0.3961*** 0.4141***
Panel B: Quotes Price Autocorrelations (ΩP )
First-order
Ask -0.0164*** -0.0006 -0.0029*** 0
Bid -0.0259*** -0.0015** -0.0032*** -0.0045***
Mid -0.0222*** -0.001 -0.0024*** -0.0019**
Fifth-order
Ask -0.0477*** -0.0029* -0.0091*** -0.0035**
Bid -0.0593*** -0.0043** -0.0095*** -0.0104***
Mid -0.0554*** -0.0037** -0.0091*** -0.0069***
Tenth-order
Ask -0.0652*** -0.0038* -0.0123*** -0.0058***
Bid -0.0765*** -0.0051** -0.0132*** -0.0137***
Mid -0.0731*** -0.0045** -0.0130*** -0.0101***
Panel C: Pricing Error (E)
Pricing error (E)
Lag 1 0.0521*** 0.1631*** 0.0202 -0.0755***
Lag 2 0.1530*** 0.2403*** 0.0594 -0.0653**
Lag 3 0.2220*** 0.2127*** 0.0880** -0.0202
Lag 4 0.1866*** 0.1953*** 0.0665* -0.0447
Lag 5 0.1404*** 0.0219 -0.0402 -0.1188***
* p<0.1; ** p¡0.05; *** p<0.01
Notes: This table describes the coefficients of the days to maturity (T˜ ) on a set of market
activities indicators and price discovery factors for the 10-year full sample period, one year
tenor group (T˜ smaller than one year), three years tenor group (T˜ smaller than three years),
and five years tenor group (T˜ smaller than five years). I utilize the following multivariate
linear regression model to verify the maturity effects on the price discovery and market quality,
Y˜ = c+T˜+p−1+V, where explanatory variables include the days to maturity (T˜ ), the inverse
of transaction prices (p−1), and the daily volatility (V) is the highest daily transaction price
subtracting the lowest daily transaction price. Dependent variables in the Panel A includes
the number of quotes and trades (nq and n) and the quotes to trades ratio Q. Dependent
variables in the Panel B are the first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order autocorrelations (ΩP )
of the volume weighted average bid, ask, and mid-quote price at tick-by-tick level. Dependent
variables in the Panel C are the pricing errors (E) measured by the lag one to lag five vector
autoregression models. It is worth noting that trades number, quotes number, pricing errors,
the inverse of price, the days to maturity and the quotes to trades ratio take the logarithm
value. All variables are the daily volume-weighted average results across five level order book
data, with 32,712 observations in the 10-year full sample, 4,683 daily observations in the one
year group, 15,009 daily observations in the three years group, and 25,481 daily observations
in the five years group across 40 Eurodollar contracts. The asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance of the coefficients of days to maturity. This table only
reports the coefficient estimates of the days to maturity, other estimations and statistics are
available in the online appendix.
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price discovery factors (pricing errors and the autocorrelations of the volume
weighted bids, asks, and mid quotes). Panel A suggests the intensity of quote
submission increases since the contract approaches the maturity date. From year
five to year one, the coefficient estimates of quote submission rise from 0.4753 to
0.5795, while the full sample coefficient is only 0.3325, suggesting that, after year
five, the Eurodollar market is less active. It is worth noting that the coefficient
of the trade number in the full sample group is significantly negative related to
the time to maturity; however, it is positively decreasing from year one group
to year five group. Combined with the decreasing tendency of the quote-to-
trade ratio from 0.4141 at year five group to 0.3693 in year one, I conclude
that when the contract moves to its settlement date, the quotes heavily grow,
but, instead of increasing the number of transactions, traders are more likely
to increase their trading volumes dramatically. Table 5.10 Panel B illustrates
an inverse relation between the distance to maturity and the volume weighted
quotes autocorrelations. The closer to maturity, the larger number of quotes
submitted to the limit order book. Hence, both bid-side and ask-side prices are
highly autocorrelated near maturity.
To assess the maturity effects on the price discovery process in the Eurodollar
market, I follow the Hasbrouck [1993] vector autoregression method to calculate
the daily pricing error for each contract, and measure the mid-price return au-
tocorrelations using Hendershott and Jones [2005] (see Table 5.10 Panel C and
Table 5.11). The results suggest that the distance to maturity date has positively
significant effects on the pricing error. The coefficient of maturity date in lag
one pricing error is 0.0521, and the highest coefficient is in lag three groups with
0.2220. However, there are also negative coefficients at five years to maturity
subsample. The estimation indicates that the pricing error will increase when
the contract approaches its maturity. In the lag-one pricing error group, the
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coefficient estimates rise from -0.0755 in five years to maturity group to 0.1631
in one year to maturity group. Similar changes can also be found in other lags
pricing error estimation. Because the pricing error reflects the deviation of the
trade prices from the efficient prices, my results demonstrate that since the future
contracts approach maturity, the transaction prices are less sensitive absorbing
available information in the market and are farther away from the actual value
of the contract. Because of the extremely active trading near the maturity, the
amount of information and inside trading also increases, which could add the
difficulty of incorporating information and efficiently adjust the prices.
In Table 5.11, I report the coefficient of maturity date on the first-order, fifth-
order, and tenth-order volume weighted mid-price return autocorrelations at 26
time intervals from tick level to half hour, respectively. In an efficient market,
the level of return autocorrelation should be tending to zero, so the reason Table
5.11 is interesting it tells you that what timescale you are looking at an efficient
market, and what timescale you are looking at a non-efficient market.
The coefficient of the days to maturity with the first-order, fifth-order and tenth-
order return autocorrelations all peak around 1ms and decrease to 1800 seconds.
Specifically, the coefficient of the days to maturity with the first-order return
autocorrelation is 0.0104 at tick level and reaches the peak with 0.0966 at 1 ms.
This suggests that the distance to maturity has the largest impacts when the
first-order mid-quote return autocorrelation is measured at 1 ms time intervals.
Once the timescale is longer than 1 ms, the coefficient starts to decline from
0.0712 at 2ms to -0.0296 at 30 minutes. When the timescale is longer than 750
ms, the coefficients of the days to maturity are below zero, which implies that
the days to maturity has negative effects on the price efficiency.
For each subsample, the finding indicates that the first-order return autocorrela-
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tion at tick level increases from 0.01 at one year to maturity sample to 0.0188 at
three years to maturity sample, and then has a slight drop to 0.0177 at five years
to maturity subsample. Both fifth-order and tenth-order return autocorrelation
also show the similar trends. In other words, the mid-quote return autocorrela-
tions of three-year tenor contracts are more sensible in terms of the changes of
the days to maturity. Table 5.11 also provides the estimations of the impacts
of maturity date on the fifth-order and tenth-order mid-price return autocorre-
lation. Consistent with the first-order return autocorrelation, the time interval
of one second is the turning point. Below one second, the days to maturity has
a positive effect on return autocorrelations; longer than one second, the relation
inverse to negative. Overall, the mid-quote return autocorrelation has its period-
icity and is significantly related to the days to maturity, which also demonstrates
the maturity effects do impact on the price efficiency in the Eurodollar future
market.
Since trading activity increases dramatically near the maturity date, I expect
that the time to maturity (tenor) would have an effect on the trading costs via
the market liquidity spreads (see Hendershott et al., 2011). Table 5.12 displays
the estimation results of liquidity spreads. The spreads are measured as the daily
volume weighted average in basis point, except that the quoted depth is taking
the logarithm value. The days to maturity has negative effects on the bid-ask
spread for the full sample. However, the coefficient of maturity days on bid-
ask spread is 15.6391 for the one year subsample. This means that, when the
days are closer to maturity, the bid-ask spread is much tighter suggesting better
liquidity in the market for the one year subsample. The coefficient estimations
are all negative for the other two subsamples. The coefficient of days to maturity
on quoted depth, -0.5663, indicates that the quoted depth becomes deeper as
the contract approaches the maturity date, which enhances the ability to absorb
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large orders without impacting the prices.
It is worth noting that the one-year tenor coefficient estimations are all signif-
icantly positive for both effective spread and realized spread at different time
intervals. This also indicates that the actual transaction prices are much closer
to the mid-point price with more liquidity in the market when the contract ap-
proaches the maturity date. The tick-by-tick realized spread is the most affected
by the days to maturity in year one group, with an increase of 0.2308 in basis
points (see Table 5.12). Although the estimation of days to maturity is significant
for the adverse selection at different timescales for the full sample, the regression
results for three subsamples illustrate that the distance to maturity and adverse
selection have a close relation. Except for the tick-by-tick adverse selection with
-0.0121, others all show positively related to the days to maturity in the one-year
to maturity subsample. This finding is consistent with the closer to maturity,
the higher liquidity in the market. For the three-year to maturity and five-year
to maturity subsamples, the coefficients are positive from tick level to 15 seconds
time intervals, and turn to a negative relation if the time intervals are longer than
one minute.
To evaluate the maturity effects on the adjustment of liquidity spreads, Table 5.13
also reports the estimation between spread autocorrelation at first-order, fifth-
order, and tenth-order with the days to maturity. The days to maturity has
negative impacts on the autocorrelation of both the bid-ask spread and quoted
half spread, with the coefficients as -0.0515 in first-order, -0.0923 in fifth-order,
-0.1080 in tenth-order. This means that the bid-ask spreads and quoted half
spreads are increasingly autocorrelated when the contract moves to its maturity
date. The price adjustment in facing the new information is likely to be less
sensitive to lower price efficiency. Similarly, the negative coefficients for the auto-
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correlations of quoted depth, effective spreads and realized spreads of the whole
sample indicates that, the closer to the maturity date, the higher the autocorrela-
tion of these three spreads. The higher absolute value of the coefficients indicates
a larger influence of the maturity effects within one year to maturity sample in
the first-order autocorrelations. Except for the tick level, the coefficients on the
first-order and fifth-order adverse selection autocorrelations are positive for the
whole sample when the time intervals are less than one second. The adverse se-
lection is less dependent on the previous one when it closes to maturity. However,
the coefficient becomes negative as the time intervals are longer than one second.
Above the one-second timescale, the first-order and fifth-order adverse selection
autocorrelations increase when it moves to the settlement date.
5.5 Chapter Summary
I have provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of the high-frequency price
discovery mechanism, the high-frequency trading performance and the maturity
effects on market quality and price efficiency using a population study of the
Eurodollar futures contracts. My dataset covers the entire market depth data and
transactions from 2008 to 2014 at tick-by-tick level with millisecond timestamps,
which contains every trade and every message update in the limited order-book,
the whole dataset includes 2.63 billion quotes observations and 263.54 million
trades observations. I believe that such a study on the high-frequency price
discovery and market performance has never been attempted before.
To capture the efficiency of price incorporating information, I measure a broad
range of first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order mid-quoted prices and return au-
tocorrelations with varying time intervals. Because I match the timestamps for
249
the mid-quoted return with the actual transaction, the results of return autocorre-
lations are much lower and more appropriate than the mid-price autocorrelations.
The evidence implies that the mid-quoted return autocorrelations gradually in-
crease from the shortest time interval to the longest time interval. Except for
the tick-by-tick mid-quoted return autocorrelation, the other returns autocorre-
lations are all positive. The higher order of return autocorrelations is, the smaller
return autocorrelations with the better price efficiency is. The first-order auto-
correlations of volume weighted average returns are below 0.5 as the time interval
shorter than 15 milliseconds. The shorter time interval is, the higher efficiency
of price adjustment is.
Furthermore, this study also illustrates the use of my new volume weighted av-
erage trade classification algorithm that replaces the Lee-Ready algorithm to
measure the trade direction within very short time intervals across the complete
limit order book. As a contribution to this study, this new empirical technique
has been employed to calculate a range of market liquidity spreads and spread
autocorrelations. Moreover, the new trade direction indicator also contributes to
the calculation of short-term pricing errors.
Following Hasbrouck [1991a,b, 1993] microstructure theory, the price can be de-
composed into two parts: the long-term efficient price and the short-term pricing
error. This chapter proxies the pricing error using the VAR model and adds both
the bid-side and ask-side market concentration as variables. The impulse response
of trade returns indicates that all the variables have the ability to influence the
trade return at short time intervals. The largest response to trade return is from
the shock to itself from the perspective of whole ten years contract life-cycle, fol-
lowed by the response of trade return to the shock in the signed bid-side market
concentration and the trade direction. Alternatively, the fastest adjustment of
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trade return is also to itself, and finishes the whole adjustment process within 200
milliseconds. The evidence also suggests that there are critical turning points in
the response of trade returns to the shocks among varying market indicators.
To provide a complementary understanding of the price discovery, I also assess
the maturity effects on price efficiency and market quality in the Eurodollar
future market. Overall, the days to maturity has a positive relation with the
pricing errors, which indicates that the closer to maturity, the farther the distance
between the actual transaction price and the efficient price. In other words, as the
Eurodollar future approaches its maturity, the trade prices are less sensitive when
incorporating available information in the market. This could be caused by the
extremely actively traded Eurodollar contract accompanied by large amounts of
information and inside trading activities. For the maturity effects with the mid-
price return autocorrelations, the linear regression coefficients also demonstrate
the days to maturity periodicity and significantly affect the price efficiency in
the Eurodollar future market. More specifically, the distance to maturity has the
largest impacts when the mid-quote return autocorrelation is measured at 1 ms
time intervals.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis provides an extensive analysis of the microstructure of the Eurodollar
future market and the impacts of high-frequency algorithmic trading activities on
the quality of this market. As a hot topic, a large-scale studies have some mixed
commentary on the impacts of HFT on financial markets characteristics. Recent
work by Kyle and Obizhaeva [2013] and Foucault et al. [2015] present theoretical
frameworks against HFT, and indicate that HFT simply through the faster access
speed to benefit and brings negative effects to other traders. Hasbrouck [2014],
Chakrabarty et al. [2014] and Kirilenko et al. [2014] demonstrate empirically that
HFT increases the price volatility, trading costs, and damage the capacity of price
discovery and the market liquidity. However, Hendershott et al. [2011], Riordan
and Storkenmaier [2012] and Chaboud et al. [2014] comment on that HFT, as the
liquidity provider, improve the information processing capacity of the financial
markets and benefits the market efficiency and quality.
A three-month delivery Eurodollar future is a Libor-referenced contract with
a unique IMM date. To understand the full picture of the microstructure of
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Eurodollar future market, I analyze its limit order book with a population study
of this future market. The data includes the entire limit order book from Jan
2008 to July 2014, and the inside quotes and transaction from Jan 1996 to July
2014. All data are gathered at tick-level with milliseconds timestamps. The
thesis addresses the relation between HFT and the market characteristics, so the
first step is to identify the market characteristics and to proxy the HFT, as I do
not have the HFT identification or traders ID in my dataset. The next step is to
develop a novel empirical methodology to capture the non-linear relation between
the impact of the fraction of algorithmic trading and a large set of different market
quality indicators. Last but not least, I measure the efficiency of price formation
process on interest rate futures and the trading mechanism.
6.1 Concluding Remarks
Notes on Chapter 2
Chapter 2 analyzes the microstructure of the quotes volatility in the Eurodollar
futures market, and the impact of high-frequency quoting on millisecond timescale
volatility. The volatility is one of the core components of the market quality.
Following the recently developed approach of Hasbrouck [2014], I adopt a Haar
wavelet multi-resolution approach, a signal processing technique, to decompose
an original price signal into a high-frequency domain and a low-frequency domain.
Therefore, I can extract the volatility scaling (variance and covariance ratios) of
the order flow over days at different timescales. The variance ratio, the price
variation between high-frequency timescale and daily-level timescale, could be an
indicator of high-frequency microstructure noise; the covariance ratio indicates
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that the agreement between bid prices and ask prices. This chapter employs
every inside-quote update (best bids and best asks) and tick-level transactions
data between the beginning of 1996 and the end of 2013.
The findings in this chapter suggest, unlike the equity market, the variance ratio
varies considerably with maturity. For the furthest tenors in the Eurodollar
term structure, there is little trading activities, unlike the equity market, and
the variance ratios of the inside quotes are well behaved and approach unity.
However, both the trading activity and variance ratio increase substantially as
the contracts approach maturity, especially two-year and one-year tenor contracts.
This illustrates the high-frequency microstructure noise inside the bid-ask quoting
prices which could cause the higher quotes variance at high frequency time-scales.
The quoting volatility substantially declines as the contract approaches maturity
(one or two weeks before its maturity date). Furthermore, this chapter illustrates
the existence of high variance scaling and low covariance ratio at short timescales
(millisecond level), which suggests the existence of high-frequency microstructure
noises and the disagreement between ask and bid side at highest frequency in this
market.
In short, as a Eurodollar future contract approaching its maturity, the quote prices
become more volatile, and the high frequency trading increases the microstructure
noises into the price volatility. My findings provide empirical evidence to support
that the high-frequency trading activities do have effects on the maturity effects
of this type future market, especially for the two to one year tenor Eurodollar
contracts. It also points out that HFT shifts trading behavior since the Eurodollar
contract passes its maturity. The identification of this critical time, maybe help
to those seeking to avoid direct trading against HFTs.
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Notes on Chapter 3
Chapter 3 provides a standard asymmetric information based theoretical model
to predict the relation on the term structure of Eurodollar future contracts. The
main theoretical prediction is a non-linear relation between the saturation of AT
versus the impacts on the quality of the market. This chapter also covers a broad
battery of liquidity provision measurements and provides the measurements for
the high frequency algorithmic trading based on the quotes messages updating
speed. To proxy the fraction of high-frequency algorithmic trading, it requires to
have every quoting update in the market, hence, the data utilized in this chapter
move from the inside quotes to the entire limit order book from Jan 2008 to July
2014.
I demonstrate the different liquidity measurements are consistent over the term
structure of Eurodollar contracts. The contract liquidity of the initial three years
is relatively stable; however, as the contract moves close to maturity, the spreads
get narrower and more volatile among the five levels (the quoted depth become
deeper). Particularly within two-year tenor, spreads become much narrower in-
dicating greater market liquidity. Moreover, the results demonstrate level two
quotes provide the largest liquidity into the market with the highest depth.
Then, I generate the approximation of the proportion of high frequency algo-
rithmic trading for both the bid and ask sides with a set of thresholds from
25 milliseconds to 200 milliseconds. This chapter explores that the majority of
quotes under 200ms. For the proxy thresholded at 25 ms, the most frequently
proportion of algorithmic activities in this market is around 65%, which is con-
sistent with the official report from CME Group [2010]. It is worth mentioning
that the second level is the most rapidly and actively messaged among the entire
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order book.
Notes on Chapter 4
This chapter captures a non-linear relation between the fraction of high-speed al-
gorithmic trading and market quality via a novel partially linear semi-parametric
regression estimator. My empirical results show the similar pattern and are con-
sistent with the theoretical prediction. Overall, this chapter suggests that the
high-frequency algorithmic trading does have impacts on the market quality, and
thresholds (or saturation points) exist in terms of the impact of HFTs on the ex-
ecution risks. Specifically, when there is a small number of algorithmic traders in
the market, AT do have impacts on the execution risk and mainly in the market
liquidity. When the proportion of AT increases, the execution costs are primarily
from the price volatility. Once the AT proxy reaches a certain saturation point,
the marginal effect on execution risks seems to disappear. This finding may par-
tially explain the puzzle why prior studies have found the contradictory evidence
regarding the impact of HFTs on market characteristics.
Notes on Chapter 5
Chapter 5 evaluates the capacity of the high-frequency price formation and dis-
covery mechanism using the tick level limited order book data from 2008 to 2014.
This chapter tells you how efficient of prices incorporating information in the mar-
ket and how fast the Eurodollar future prices can adjust to the efficient prices.
In this chapter, I measure a broad range of quotes and trades autocorrelations at
first-order, fifth-order, and tenth-order at 26 timescales to capture the efficiency
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of the Eurodollar future prices. The findings demonstrate that the mid-quoted re-
turn autocorrelation are positive and gradually increase from the high-frequency
time-interval to the low-frequency time-interval. If I set 0.5 as the benchmark,
the mid-quote prices can adjust to the information within 15 milliseconds. The
shorter time interval is, the higher efficiency of mid-price adjustment is.
In addition, this chapter provides a new volume weighted average algorithm to
classify the trades directions and employs its indicators in the following analysis.
Because the traditional Lee-Ready algorithm lacks the accuracy dealing with tick
data at millisecond timestamps. So I develop this novel approach specific for the
microstructure studies utilizing order book data. This is another contribution of
this thesis.
I then utilize a vector autoregression to capture the pricing error proxy, as the
deviation of transaction prices from the efficient prices to illustrate the term
structure of these costs. The impulse response of trade returns also reports that all
the factors (the trade return, signed trade direction, signed trade volume, signed
square root of trade volume, and signed asks and bids market concentration ratio)
have the ability to affect the trade return at very short time intervals. The fastest
adjustment of trade returns is finished within 200 milliseconds from the shock to
itself. It is worth noting that the three-year tenor contract has the fastest trade
price formation process than one-year tenor and fifth-year tenor contracts.
This chapter also conducts a multivariate linear regression to capture the maturity
effects on the Eurodollar future price formation process. The results illustrate
that the distance to maturity can influence the price efficiency. In other words, as
the Eurodollar future approaches its maturity, the trade prices are less sensitive
when incorporating available information in the market.
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6.2 Future Research
There are still some limitations in this thesis, for instance the measurements
of high frequency trading. Although 25 ms interval is very fast, faster than
human reaction, it is still possible that some accidental orders submit by humans
located within this 25 milliseconds interval. So in the future work, I will consider
improving the measurements of AT proxy. Meanwhile, I will try to simulate the
Eurodollar market to see whether it is possible that a large amount of traders
could it create the false appearance of HFT.
Secondly, because of the unique IMM date of this future market, one of the fu-
ture work may look at the impact of trading activity on the term structure of
Eurodollar futures market. Especially after the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, trading
in OTC-IRS interest rate swaps has become more heavily regulated and there
has been a significant transfer of activity from the opaque OTC-IRS to using Eu-
rodollar strips to construct synthetic swaps. With the exploded trading activities
on the Eurodollar future market, it could be interesting to consider the changes
in trading activity around IMM dates with a distorting effect on the benchmark.
Thirdly, because I have the full limited order book, in future, I will try to identify
a set of malicious trading in the Eurodollar futures and assess its impacts on
market quality. For instance, the iceberg order or hidden order is the order only
report its prices but hidden parts of the quote volume.
One more thing is to extend the data period from middle of 2014 to the latest
available date. It is worth noting that the European central bank has set the
negative deposit rate in September 2014, which could have a significant impact
on the Eurodollar deposits and its future market. My current data span, from
1996 to July 2014, does not cover the period after negative rate. It could be
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interesting to dig a little deeper on the microstructure changes after the middle
of 2014.
Last but not least, two techniques have developed in this thesis, one is the trade
classification algorithmic to identify a buyer-initiated trade or seller-initiated
trade, the other is a non-parametric estimator to determine the influence of al-
gorithmic trading on the execution risks. So in future work, I will also focus on
the development of these two techniques and try to apply them into the market
microstructure research area.
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